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CHAPTER I
THE EVE OF WAR
In the years 1939 to 1941, Illinois stood poised to
undergo significant changes in its economic, political and
social landscape.

In 1939, the state was coming out of a

long depression.

Many of its citizens were out of work.

Many others, especially blacks, were employed in work relief
projects of the Works Progress Administration (WPA).

How-

ever, the state's mills and factories were increasing production as the threat and then the onset of war in Europe led
foreign governments and later the United States itself to
purchase military supplies.

Though many Illinoisans pro-

fited from the arms buildup, few wanted the nation to join
the conflict in 1939.

The Midwest was a citadel of isola-

tionism and the chief mouthpiece for non-intervention was
the Chicago Tribune.

Politically, the state was in the mid-

dle of a transition from vigorous competition by both parties for all offices to a bipartisan division of power between Democratic Chicago and the Republican downstate as the
Chicago Democratic machine and the Republicans in the city
and state reached an accommodation with each other.

One

source of the machine's strength was its alliance with the
Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

1

an

2

arrangement which provided jobs and money when both Chicago
and the city Democratic organization badly needed them.
In 1939, Illinois was a complex state with a heterogenous population. Chicago itself was ethnic, black, urban,
catholic, Jewish and increasingly Democratic.

In 1930, first

and second generation white immigrants comprised 64.3 percent
of the population.

Blacks made up another 6.9 percent.

Only

27.9 percent were native-born whites with native-born white
parents.

Most of these ethnics came increasingly to vote

Democratic.

Downstate Illinois, however, was largely white,

rural, small-town, Protestant, conservative and Republican.
Downstaters viewed the big city of Chicago as a place of
crime, corruption and sin, a place to visit but not to live.
For their part, Chicagoans looked upon downstaters as hicks.
Downstaters looked to the Republican party to uphold traditional small-town American values.

Ethnic and black Chica-

goans looked to the Democratic party to help them realize
their aspirations.

While downstate Republicans relied on

charity and private initiative to solve problems,

Chicago

Democrats looked to government for assistance. 1
During the thirties,

the Democratic machine gained

control of city government in Chicago.

During the twenties,

the Irish controlled the organization, but in 1928, Anton J.
Cermak organized a coalition of Bohemians, Poles, Jews and
other non-Irish along with a few dissident Irish, including
Edward J.

Kelly, Thomas J. Courtney and Patrick Nash,

and

3

ousted Michael Igoe and his Irish allies from control of the
local machine.

Cermak installed Nash as Cook County Demo-

cratic chairman.

The Depression and the prohibition issue

helped bring Democratic victories in the early thirties.

In

1931, Cermak defeated Republican Mayor William Hale Thompson,
who was running

for

reelection and

Horner was elected governor.

in 1932,

Judge Henry

At this point, Horner was a

loyal ally of the machine. 2
Ed Kelly started in Democratic politics while working
for the Chicago Sanitary District and in 1905 ran for trustee of the District,

but lost in a

Republican landslide.

The new Republican officials did not appreciate his campaigning at worksites.

While working on the North Shore Chan-

nel, he ended a dispute with the son of a local Republican
official by flattening him with a single punch.

When called

before Sanitary District President Robert Rutherford McCormick,

a

staunch Republican,

Kelly expected

to be

fired.

McCormick, however, admired his bravado and raised his salary.

Thus started a lifelong friendship between Kelly and

the aristocratic scion of the Chicago Tribune family.

Kelly

rose through the ranks at the District, eventually becoming
chief engineer in 1920.

His lack of formal training promp-

ted charges that he had gained his position due to his political connections and McCormick's friendship.

He also was

indicted with several others on various charges of political
corruption, but a friendly Democratic judge quashed the in-

4

dictments.

When the State's Attorney reassembled a case be-

fore a new grand jury, it reindicted everyone but Kelly, who
alone escaped unscathed.
Irish Democrats,

3

including Ed Kelly,

despised Mayor

cerrnak's leadership, but while others threatened rebellion,
Kelly remained silent.

Mayor Cermak supported Al Smith for

the presidency in 1932, and failed to jump on the Roosevelt
bandwagon at the Democratic convention until the tide swung
to Roosevelt on the fourth ballot.

In February, 1933, Cer-

mak went to Miami to make peace with the President-elect,
but was fatally wounded by an assassin. 4
Even before Cermak died on March 6, the struggle for
succession began.

On February 24, Democratic leaders dis-

cussed candidates, including Alderman Jacob Arvey.

However,

Nash thought a Jewish mayor and a Jewish governor,

Henry

Horner, would be rubbing it in for the Irish who were trying
to regain their traditional leadership in the party.

Arvey

and other Jews agreed and party leaders considered other
candidates, including Nash himself.
job, however,

and on March 8,

keep him as party leader,
Cermak as national
Council,

Nash did not want the

Democratic leaders voted to

and later chose him to succeed

committeeman.

On March 10,

after rejecting rival candidates,

the City

chose Alderman

Francis J. Corr as acting mayor. 5
Meanwhile, in Springfield, the General Assembly passed
legislation allowing the City Council to choose a mayor from

5

outside its own ranks.

On April 10, Nash suggested Ed Kelly.

other party leaders concurred and on April 14, the Council
elected

Kelly.

There

was

much

candidates and their friends,

bitterness

among

some of whom suspected that

colonel McCormick had assisted in Kelly's election,
to secure a

friendly

Democrat

McCormick did not resist.

rival

in City Hall.

hoping

Certainly,

6

The Depression hit Chicago at a time when it was already suffering financial difficulties.

Mayor Cermak, unab-

le to get more than limited relief from the state, turned to
the federal government.

By March,

1933,

Illinois had re-

ceived its statutory limit of $45 million in loans from the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
over,

When Mayor Kelly took

he used a variety of expedients to solve the more

pressing financial difficulties, but he too turned to Washington for assistance and got it.

New Deal agencies, espe-

cially the Works Progress Administration, provided financial
assistance and work relief projects to Chicago and other cities.

Chicago gained many civic improvements,

modernized
parkland,

airport,

the

State

Street

subway,

including a
additional

expressways and various street and sewerage im-

provements. 7
In addition to taking credit for such projects, Mayor
Kelly and other Chicago politicians took advantage of the
infusion of money and jobs to reward themselves and their
followers much as they later did during the war with the home

6

front war agencies.

From time to time,

the

local press

uncovered instances of extortion and other corrupt practices.
Though federal agencies made some changes to prevent such
abuses, they had to maintain constant vigilance to keep the
graft within

reasonable bounds.

Even

then,

despite

the

efforts of federal administrators to hire without regard to
political affiliation, many Kelly-Nash politicians told jobseekers that they could get jobs if they had the support of
the machine.

So, it was not unusual for Chicago Congressman

Arthur W. Mitchell to advise a constituent seeking a federal
job to first get a letter from his ward committeeman. 8
In practice, the machine did not have the influence
it claimed to have in securing jobs for supporters, but the
belief that it did brought additional votes for machine candidates, especially if machine supporters did get jobs.

It

also brought criticism from Republicans and independents,
who claimed that the success of the machine rested on the
captive votes of those on relief.

This, too, helped the ma-

chine since Republican criticism of relief participants as
parasites and WPA projects as costly boondoggles allowed the
Democrats to portray themselves as the friends of the common
people.

This won votes at the expense of the apparently

callous Republicans.

Mayor Kelly's support of the New Deal

was not solely based on political benefits.

He believed in

Roosevelt and the New Deal and was committed to helping the
underprivileged.

Though he never repudiated the tactics of

7

bossism, they gradually became less conspicuous under RooseThe alliance between the Democratic ma-

velt's influence.

chine and the Roosevelt Administration was not one-sided,
for the Administration relied on the machine to deliver Democratic votes in a region where it had many enemies. 9
one powerful opponent of the Administration was Mayor
Kelly's friend,

Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick,

owner

and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and leader of the Republican party in Illinois.

At first,

he was friendly to-

ward his old schoolmate, President Roosevelt, but soon broke
with him as the New Deal introduced extensive government regulation into the economy.

McCormick regarded this as fas-

cist or socialistic, and Tribune editorials often portrayed
New Dealers as communists.

McCormick blamed the Depression

on government spending and felt that budget cuts would bring
recovery.

Hence, the Tribune ferreted out and attacked waste

in New Deal agencies, while suppressing news favorable to the
Administration.

State and local Democratic officials also

came under attack, with the exception of Mayor Kelly. 10
Colonel McCormick also opposed the Administration's
increasingly interventionist foreign policy.

McCormick was

an isolationist, opposing American intervention outside the
Western Hemisphere.

He had no use for the Nazis, but felt

that Europe should settle its own problems without American
intervention.

Then too, he considered Russian communism to

be a far greater threat than German or Italian fascism, and

8

hence favored a pol icy of appeasement of the Germans and
Italians to ward off the Soviet Union.

After war broke out,

he did support England and France against Germany and Italy,
but still opposed American involvement.

McCormick also op-

posed American and European efforts to block Japanese expansion in the Far East.

He urged a buildup of American defen-

ses in the Pacific, but favored abandoning the Philippines
to the Japanese as not worth saving.

McCormick distrusted

the Europeans, especially since they did not pay their war
debts, and he disliked the English class system and English
. 1.ism. 11
socia

The Chicago Tribune was popular throughout much of
the Midwest.

During the thirties, about a third of its Sun-

day circulation went to cities outside the Chicago area.
1931,

In

83 percent of families in Champaign read the Sunday

Chicago Tribune.

The paper appealed to individualistic va-

lues of small-town free enterprise Americans in downstate
Illinois, who looked with disfavor at Chicago's cosmopolitanism, its heterogenous population and its wickedness.

In

Chicago, the Tribune was most popular in the wealthy neighborhoods, while others either read a different newspaper, or
as in the case of many ethnic neighborhoods, the foreignlanguage press.

While downstaters and many of the wealthier

Chicagoans tended to vote Republican, most other Chicagoans
became increasingly Democratic, especially after 1931.
though the Tribune continued to be popular,

Even

its editorial

9

stand earned it many enemies,
1939.

especially in Chicago after

12

one of the biggest accomplishments of the Kelly-Nash
machine was convincing Chicago's black community to shift
its political allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic party.

Mayor Cermak tried police raids on policy games

in black neighborhoods to force blacks to support Democrats.
Mayor Kelly dropped such tactics and allowed vice to flourish unchecked.

He also offered more patronage

jobs to

blacks than had the Republicans, and appointed blacks to high
positions in city government.
deal with its work projects.

The New Deal helped a good
In June, 1937, 53 percent of

the city's blacks were involved with New Deal work relief
projects. Kelly had to contend with segregationist policies
in the school board and national public housing agencies as
well as his white supporters.

Though this limited the suc-

cess of his policies, his support of integration in housing,
education and public accomodations generated support for the
machine in the black community. 13
During the thirties,
thened its hold on Chicago.

the Kelly-Nash machine strengMachine candidates won large

victories, often with a huge Cook County vote offsetting a
heavy Republican vote downstate.

Many Democratic voters were

relief recipients bearing cards identifying themselves as
illiterates who wished to vote a straight Democratic ticket.
Ward politicians distributed them, warning recipients to vote

10

Democratic or lose relief funds.

Such tactics angered some

officials in the Roosevelt Administration, but in 1935, the
president reluctantly endorsed the Mayor for reelection after
Jim Farley advised him that the Mayor had the nomination
locked up and that it would be foolish to oppose

him.

In

that election, the Republicans made a deal with the machine
and

put

up

a

weak

lackluster campaign.
fifty wards.
result.

candidate,

Emil

Wetten,

who

waged

a

Mayor Kelly won easily, carrying all

Massive vote

fraud

merely embellished the

Soon afterward, when the Roosevelt Administration

wanted the Illinois General Assembly to pass a tax increase
to pay for relief funds, Mayor Kelly helped to push a bill
through after Governor Horner was unable to do so.

This

increased the Mayor's prestige with the Roosevelt Administration at the expense of the Governor. 14
Mayor Kelly and Governor Horner did not get along
well.

Kelly felt that Horner should take orders from the

machine on matters of patronage, while the Governor insisted
on maintaining his independence.

In 1935, the Mayor broke

with the Governor after Horner refused to appoint a friend
of the mayor to a state commission and vetoed a controversial bill sponsored by the machine to license and tax gambling in Chicago.

Kelly slated Dr. Herman Bundesen, the ci-

ty• s health commissioner, for governor, and John Stelle, of
McLeansboro,

for lieutenant-governor.

The President tried

to persuade Horner to drop out of the race, but he refused.

11
Instead, he struck back,
state

jobs.

firing Kelly-Nash supporters from

Campaigning

against

Kelly

and

bossism,

he

soundly defeated Bundesen and went on to win easily in the
Democratic landslide of 1936.

Following the election, Hor-

ner gathered a team of politicians allied with him against
Kelly,

including

Courtney.

Cook

In 1938,

County State's Attorney

Thomas

their candidate for the Senate,

J.

Con-

gressman Scott Lucas, defeated Mayor Kelly's choice and went
on to win in November despite growing hostility toward President Roosevelt in isolationist Illinois as international
tensions worsened.

During the campaign, Mayor Kelly, at the

insistence of his allies,

finally made peace with Governor

Horner to preserve party harmony.

However, the Mayor ulti-

mately decided that he wanted no more Democratic governors,
and after Horner's death in the fall of 1940, Kelly worked
to defeat the Democratic gubernatorial candidate.

Eventual-

ly, he formed a working relationship with the Republicans in
Springfield. 15
During the thirties, the Army and Navy Munitions Board
revised its industrial mobilization plan several times.

In

August, 1939, the War Department established the War Resources

Board,

headed

Stettinius, Jr.

by

steel

company

executive

Edward

J.

The Board only lasted a short time, but did

make recommendations.

In May, 1940, the President appointed

an advisory commission to the Council of National Defense.
Actually, the Council, an old World War I agency,

remained

12
dormant while the Advisory Council advised the President and
gradually began

to coordinate the defense

effort.

Each

advisor on the Commission represented a different aspect of
the defense program and each built up a small staff, which
eventually formed the basis for war agencies established
later.
the

Its Industrial Production Division eventually became

Office

of

Production

Management,

which

replaced in 1942 by the War Production Board.

itself

was

These produc-

tion agencies steadily assumed a more active role in supervising

and

industrial

coordinating
resources

the

from

conversion

the

of

the

nation's

manufacture

of

civilian

products such as railway equipment and farm implements to
production of tanks, artillery and other military supplies.
Eventually,

war

brought

government

involvement

in

every

aspect of the economy on an unprecedented scale. 16
Defense production began as early as 1938 when some
Illinois

firms

received educational

orders

from military

procurement agencies. These orders were designed to test the
ability of private companies to adapt themselves overnight
to production of war supplies.

In 1939, the outbreak of war

in Europe brought an influx of orders for military supplies
from

the

Allies,

especially

Britain,

and

in

American armed forces increased their purchases.

1940,

the

During the

years 1939 to 1941, much of Illinois industry converted from
civilian to defense production with some assistance from the
nation defense production agencies and from Governor Dwight

13
Green and Mayor Kelly, who sought defense contracts for state
•

industries.

17

conversion to defense production brought some shortages of civilian goods at a time when consumers were eager to
buy.

Prices rose rapidly, spurring demands by labor for in-

creased wages, which in turn led to further price hikes.

To

stem the resultant inflation, the National Defense Advisory
commission adopted informal voluntary price controls.

In

April, 1941, its price stabilization section became the Office

of

Price

Stabilization

and

Civilian

Supply,

later

changed to the Office of Price Administration when civilian
supply was shifted to the Office of Production Management.
Controls remained voluntary at first, and were restricted to
industrial prices.

In 1942,

however,

the agency adopted

mandatory controls and extended them to the retail level as
it sought to keep prices at a reasonable level.

Rationing

was utilized to allocate food and scarce consumer goods on
an equitable basis.

Even so, demand outstripped supply and

black markets developed.

Ultimately, despite protests from

farmers and labor, farm prices and wages were also restricted in effort to hold down inflation. 18
A major reason for the difficulty in holding down inflation was farm prices.

Illinois agriculture was in a de-

pression throughout the twenties and thirties and prices declined.

Farmers responded by seeking parity prices for crops

to give them the same purchasing power that they had between

14
19 10 and 1914. The Roosevelt Administration championed their
cause and tried various means of getting farm prices up to
parity during the depression

of the thirties.

New Deal

agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration
(AAA) and the Soil Conservation Service worked to restrict
farm production through payments to farmers for not planting
all of their cropland.

In 1939, price adjustment payments

were made to offset low market prices.

Gradually,

farm

prices, which had bottomed out at 63 percent of parity in
1932, rose to 79 percent of parity by 1939.

Because of their

experience with low prices and heavy crop carryover during
the twenties and thirties, farmers and New Deal agricultural
agencies were slow to adjust to the increased demand for food
following

the

outbreak

of

war

in

Europe,

fearing

that

overproduction would bring large surpluses and low prices.
In 1941, the Department of Agriculture established special
price supports on hogs and other commodities to stimulate
production.

Later, the Department also established agricul-

tural war boards at the local level to promote increased
planting.

However, there was no agricultural defense agency

until the War Food Administration was established in 1943.
Instead, existing agencies simply handled new tasks.

Even

then, farmers, farm organizations and agricultural agencies
resisted

efforts

to

subject

farm

commodities

to

price

controls and indeed forced the Off ice of Price Administration
to accept a ceiling on farm prices of 110 percent of parity

15

. e 19
for a t im •
Though agriculture in Illinois was highly diversified,
corn was the chief crop.

Corn was fed to hogs and other

livestock,

or sold to refineries for use in a variety of

products.

Wheat was another major crop,

but surpluses in

the early forties led to a substantial reduction in wheat
planting in 1942.

Soybeans were becoming an important crop.

By the eve of war, soybean planting was one-fourth that of
corn.

Soybeans were sent to processors like A.

Company in Decatur,
region,

E. Staley

the soybean processing capital of the

to be crushed and converted to vegetable oils and

animal feed.

Many farmers raised livestock, usually hogs,

though cattle were a

significant crop.

Mechanization of

farms was checked somewhat in the early thirties, but revived in the late thirties as farmers reequipped their farms.
In 1920, Illinois farmers owned 23,102 tractors.
they had 126, 067,

and in 1940 and 1941,

purchases of additional implements.

By 1940,

they made record

Illinois also led other

states in the use of limestone to sweeten the soil. 20
Many Illinois farms lacked the amenities of urban life
on the eve of the war.

Running water was often a luxury.

Outhouses served sanitary needs.

Most farms in the northern

counties had electricity due to pioneering efforts by public
utilities in that area in extending electricity to farms and
rural homes.

In the central and southern counties, it was a

different story.

Public utility companies were reluctant to

16
extend electric lines into rural areas for fear that they
would be unprofitable.

In 1935, the Rural Electrification

Administration was established to offer low-interest loans to
cooperatives for extension of power lines to rural areas.
still, during the war, only about half of Illinois farms had
any electricity and even fewer were fully electrified. The
situation was worst in the southern counties where only about
10 percent of farms had electricity.

Indeed, many farms in

the southern counties were small subsistence farms,
owners barely eked out a living.

whose

Still, many Illinois farms

did have radios and telephones and farmers drove automobiles
to town on new hard roads. 21
Many farmers were owners or part-owners, but others,
including some large-scale commercial farmers, were tenants.
By 1940, ownership was gaining over tenancy.

In 1935, there

were 86,862 full owners, 39,698 part owners (who owned part
of their land and rented the rest) and 102,856 tenants.

By

1940, there were 87,004 full owners, 32,826 part-owners and
91,982 tenants.

This trend continued during the war.

number of farms was also declining.
237,181 farms.

In 1920,

In 1940, there were only 213,439.

there were
Of these,

105,857 were medium-sized farms of 50 to 180 acres.
values fell during the twenties,

Land

but bottomed out in the

early thirties and rose somewhat by 1940.
they were to rise sharply.

The

During the war,

Many farmers were members of the

Illinois Agricultural Association,

the state affiliate of

17
the American Farm Bureau and the largest and wealthiest state
farm organization in the country.

In 1941, 33.8 percent of

Illinois farmers belonged to the organization.
included

large

and

small

farmers

and

tenants

Membership
as

well.

However, by and large, the organization served the interests
of the successful commercial farmer and was apathetic toward
disadvantaged farmers.

The Illinois Agricultural Association

was a staunch supporter of New Deal programs.

In 1934, when

only 36 percent of Illinois farms of under 100 acres were
under the AAA program, 71 percent of those ranging from 260
to 500 acres were under it. 22
Many farmers sent their children to one-room schools
staffed by poorly-paid and poorly-trained teachers, who had
only a few students to teach.

The schools themselves often

lacked water or even outhouses and the educational quality
was inferior to that of city schools.

Though the number of

one-room schools was slowly declining in the early forties,
there were still over 12,000 school districts in Illinois in
1942, of which about 10,000 were one-room schools.

Illinois

had more one-room schools than any other state in the country. 23
Farm workers were plentiful on the eve of war.

Many

were young men from nearby farms, who could not be employed
profitably at home.

They worked on other farms, gained ex-

perience, saved up a little money and bought their own farms
or went into non-farm work.

Other hired hands were permanent

18

farm laborers.

Wages were low.

In April, 1939, the average

monthly wage for an Illinois farm laborer was $32.25 with
room and board and $43.25 without it.

Living quarters for

hired hands and tenants were often undesirable.

As late as

April, 1942, hired hands in Jo Daviess County often lived in
houses lacking running water and electricity.
were migrant workers following seasonal crops.

There also
In 1941,

seasonal workers in Southern Illinois lived in tents or slept
in sheds on the farms while harvesting fruits and vegetables.
Pay ranged from $1.20 to $1.60 for a 10-hour day.
soon to change as the draft and defense
farm laborers.

This was

plants drained off

By the summer of 1941, many farmers around

the state had a

difficult time securing hired hands and

migrant workers.~
Illinois has long been a

major crossroads for the

transportation arteries of the nation.

Within the state,

several cities, especially Chicago, were long-standing points
for transhipment and interchange of people and cargoes and
junctions between carriers serving different parts of the
country.

On the eve of the Second World War, the railroads

dominated common-carrier transportation,

handling over

60

percent of all freight and carrying over 64 percent of all
passengers traveling on public carriers.

Illinois had 11,949

miles of line, more than any state in the Union except Texas.
Chicago, which was served by twenty-two trunk-line railroads
and several terminal

roads,

was the hub of the national
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railway system.

East St.

Louis,

Peoria and several other

Illinois cities were also important railway terminals with
.
b e t ween numerous carriers.
.
25
connections

The railroads greeted the outbreak of war in Europe
with some trepidation.

During the First World War, a series

of blunders by both the companies and the government led to
government takeover and operation of the railways.

It was a

costly experience which neither party wished to repeat.

One

of its legacies was an agreement between the government and
the railroad brotherhoods on work-rules.

The carriers soon

embarked on a lengthy battle with the unions to change these
work-rules,

which were out-dated,

inefficient and costly.

During the twenties, the railroads invested heavily in new
equipment only to find themselves saddled with excess capacity when the Depression hit in the thirties.

Traffic fell

off and many railroads entered receivership.

Although the

outbreak of war in 1939 brought increased traffic, the carriers were reluctant to purchase new rolling stock except to
replace existing equipment lest they be stuck with excess
capacity after the war.

This

reluctance

led to

serious

equipment shortages during the war. 26
By the end of the thirties, railroads faced serious
competition from other means of transportation,
the automobile.

In 1922,

automobile passenger-miles were

one-fourth that of passenger trains.
was reversed,

and by 1940,

especially

By 1927,

the figure

only 8.71 intercity passengers
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went by rail, though trains did carry most of those who did
not go by car.

The automobile emptied locals and made seri-

ous inroads on long-distance travel.
increased so that by 1940,

Bus competition also

almost 30 percent of travelers

using common carriers went by bus.

Auto and bus travelers

benefitted from steadily increasing government investment in
highways.

In 1916, in response to demands by motorists for

good roads,
program.

Congress established the first federal highway

By the twenties, every state was building new roads

with federal matching funds.
miles of paved hard

roads,

By 1940, Illinois had 14,000
which were

soon crowded with

automobiles, buses and trucks. 27
Airlines also captured a small but growing portion of
intercity passenger traffic,
vel.

especially long-distance tra-

In 1940, airlines carried 2.7 percent of all passengers

traveling on common-carriers.
1941.
the

Illinois had 54 airports in

The first ones were mainly private ventures, but in

thirties,

the

Civil

Works

Administration,

the

Works

Progress Administration and the Illinois Emergency Relief
Commission financed municipal airport projects in Chicago,
Bloomington, Danville, Springfield, Peoria and other cities.
Chicago built its Municipal Airport, now Midway Airport, on
the city's Southwest Side.

In 1941,

the airport was im-

proved and enlarged after a railroad line running through it
was relocated.

At the same time, with air traffic outgrow-

ing the airport, Chicagoans sought a site for another air-
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field.

Many, including Merrill C. Meigs, a newspaper publ

sher and aviation advocate, urged a lakefront airport since
it would give Chicago air facilities close to the city's
business district.

There also was some discussion of a site

on the city's Southeast Side in the Lake Calumet District.
ultimately, the city had to wait until after the war to fulfill its dreams.

Meanwhile, eight major airlines served the

city, including United Air Lines, which maintained its central offices in a new building at the airport. 28
Railroads responded to the loss of passenger traffic
to the auto,

the bus and the airplane by introducing new

streamlined passenger trains in the mid-thirties.

Streamli-

ners recaptured much lost passenger traffic with their speed
and modernity.

Railroads added more every year until after

Pearl Harbor.

Most were pulled by diesel-electric locomo-

tives.

Some railroads

twenties

for switching,

experimented with diesels
but

it was

in

in the thirties

the
that

railroads started ordering diesels in ever-larger numbers
for passenger service,

switching and finally in the early

forties, for line-haul freight service.

Though they conti-

nued to buy steam locomotives, by 1939, railroads bought more
diesels than steamers.~
As with passenger service, railroads faced increasing
competition in freight traffic.

In the late twenties, rail-

roads handled 75 percent of all freight.

In 1940, they still

carried almost 62 percent, but trucks handled over 8 percent,
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waterways almost 20 percent and pipelines over 10 percent.
The number of trucks on the road grew rapidly in the twenties
and by the end of the decade carried almost 4 percent of
total intercity freight ton-mileage, most of it light loads
moving short distances.

During the thirties, truck transport

expanded rapidly as unemployed truck drivers bought their own
trucks

on

credit

in

order to

establish

intercity trucking businesses.

their

own

Though many soon

others arose to take their place.

small

folded,

Trucking was unregulated

until 1935 and like the automobile and the bus, benefitted
from new highways reaching all parts of every state. 30
Shortly before the turn of the century, the City of
Chicago built the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, mainly to
improve drainage and sanitation.
was useful for transportation.

However,

the canal also

In 1908, Illinois initiated

improvements to the Illinois and Des Plaines Rivers and the
Chicago waterways.

When completed in 1933,

the resulting

Illinois Waterway connected Lake Michigan with the Mississippi River.

Chicago also straightened a portion of the

Chicago River during the twenties.
relieve pressure on the railroads,

In 1918,

in order to

the federal government

created a division of Inland Waterways in the United states
Railway Administration, which oversaw the government operation of the railways.
its

barges

after the

The Division continued operation of
railroads

were

returned

to

private

hands in 1920, and in 1924, Congress created the Inland Wa-
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terways corporation to operate the Federal Barge Lines.

By

the late thirties, about 500 private operators were on the
waterways.

During the twenties and thirties, the government

also built a series of locks and darns on the Mississippi and
Ohio Rivers to improve navigation on those waterways.
traffic rose rapidly due to cheap rates.

Water

Tonnage on the Il-

linois waterway went from half a million in 1934 to 7 million in 1940.

Barges carried coal, grain, sulphur, sugar,

oil, scrap iron, sand and gravel, and other bulk products.
Great Lakes traffic also increased in the late thirties and
early forties as a recovering economy and the defense boom
brought big gains in lake movements of coal, iron ore, grain
.
t one. 31
and 1 irnes

All carriers, rail, highway, air and water, were cornpetitors in 1940.

Wartime conditions were to force them in-

to a temporary cooperation and retard the shift in traffic
from some carriers to others.

However, the general direction

of these trends was already set and they would resume in the
postwar years.
The labor movement in Illinois was also changing on
the eve of the Second World War.

In 1930, most of Illinois

labor was unorganized and many companies were militantly anti-union.

The Fox River Valley Manufacturers Association

maintained a blacklist for many years.

Some companies, such

as International Harvester, established company unions, which
they dominated in an effort to stave off outside organizers.

24
company unions did provide some benefits for their members,
but generally failed to engage in real collective bargaining.
They were outlawed by the Wagner Act of 1935 and after the
supreme court upheld the law's constitutionality in 1937,
most company unions were gradually dismantled,

The American

did not end efforts to avoid unionization.
Federation

of

Labor

(AFL)

and

its

Illinois State Federation of Labor
ganized labor in Illinois.

state

though this

affiliate,

(ISFL),

the

dominated or-

The latter was hard hit by the

Depression as its membership dropped from 189,000 in 1927 to
about 76,000 in 1933, though it rebounded to 237,000 by 1941.
In 1933 and

Most AFL unions were based on specific crafts.

1934, the Federation tried to organize new locals in various
industries, but with little success, partly because of its
insistence that workers

join craft unions.

wanted industrial unions.
tions,

led by John L.

urged that

Many workers

Although some member organiza-

Lewis and his United Mine Workers,

the AFL organize new unions

on an

industrial

basis, the more conservative craft unions objected to this.
The United Mine Workers and others soon bolted the Federation
and set up the Congress of Industrial Organizations and set
out to organize the unorganized industries on an industrial
basis. 32
One of the first targets was the steel industry.

The

United Mine Workers helped establish the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, which set out in 1936 to conquer the mills.
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The new union had limited success that year, but early in
1937 , the united states Steel corporation gave in without a
However, several
other victories soon followed.
fight.
smaller "Little steel"

producers,

led by Republic Steel,

organized to fight the Steel Workers union.

On Memorial Day,

19 37, Chicago police fired on a crowd of strikers and their
families, killing ten and wounding others.
beat the union temporarily.

"Little Steel"

However, within a few years, the

union resumed its organizing activity under more favorable
circumstances during the defense boom of 1940-1941.
heavy defense business,

the companies were

in

With the

less of a

position to resist unionization. 33
In the late thirties, the Farm Equipment Workers Organizing committee, an offshoot of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, set out to organize the farm equipment industry.

It faced a

formidable obstacle in International

Harvester, which set up a company union in 1919 in a successful effort to avert unionization by the American Federation of Labor.

The company union, the Harvester Industrial

Council, had a Works council in each plant.

Management do-

minated each local, though they did have employee representatives.

The company managed to fight organization by AFL

unions for some time.

In 1937, the Farm Equipment Workers

union gained control of the Works council at the Tractor
Works in Chicago.
at the plant.

A year later, the union won recognition

One of the Works Council employee representa-
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tives who joined the new union was Gerald Fielde,

later to

become one of the most talented leaders of the union.

Mean-

while, following a Supreme Court decision outlawing company
unions, International Harvester replaced its Works Councils
with independent unions in each plant,

each with the old

works council leadership, many of whom were soon promoted to
managerial positions.

There were no elections.

The company

simply signed contracts with the locals after they were organized.

The Farm Equipment Workers union protested to the

National Labor Relations Board that the independents were
company unions.
in February,

After investigation, the Board agreed and

1941,

ordered their disestablishment.

This

paved the way for a drive to unionize International Harvester.

During the late thirties, the Farm Equipment Workers

union and others also complained to the National Labor Relations Board about John Deere and Company's reliance on an
individual

contract with each worker.

The contract con-

tained a clause forbidding the employee to join in a concerted action to change wages, hours or other conditions of the
contract.

Though the Board forbade the company to enforce

the clause, unions generally had only limited success in organizing John Deere in the late thirties.

Though a Pattern-

makers union affiliated with the AFL won contracts at some
Moline plants in 1939, unions scored no major gains at John
Deere until 1942 and 1943.~
The Congress of Industrial Organizations grew rapidly
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in the thirties as it organized industrial unions in meat
·
electrical equipment and other industries.
packing,

At that

time, it allowed competition between member unions in organizing companies.

This eventually led to a bitter feud be-

tween the Farm Equipment Workers union and the United Auto
workers, which wished to organize the farm equipment industry itself.

Ultimately, the latter union triumphed in the

postwar world and the Farm Equipment Workers union folded. 35
During the thirties, Illinois was also the scene of a
battle within the United Mine Workers union, which led to
secession of many Illinois members and formation of a rival
union.

John L.

Lewis ruled his union with an iron hand.

His dictatorial policies and interference in union politics
and wage

disputes

in

Illinois

led

dissidents

to

form

a

schismatic group, the Reorganized United Mine Workers of Illinois, in March, 1930, claiming that they were rescuing the
union from Lewis.
out

among

The movement faltered as its leaders fell

themselves.

The

original

leadership

selfless and incorruptable union officials,

included

but they soon

deserted the movement when the membership demanded acceptance of several
leaders.

locally popular but notoriously corrupt

Some of these leaders accepted Communist support,

thus allowing Lewis to engage in red-baiting, though he himself had no scruples about hiring leftists if it suited his
purpose.

Lewis took the opportunity to strengthen his hold

on his union's District 12, which controlled the Illinois
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coalfields.

Violence broke out as Lewis supporters engaged

in gun battles with dissidents.

In March,

1931, the move-

ment collapsed after a local court ruled that the Lewis faction was the legal union and that the rival faction had to
disband.

Although it soon did, Lewis provoked a second and

more successful

revolt when he forced

accept a wage cut in August, 1932.

Illinois miners to

They responded by for-

ming the Progressive Mine Workers of America.

Lewis ended

up with the shell of a union in Illinois as most miners deserted to the Progressives.

The new union encountered dif-

ficulties in securing recognition.

Bitter civil war broke

out as the two unions dueled over jurisdiction of the miners.

Scores lost their lives in bombings of homes and other

violence.

In 1938, after the United Mine Workers left the

American Federation of Labor,

the Progressives obtained a

Federation charter, only to withdraw in 1946 when the United Mine Workers rejoined for a short time.

They would not

remain in the same organization with John L. Lewis, though
they sometimes participated in strikes called by the United
Mine Workers. 36
The increase in business for Illinois firms following
the outbreak of war in Europe created new job opportunities
for many on relief.

Unemployment, which hit 1,215,000 in

1932, over 42 percent of the state's work force, declined to
511,000 by 1937, then rose to 892,000 in 1938, then dropped
to 251,000 by the end of 1941.

By December, 1940, the Works
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progress Administration was employing mostly older men, who
had difficulty finding jobs in the new
Most were untrained and unskilled,
skilled,

younger men.

Within a

defense industries.

while

industry sought

few years,

however,

companies would be glad to hire even the unskilled.

most

In some

cases, new defense industries led to the rise of boomtowns
such as Wilmington, a Northern Illinois community, which was
crowded with workers employed at the nearby ordnance plants.
Elwood, another nearby town doubled its population by May,
1941.
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Due to pervasive discrimination, blacks were slower
to benefit from the reviving economy.

Many employers refused

to hire blacks at all or restricted them to service positions.

Some

unions,

all

of

them

either

independent

or

affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, discriminated against blacks, either by banning them outright or by
segregating them in auxiliary locals,
job opportunities.
in 1939 to

which limited their

A commission appointed by Governor Horner

investigate the condition of urban blacks

in

Illinois found extensive discrimination by defense industries
and unions.

In 1941, the commission sent a questionnaire on

black employment to 473 firms holding defense contracts.
the

146

who

replied,

95

employed

remainder employed very few.
to

hire

blacks,

opposition.

while

no

blacks,

while

Of
the

Some companies simply refused

others

cited

There were exceptions.

union

or

community

International Harvester
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employed hundreds of blacks, many in skilled positions.
did Chicago meat packers.

So

However, a Chicago military truck

plant employed only a single black janitor, while a Peoria
tractor plant employed no blacks among its 12,000 workers.
Even blacks trained in defense work had difficulty getting
Many were rejected in favor of whites with lower

jobs.
grades.

Often, blacks were instructors in training classes

for jobs which they could not get simply because of racial
barriers.

Some employers also restricted hiring to Gentiles.

All of this was soon to change as the draft and resultant
labor shortages forced employers to hire blacks and other
.
' t 1es.
'
38
minor1

In 1940, there were 854,276 women in the state's labor
Most

force.

were

in

poorly-paid

industries and industrial jobs.
work outside the home.
ried women.

off ice

work,

service

Many other women did not

Some employers refused to hire mar-

The school board in Rockford required woman

teachers to retire at the end of the semester in which they
married.

Other employers were reluctant to hire women for

traditionally male jobs.

The defense boom brought women in-

to defense industries luring them away from jobs as domestics,

though even then comparatively few women were hired

because employers had large pools of unemployed men to draw
upon.

Not until 1942 was there a big increase in employment

of women in defense industries. 39
On the eve of the Second World War, Illinois was al-
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ready undergoing some changes in its political and economic
A resurgent Republican party was engaged in its ul-

fabric.

campaign

timately successful

to

recapture

the

statehouse

while the Chicago Democratic machine was strengthening its
hold on the city.

Much of the machine's support came from

working-class ethnics and blacks who were seeking a larger
share of the city's resources.

Many workers were organizing

themselves into unions to secure better wages and working
conditions in the state's industries which were emerging from
a

severe

Depression.

Other

employed or underemployed.

workers,

however,

were

un-

Farm workers were plentiful and

farmers themselves restricted production in the hope of securing higher farm prices.

At the same time,

they were

mechanizing their farms to improve their efficiency and increase profits.
Many of these trends continued during the war and some
were actually strengthened by it.

The division of political

power between Democratic Chicago and Republican downstate
eventually led to a measure of bipartisan cooperation in the
General Assembly.
emergency,

Throughout the defense buildup and the war

all levels of government cooperated in civilian

defense

and

in

efforts

state's

manufacturers.

to

secure war

Expansion

of

contracts

for

the

industry

relieved

unemployment and strengthened the hands of union organizers
since the heavy defense business made companies reluctant to
fire skilled workers for union activity.

Eventually, many
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firms had to accept unionization.
other changes were somewhat retarded by the war, only
to resume soon after the war, often at an accelerated pace.
Farmers could not obtain new agricultural implements during
the war and railroads were forced to curtail dieselization.
More significantly,

the war delayed but did not stop the

shift of most common carrier passenger travel and much intercity freight traffic

from railroads to other forms

of

transportation.
The war also stimulated new currents which ultimately
resulted in profound social changes.

In 1939, most married

women stayed home and tended to household duties.

Those who

did work were usually employed at low-paying jobs in clerical and service industries.

Blacks were largely confined to

low-paid menial and unpleasant occupations.
work relief projects.

Many were on

Trade unions often barred them or

segregated them into auxiliary locals controlled by white
locals.

The war, however, created new employment opportuni-

ties for women, blacks and other minorities and ultimately
raised their status in society.
Illinois on the eve of war was strongly isolationist,
somewhat provincial and divided in its political allegiance
and its reaction to New Deal farm, labor and relief policies.
The war that broke out in Europe ultimately led to significant changes in the state's political and economic life and
left a different world in the postwar era.
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CHAPTER II
ILLINOIS POLITICS IN WARTIME
Illinois politics during the late thirties and forties blended concerns over national domestic and

foreign

policy issues with those of state and local interest.

The

Chicago Democratic machine established close ties with the
Administration of President Frankl in Delano Roosevelt and
supported its domestic and foreign policies, while Illinois
Republicans fought these same policies and the Democratic
machine as well.

In addition, a long-standing rivalry be-

tween the city of Chicago and downstate

Illinois

led to

friction within the Democratic party as Governor Henry Horner arose as a political rival to Chicago Mayor Edward Joseph Kelly.

This split within the Democratic party eventu-

ally benefitted

Illinois

Republicans,

who

capitalized

on

voter discontent with the New Deal, scandals in the Horner
Administration, machine politics in Chicago and the Roosevelt
Administration's foreign policy to regain control of state
government.

This brought a new division of political power

between Democratic Chicago and Republican downstate with some
assistance from Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, archconservati ve owner of the powerful Chicago Tribune and a good
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friend of Mayor Kelly.

Illinois Republican politics began to

shift during the forties from the isolationism of Colonel
McCormick to the

internationalism of Colonel

owner of the Chicago Daily News.

Frank Knox,

Though Governor

Dwight

Green steered a middle course, some of his allies associated
themselves with the movement.

The Old Guard continued to

dominate the party, but with decreasing electoral success.
This led to bipartisan cooperation between Governor Green and
Mayor Kelly in 1945.
In 1939, Illinois politics was dominated by the Democrats who controlled the statehouse as well as the City of
Chicago.

In Chicago, the Democratic organization maintained

an alliance with the Roosevelt Administration, helping to get
out the vote on election day.

The Administration, in turn

allocated funds and work relief projects for the city.

These

projects resulted in many civic improvements for the city and
provided jobs for machine supporters and its constiuents at
a time when jobs were scarce.
Governor Horner,

once a

However, during the thirties,

loyal

supporter

of

the machine,

became a political rival to Mayor Kelly when he refused to
obey the dictates of the machine on patronage and vetoed
legislation supported by the machine to allow gambling in
Chicago.

After Kelly failed in an attempt to unseat Horner

in 1936, the Governor gathered a team of politicians allied
with

him

against

Kelly,

Attorney Thomas J. Courtney.

including

Cook

County

State's

During the 1938 campaign, Mayor
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Kelly,

at the insistence of his allies,
with

peace

Governor

Horner

to

finally made his

preserve

party

harmony.

aowever, some of Horner's allies continued to oppose Kelly
and backed State's Attorney Courtney

for

mayor

in

1939.

courtney, who portrayed himself as a crime-fighting reformer,

campaigned against machine politics and boss rule and

accused the machine of protecting criminals.

Horner was in

seclusion in Florida recovering from a serious illness and
took no part in the campaign.

His aides and allies were

divided, with some supporting Courtney and others, including
Lieutenant Governor John Stelle,

backing Kelly.

In the

end, Kelly beat Courtney by a substantial margin. 1
Mayor Kelly faced a formidable Republican opponent in
Dwight H. Green, a successful attorney who had assisted in
the prosecution of Alphonse Capone and Samuel Insull.

In

1938, local Republican leaders approached Green and persuaded him to run for mayor.
to elect a

Illinois Republicans believed that

Republican president,

the party would have to

carry Illinois, and to do this, they would have to destroy
the Democratic machine.
mayor,

If they could elect a Republican

they stood a good chance of electing a Republican

president.

Green campaigned against the Kelly-Nash machine,

accusing it of political domination of municipal services.
He also charged that it was allied with the Capone gang and
promised, if elected, to destroy the political influence of
criminal elements in city Hall.

There was a good deal of
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Gambling flourished

truth to his charges.

in Chicago as

police looked the other way and the underworld made payoffs
to the machine.

Each ward committeeman was in charge of

supervising gambling revenue in his ward.
the issue of foreign policy, promising,

Green also raised
if elected, to aid

the Republican party in its policy of keeping the country out
In the end, Green lost to Mayor

of foreign entanglements.

Kelly by about 183, 000 votes,

but this was

still

a

much

better showing than in 1935, and the party saw prospects for
further victories in 1940. 2
Illinois Democrats soon made things easier by providing them with an issue.

In the spring of 1939, committees

in the Illinois General Assembly found considerable evidence
of graft and minor corruption in the Horner Administration.
Though Democrats managed to stop the
issue would not die.

investigations,

the

A new crisis arose over a Democratic

campaign slush fund to which state employees and contractors
doing business with the state had to contribute.

Director of

Public Works F. Lyndon Smith was in charge of the fund, but
in the

fall of 1939,

State Finance Director Sam Nudelman

demanded more control over the fund.
Horner's favor.

Both contended for

When Smith lost out, he became emotionally

unbalanced and in February, 1940, went on a long vacation in
Florida, allowing Nudelman to take control of the slush fund
and state jobs.

Later that month, a state policeman filed

suit in a Sangamon County circuit court demanding an account-
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.

The court ordered Smith to appear and

of the fund.

in9

deliver such an accounting.

Smith returned to Springfield,

burned his papers, and after an unsuccessful suicide attempt,
was admitted to a hospital for observation and treatment.
March 9, the day he was to appear in court, he
suicide.

On

committed

His death intensified demands for an investigation

of the fund, and on April 30, when the General Assembly met
in a special session, it appointed a committee to investigate
the fund and other abuses by officials of the Horner Administration.

Although many records of the slush fund were

missing, the committee did uncover evidence of other corrupt
practices, all of which provided ammunition in the political
campaign which was underway. 3
At first,

Governor Horner wanted to run for reelec-

tion, but his poor health forced him to withdraw from the
race.

In February, 1940, Mayor Kelly and some of his allies

met with some of the Governor's aides to determine possible
candidates.
not

even

Kelly wanted Stelle for governor, but Horner did

want

him

for

lieutenant-governor,

fearing

that

Stelle would plunder the state if he ever became governor.
The conferees finally chose State Democratic Chairman Harry
Hershey for governor and slated Lieutenant-Governor Stelle
and Senator James Slattery for reelection.

Stelle, however,

broke with the harmony slate and ran for governor himself
with his own slate of candidates.

He also charged that Hor-

ner was too sick to run the state and was letting his aides
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perform his duties.

At one point, Stelle stormed into the

Governor's office and declared himself governor in a vain
He was ignored by secretaries and

attempt to seize power.
ridiculed by Horner.

Soon afterward, he and his allies were

swamped by the Kelly-Nash-Horner forces in the primary. 4
Illinois Republicans looked forward to the 1940 campaign with great expectations.

Dwight Green's strong show-

ing in the 1939 Chicago mayoral election suggested that Illinois was swinging back to the Republican party.
the primary campaign,

During

the candidates mixed concerns over

machine politics and scandals in the Horner Administration
with hostility to the New Deal, the Roosevelt Administration' s

interventionist foreign policy and the President's

own quest for an unprecedented third term.

Green himself

won the nomination for governor, while C. Wayland Brooks, a
protege of Colonel McCormick and a perennial candidate for
office during the thirties, won the nomination for senator. 5
Illinois Republicans fought vigorously to influence
the party platform on defense and foreign policy.
Springfield in mid-June,

Meeting in

they drafted a platform urging a

strong defense effort, but opposing intervention in foreign
wars.

There were some interventionists led by Colonel Frank

Knox, owner of the Chicago Daily News and former vice-presidential candidate in 1936.
plank,

They opposed the foreign policy

arguing that Illinois was not isolationist.

county leaders

noted that

rigid

isolationism was

Some
not

so
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popular and there was growing support for aid to the allies.
soon afterward,

President Roosevelt appointed Colonel Knox

secretary of the navy,
April, 1944.

a post he held until his death in

Illinois Republicans carried their anti-inter-

vention campaign to the national convention later in June.
colonel McCormick appeared before

the

platform committee

urging a plank opposing a peacetime draft, while his friend,
c. Wayland Brooks, Illinois member of the committee, fought
unsuccessfully, first to have the Illinois convention's anti-war plank adopted, and then to include the Illinois stand
against sending American troops into foreign wars as part of
the final platform.
Gates Dawes,

a

However, former Vice-President Charles

Chicago banker,

negotiated a

watered-down

compromise plank opposing American intervention in foreign
wars.

The Illinois delegation generally supported Thomas E.

Dewey, the winner of the Illinois primary, but he was overwhelmed by Wendell L. Willkie. 6
Meanwhile, Mayor Kelly orchestrated efforts to persuade President Roosevelt to run for a third term.
ruary 3,

1940,

On Feb-

despite the President's refusal to commit

himself, Cook County Democratic leaders put Roosevelt's name
on the primary ballot.

Technically, this was illegal since

the President had not filed a certificate of candidacy as
required by Illinois

law.

Secretary of State

Hughes chose to overlook this infraction.

Edward J.

Mayor Kelly and

Pat Nash also convinced the Democratic National committee to
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have the convention in Chicago.
bis rivals in the primary.

Roosevelt easily overwhelmed

At the state convention in June,

Illinois Democrats endorsed the President for a third term
and adopted

resolutions pledging war

only

to

defend

the

nation, but evading the issue of intervention. 7
on the first day of the national convention in June,
Mayor Kelly packed the galleries of the Chicago stadium with
machine supporters, who shouted down a speech by Virginia
senator Carter Glass on the pitfalls of a third term.
the

following day,

Kelly stationed Thomas Garry,

On

Chicago

superintendent of sewers, in the basement with a microphone
hooked up to the hall's public address system.

When Kentucky

senator Alben Barkley read a letter from President Roosevelt
denying his desire for a third term,

Garry's voice boomed

from loudspeakers urging Roosevelt's renomination.

A parade

started which lasted almost an hour until the voice subsided.
Finally,

Jim

Farley,

regained

control

of

who
the

presided
floor

nominate Roosevelt by acclamation.

and

over

the

defeated

proceedings,
efforts

to

However, on the next day,

the President won on the first ballot, easily overwhelming
his rivals.

Though Illinois Democrats backed Senator Scott

W. Lucas for vice-president, he withdrew from the race early
and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace was nominated,
though

Lucas

later

ran

the

campaign

in

Illinois.

Many

Democrats were unhappy at the President's apparent duplicity
in accepting a synthetic draft and the machinations of the
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Chicago machine, but Roosevelt wrote to Kelly expressing his
·
f o r the machine's efforts. 8
appreciation
During the campaign, Illinois Republicans focused on
corruption in Chicago city government and the Horner Administration, the third term issue, the New Deal, farm policies and neutrality.

Farmers generally returned to the ReThis

publican party now that farm conditions were better.
brought a sharp drop in the Democratic vote.

Neutrality was

Willkie favored aid to the Allies, which

a sticky issue.

many Illinois Republicans feared would lead to war.
Green and

c.

Dwight

Wayland Brooks voiced support for neutrality

and opposition to American involvement in the European war,
though denying any differences with Willkie.

The Chicago

Tribune tried to convert Willkie to isolationism but with
little success.

Democrats, however, accused Republicans of

seeking to appease the Axis Powers and criticized Brooks and
Colonel McCormick for their role

in shaping the Illinois

Republican party platform. 9
Late

in

the campaign,

there were

rumors

that

the

Kelly-Nash forces were committed to Roosevelt, but less optimistic about the state races, while the reverse was true of
the Republicans.

There were rumors of a deal which would

spare Secretary of State Hughes as a

reward

for putting

Roosevelt on the primary ballot despite a technical violation of state law.

Though both parties denied it, the re-

sults suggest that a deal was made.

President Roosevelt won
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the state, though his vote was down sharply from previous
years.
Hughes.

The Republicans swept the state offices except for
Harry Hershey lost to Dwight Green after winning

Chicago by only a slight margin.

Mayor Kelly ordered his

precinct captains to trim Hershey's votes partly because
Hershey had promised,

if elected, to suppress gambling, an
Kelly also

important source of revenue for the machine.
wanted

no more

Democratic

governors

who

challenge his leadership within the party.

could

seriously

Senator Slattery

was leading until a sudden upsurge of votes from Cook County
precincts gave Brooks a narrow victory.

Slattery was suspi-

cious and called for an investigation, but Brooks was seated
in the Senate.

Bipartisan deals were not unusual in Illi-

nois politics, especially in Chicago where many Republican
committeemen

cooperated

with

the

machine.

Mayor

Kelly

benefitted from this by getting weak Republican opposition
and gradually eliminating rivals within his own party, while
the Republicans elected candidates on the state level after
1938.

Not until 1948 did the Democrats recapture the state-

house and defeat Brooks. 10
After Governor Horner died on October 6, 1940, Lieutenant-Governor Stelle confirmed all of Horner's worst fears
about his extravagance.

Shortly after taking office, Gover-

nor Stelle fired his political enemies, replacing them with
his supporters and rewarding them with extra pay.

He also

rewarded allies with contracts for heavy purchases of coal,
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building repairs, road construction and repairs and services
used by the state.

Stelle redecorated the governor's man-

sion, threw lavish parties and pardoned hundreds of inmates
in state prisons.

His spending spree, coming at a time when

the state was facing a budget crunch, forced incoming GoverOne of his

nor Green to embark on a program of economy.

first acts was to fire over a thousand state employees, including Stelle' s cronies. 11
Illinois politics between 1939 and 1941 was highly
influenced by the debate over American involvement in the
war in Europe.

The big battle over isolationism was in the

Midwest and Chicago was the capital of the Midwest.

Al-

though opinions on the issue cut across party lines,

most

isolationists were conservative anti-New Deal
like Colonel McCormick.

Republicans

They generally distrusted England,

though they preferred to see her defeat the Nazis.
also anti-Semitic.

Some were

Interventionists were usually liberal

Democrats like Mayor Kelly, Paul Douglas and Adlai
son.

Steven-

There were internationalist Republicans like Colonel

Knox and isolationist liberals like R. Douglas Stuart, Jr.,
a founder of the America First movement, who foresaw that war
would curtail New Deal programs he wanted expanded. 12
The debate over intervention spawned organizations on
both sides of the issue.

Several small groups were active

in the fight over Cash and Carry in the fall of 1939.

Sena-

tor Lucas alone received over 60,000 letters, telegrams and
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postcards on the issue.

In 1940, the battle over neutrality

was carried on in the campaign and election, which the Tribune declared was a victory for isolationism and suggested
~

that Willkie would have won if he had accepted neutrality.
Later, it read him out of the party for endorsing Lend-Lease.
The

most

significant

non-interventionist

organization,

America First, was founded in 1940, but was not very active
until the battle over Lend-Lease early in 1941.

Its chief

mouthpiece, the Chicago Tribune, gave extensive publicity to
the

fight

Chicago.

and

to

the

organization,

which

was

based

in

Though the group had chapters in most areas of the

country, most of its membership was concentrated within a
300-mile radius of Chicago,

an area in which the Tribune

enjoyed a sizable circulation.
downplay the

activities

of

The paper did its best to

interventionist

groups,

often

sending photographers to take pictures of any empty seats at
their rallies.

The Committee to Defend America by Aiding

the Allies was not based in the Midwest, but did have chapters in several Illinois cities and a newspaper voice in the
Chicago Daily News.

Many interventionists fought as hard in

favor of Lend-Lease as isolationists against it.

Adlai Ste-

venson, head of the Chicago chapter, often represented the
group in debates with his friend, Clay Judson, of the America First movement. 13
Isolationism steadily lost ground,
the passage of Lend-Lease.

especially after

By the summer of 1941, attendance
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at rallies sponsored by the Committee to Defend America far
surpassed that at America First events.
other groups continued the fight.
anti-war polls.
anti-Semites

and

America First and

The Tribune conducted

America First tried to keep out Bundists,
other

extremists,

participate in its activities.

but

some

managed

Colonel Charles A.

to

Lind-

bergh's anti-Semitic speech in September in Des Moines, Iowa,
in which he claimed that Jews and others were pushing the
nation into war,
some support.

embarrassed the organization and cost it

During 1941, some isolationists grew

singly discouraged and by the fall,

some,

increa-

including Con-

gressman Everett Dirksen of Pekin, felt that the country was
already at war and either ceased their opposition to intervention or actually supported Administration policies.

Even

those who continued to oppose intervention were divided on
some defense measures.

Still,

in November,

America First

prepared to participate in the 1942 elections and endorsed
Senator Brooks for reelection.

Pearl Harbor, however, ended

this brief venture into electoral politics, and led to the
movement's disbandment.
continue,

Though its officers preferred to

they felt that the organization's opposition to

the war would render it suspect.

The Committee to Defend

America also disbanded after Pearl Harbor. 14
Other local groups,

however,

did not disband.

The

Chicago-based Citizens Keep out of War Committee, headed by
Avery Brundage and William J.

Grace,

a Reublican attorney
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and unsuccessful office-seeker, reorganized as the Citizens
USA committee,

a defeatist organization.

It backed Cong-

gressman-at-large Stephen A. Day, a McCormick protege,

for

reelection in 1942 and promoted the Colonel himself for the
presidency in 1943 and 1944 until McCormick killed the boomlet.

Grace himself represented dissident unionists in legal
Mrs.

action against allegedly Communist union officials.
Elizabeth

Dilling's

Mothers Mobilize

isolationist

for

America,

organization,

gained

new

We,

leadership

the
and

joined Grace's organization in promoting a peace conference
~arly

in 1942 and also backed conservative Republicans in

1942 and 1944.

Mrs. Dilling

herself was tried with several

others on charges of sedition, but the case was dropped in
March, 1945 after the judge died in the course of a lengthy
trial.

All

of

these

organizations,

as

well

as

several

others, later came under fire from Mayor Kelly's Committee
on Race Relations for their racist, anti-semitic and anticatholic propaganda. 15
The

Chicago

Tribune's

editorial

bias

resulted

in

attacks by interventionists at rallies during the summer of
1941, and in December brought the birth of a rival newspaper,
the Chicago Sun.

Marshall

Field

III

and

other liberals

wanted a pro-New Deal morning newspaper to off set the biased
reporting of the Tribune.

The Administration encouraged the

project and the sun appeared on December 4, 1941.

The Sun

never did well financially, though the Tribune's circulation
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dropped by

100, 000

during

bought the Chicago Times,
merged it with the Sun.

the

In

forties.

1948,

Field

an afternoon tabloid daily,

and

The Tribune fought the Sun's ef-

forts to join the Associated Press until a government law.
.
. 1945. 16
suit forced a d mission
o f th e Sun in

After Pearl Harbor, the Tribune loudly proclaimed its
patriotism, but continued its attacks on the Roosevelt Administration's foreign and domestic policies and the conduct
of the war.

The paper was quick to publicize blunders by

war agencies, though it sometimes distorted an incident so
much that it drew protests from both sides.

Colonel McCor-

mick offered his own commentaries on military tactics.

The

Daily News responded with a series of cartoons caricaturing
the Colonel as "Colonel McCosmic."

When a friend wrote to

McCormick in February, 1942, suggesting that he temper his
views on Administration foreign policy, the Colonel replied
with a letter in which he claimed credit for introducing the
machine gun,
forces.

The

mechanization and other reforms in the armed
Daily News published

it under the

caption,

"Whatta Man!" and the Colonel became the subject of ridicule.
Later that year, the Justice Department sought to indict the
Tribune for printing a story suggesting that the Navy knew
the Japanese plan of attack at Midway.

The Navy did know,

but was anxious to keep the Japanese from learning
United States had broken their naval code.

that the

The proceedings

were dropped after the reporter explained that he had written
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the story based on his knowledge of naval affairs and assumed
that the Navy had guessed the Japanese plans. 17
While Colonel McCormick and his allies fought to keep
the

nation

out

of war,

Mayor

Kelly,

Governor

Green

and

others worked to prepare the state for its role in the upcoming conflict.

While Green paid lip service to isolation-

ism, he also called for unity in defense.

Mayor Kelly ac-

cepted the nation's involvement in the war as inevitable.

on

December 20, 1940, the Chicago City Council established a new
city agency, the Chicago Commission on National Defense with
Kelly as its chairman.
city defense council.

In the spring of 1941, it set up a
Governor Stelle

Illinois Emergency Defense Council,

appointed

an

which was replaced in

April, 1941 by the Illinois State Council of Defense, later
renamed the Illinois War Council.

Each member of the Coun-

cil headed a particular division such as agriculture, industrial production and the like.

Members were business and

civic leaders from around the state.

Governor Green also

appointed political leaders from both parties as ex-officio
members.

In May, President Roosevelt created the Office of

Civilian Defense, which established a regional headquarters
in Chicago and later designated the Chicago area as a separate defense district from the rest of Illinois, with Mayor
Kelly as its director.

At first, the Chicago District in-

eluded Lake county, Indiana, but the county was consolidated
with the rest of Indiana in August, 1942.

Though the Illi-
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nois war council was unhappy with Chicago's status as

a

separate district, its relations with the Chicago organization were friendly.

There also were 640 local defense coun-

cils, mostly at the county, municipal and township level.
Cities,

county and township councils served rural areas.
especially Chicago, set up block organizations.

Many com-

munities adopted ordinances enforcing directives of municipal defense councils.

Other local defense councils and the

state council had to rely on voluntary cooperation. 18
In 1941, the state and local civilian defense organizations were mostly concerned with attracting defense business to the state, though they also sponsored scrap drives
and other defense projects.

During the war years, they held

scrap drives, promoted victory gardens and car pools, set up
day care centers, recruited war workers and trained air raid
wardens,

first aid workers, demolition teams and auxiliary

police and fire units.
tral

control

attack.

In Chicago and other cities, a cen-

station alerted local uni ts

in case

of air

There were blackouts and "bombings" to test the ef-

fectiveness of the system throughout the state.

Though the

Midwest was never bombed, civilian defense units proved invaluable in handling floods,
disasters.

fires, train wrecks and other

State police and militia units played a role in

such disasters and also in guarding important bridges, airports and other possible targets of sabotage.
ties also established serviceman's centers.

Many communiChicago had the
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biggest with every amenity desired by a soldier on leave. 19
Inevitably, politics crept into civilian defense as
it had with the New Deal.

Mayor Kelly used the program, and

to some extent other war agencies as a source of patronage.
oemocratic politicians secured jobs with various war agencies.

Ex-Congressman Raymond

s.

McKeough, who lost a Senate

race in 1942, headed the regional price control office in
1943.

There also were reports of favoritism in gas ration-

ing toward people with political connections.

In 1942, the

Auburn Park community civilian defense commander tried unsuccessfully to bar a local Republican congressional candidate from appearing at patriotic gatherings, and also tried
to fire block captains who were Republican precinct captains.
In the spring of 1945, when President Harry

s.

Truman closed

down the civilian defense program, Mayor Kelly insisted that
it was still needed and did not close the Chicago office
until the war ended in August. 20
During the thirties, the Kelly-Nash machine converted
the black community in Chicago to the Democratic party.

Ma-

yor Kelly offered patronage jobs and appointed blacks to high
positions in city government and to prestigious commissions.
The machine also claimed credit for helping blacks secure
jobs on New Deal work relief projects, an important source of
employment

for

blacks.

The

machine

also

established

a

Democratic organization in the black South Side wards, which
eventually led to construction of a submachine run by William
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L. Dawson, a black politician who joined the shift of his
constituents from the Republican to the Democratic party.
While alderman from the Second Ward, Dawson started backing
the machine

in

the

City Council.

He

lost

his

bid

for

reelection in the 1939 primary,

but then backed Earl

Dickerson,

a

a

Democrat,

against

He

Republican.

switched parties and became Second Ward Cammi tteeman.

B.

soon

Dawson

was soon at odds with Dickerson, who also irritated the Mayor
with his militance on civil rights and outspoken criticism of
the machine in the Council.
refusing

to

support

some

He also angered the machine by
of

its

candidates,

including

congressman Mitchell, and supporting Fifth Ward Alderman Paul
Douglas,

an

anti-machine

candidate for Senator.

Democrat,

against

the

machine

When Mitchell retired from Congress

in 1942, Dickerson tried to take his place, but was beaten in
the primary by Dawson, who went on to win in November.
1943,

Dickerson lost his council seat to a

In

Dawson ally.

Dawson went on to extend his control over other wards as they
changed

from

white

to

black.

By

1950,

his

submachine

controlled over a quarter of a million votes. 21
The war raised

racial

tensions

as Southern blacks

moved into already overcrowded housing and schools in the
ghetto.

Shortages forced many industries to start hiring

blacks in 1942 and 1943.

This led to friction with whites

who resented the economic gains of blacks which threatened
their status.

In 1943, race riots broke out in Detroit and
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other cities, but not Chicago.

Mayor Kelly responded to the

oetroit riot by appointing the biracial Mayor's Committee on
Race Relations, later renamed the Mayor's Committee on Human
Relations, to identify and alleviate sources of racial friction, especially housing.

The Committee worked with the po-

lice department to keep racial incidents from getting any
bigger.

This led to better police and community relations

and a drop in juvenile delinquency in some cases.

The Com-

mittee also persuaded the school board to add classrooms in
black areas and cease its practice of transferring white
students in the district to white school districts.

Most of

the Committee's achievements were limited, but it did provide a forum for discussion of the problems of blacks and
other minorities.

The Mayor's firmness in suppressing ra-

cial disturbances and his commitment to solving the problems
of the ghetto helped Chicago escape the riots that hit other
cities

during

the

war

years.

Other

cities,

including

Springfield, appointed similar committees and Governor Green
established a

state-wide commission to study the problem.

They too achieved some 1 imi ted success,
problems continued.

though the basic

Mayor Kelly also backed Elizabeth Wood,

head of the Chicago Housing Authority, in her efforts to integrate public housing,

and refused to support white stu-

dents who struck against integration of public high schools
in Morgan Park in 1934 and Calumet Park, Englewood and Morgan Park in 1945.

In supporting integration, Kelly ran up
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against segregationist policies in the school board and national public housing authorities as well as his own white
followers.

Ultimately, this was to prove a factor in for-

cing his retirement from office in 1947.

22

ouring the forties, Governor Green built an efficient
Republican machine, which dominated downstate Illinois politics, especially in the statehouse.
however.

Some Green supporters,

There were dissidents,
who objected to Colonel

McCormick's control of the party, complained that the Governor was too generous in giving patronage to leaders in that
faction,

while neglecting his own supporters.

They also

worried that renomination of Senator Brooks and Congressmanat-large Stephen A.
Colonel McCormick,

Day,

both isolationists and allies of

would wreck

Senate to the Democrats.

the

party and

return

They also criticized the extreme

isolationist platform of the Illinois Republican party.
Blackett,

the

Hill

former national committeeman from Illinois,

was

leader of these dissidents who sought a Senate candidate who
was committed to an interventionist foreign policy

before

Pearl Harbor.

Warren

They found him in State Treasurer

Wright, who announced his support for the President's foreign
policy

shortly before

Pearl

Harbor.

promptly read him out of the party,

Though the

Tribune

Wright announced

in

January, 1942, that he would run against Brooks. 23
Green stayed out of the battle over neutrality, Though
he often spoke out in favor of preparedness and unity in
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national

defense,

he

also praised Senator

Brooks at

the

Governor's Day conclave at the 1941 State Fair in Springfield.

Green eventually endorsed Brooks and his slate in a

meeting with the Senator in February.
and angry when copies

of

Brooks was embarrassed

an anti-war speech he made

on

October 31 and mailed to constituents before Pearl Harbor,
arrived in Illinois after the attack.
congressman

Day,

was

even

more

His running mate,

embarrassed

when

it

was

disclosed that an anti-war book he wrote in 1941 had been
published by a Nazi-subsidized company in New Jersey.
denied any knowledge of the Nazi affiliation.

Day

Later in the

campaign, he was accused of having sent a telegram to Adolf
Hitler in 1933 congratulating him on his rise to power.
Wright and Denison Hull, who ran against Day, played up their
opponents' isolationism.

They and their allies also criti-

cized Tribune domination of the party and depicted Brooks as
a puppet of the Colonel.

Brooks himself campaigned on his

record and the conduct of the war, while Day attacked the New
Deal. 24
A battle also developed in the Democratic primary when
Mayor Kelly slated Congressman Raymond
against Senator Brooks.
himself,

s. McKeough to run

Kelly briefly considered running

but opposition within the party,

from Roosevelt

and

the

problems

of

lack of support

tackling

a

resurgent

Republican party in an off-year election led him to forego
any senatorial ambitions.

McKeough was a little-known ma-
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chine supporter, who expressed pride in his connection with
the organization.

Dissident Democrats and Republicans ac-

cused Kelly of making a deal with Colonel McCormick to slate
a weak candidate to oppose Brooks in exchange for a weak Republican opponent in the 1943 mayoral race.

The machine made

similar questionable nominations when it slated Dr. Herman
aundesen to oppose Brooks for governor in 1936 and senator
Chicago Democrats were more concerned

Slattery in 1940.

about control of municipal and county off ices than state and
national

During

races.

Alderman Paul H.

the

fall

of

1941,

anti-machine

Douglas toured the state urging all-out

support for the President's foreign policy.

In January,

Douglas entered the race to oppose Brooks.

Douglas cam-

paigned vigorously against the Kelly-Nash machine and the
isolationist

record

of

Senator

Brooks.

McKeough

also

attacked Brooks and the Tribune, even accusing the Colonel
of treason for a Tribune editorial describing Administration
leaders as draft dodgers.

Downstaters, especially allies of

the late Governor Horner, wanted state's Attorney Courtney
to join the race,

but he withdrew when the machine slated

another Hornerite, Benjamin Adamowski, to oppose Day and help
McKeough downstate.

The state party accepted the machine

candidates, but the downstate eventually went for Douglas. 25
A light vote in the primary brought victory for both
machines.

The Republicans

selected

Brooks

and

Day,

who

crushed their rivals while the Democrats chose McKeough and
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Adamowski.

Even so, the vote totals reflected an anti-ma-

chine sentiment for Adamowski did better than McKeough, who
won because of a big lead in Chicago.
him downstate.

Douglas soundly beat

Soon after the primary, the fifty-year old

Alderman enlisted as a private in the Marine Corps where he
served with distinction,
colonel.

eventually

rising

to

lieutenant

26

The Tribune,
potatoes."

meanwhile,

labeled McKeough

This backfired when the Democrats

as

"small

proclaimed

their candidate as the representative of the common man, who
was small potatoes to the wealthy.

Rural Democrats brought

baskets of spuds to the fall party convention in Springfield
(they were later given to charity).

The Tribune then began

calling McKeough a rubber stamp New Dealer.

Republicans al-

so continued their attacks on McKeough's ties to the KellyNash machine while the Democrats attacked Brooks and Day and
Colonel McCormick for their isolationist record.

Voting was

light and the results reflected voter discontent with the
conduct of the war and with the discomforts of rationing and
shortages.

Brooks and Day won reelection, but the latter's

margin of victory was well below that of the Senator.
publicans also did well in state contests.

Re-

The Republican

resurgence of 1940-1942 bred a Democratic fatalism and indifference which probably influenced the results.

Reelection

of Senator Brooks and Congressman Day was distasteful, but
Palatable since Kelly himself was not running. 27
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In
Faherty,

December,
a

wealthy

Colonel

McCormick

selected

lawyer and political

against Mayor Kelly in 1943.

Roger

unknown,

to

M.
run

After he boasted of his close

ties to Kelly and disclaimed any knowledge of issues on which
to campaign, Republicans protested and refused to back his
candidacy.
McKibbon,

Faherty withdrew and the party chose George W.
the state director of finance,

to oppose Kelly.

McKibbon was little better-known and his father-in-law headed one of the street-car companies, thus making it easy for
the Democrats to label him a tool of the unpopular transit
companies.

The Republican choice of a

mayoral candidate

made it a good deal easier for Kelly at a time when problems
with the city's schools and police corruption might have
threatened his re-election.

Indeed, dissidents in both par-

ties charged that Faherty and McKibbon were chosen to guarantee Kelly's reelection in exchange for election of Senator
Brooks and Governor Green.

Both Kelly and McKibbin faced

rivals in the primary, but the anti-machine Democrats were
divided and ineffective as were the opponents of McKibbon,
who was backed by Governor Green.

The Mayor's opponents

criticized the city's schools and blasted the machine for its
ties to the underworld.

Several gangland slayings and a

gangster's suicide helped remind voters of the connection.
McKibbon also played on popular discontent with rationing by
claiming that the rationing system was controlled by the
machine, which was using it as a source of patronage.

Mayor
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KellY campaigned very little, choosing to run on his record
of civic improvements,
street subway.

including the newly-finished State

Shortly before the election, the Democrats

also accused McKibbon and his wife of signing a restrictive
covenant barring blacks from their Hyde Park neighborhood.
McKibbon denied it, but then the Republicans sent some Republican workers, including a white real estate agent known
for his advocacy of segregated housing, to deliver leaflets
accusing Kelly of signing such a covenant.

When they tried

to deliver them to the home of a black Republican Alderman,
Oscar DePriest, they were jumped by several black Democrats
and arrested on charges of inciting to riot.
cident backfired for the Republicans.
beat McKibbon,

The whole in-

Soon afterward, Kelly

though with a smaller margin than in 1939.

McKibbon returned to his state post soon afterward. 28
Meanwhile, a fight was brewing within the Republican
party over isolationism.

During the

1942 campaign,

Con-

gressman McKeough proposed a world organization for peace.
Some Illinois Republicans echoed these sentiments and tried
unsuccessfully to influence their party platform along those
lines.

When the isolationists managed to defeat their ef-

forts, some of the internationalists switched their support
to McKeough and Adamowski.

In February, 1943, the interna-

tionalists, led by Deneen Watson, chairman of the Governor's
advisory committee on taxation (and for a time, representative of the Illinois War Council in Washington seeking de-
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fense contracts for the state), started a doorbell campaign
financed by Denison Hull, Congressman Day's opponent in the
1942 primary, to convert the rank and file of the party to
international cooperation.

They organized the Republican

postwar Policy Association,

headed by Watson,

to carry on

the campaign, which soon spread from Illinois to the rest of
the country.
attended by
Dirksen.

In May, the group held a convention in Chicago
100 delegates,

including congressman Everett

Governor Green did not attend,

but did give a

speech to downstate papers urging postwar planning.

The

Tribune denounced the organization as a group of Willkieites
bent on betraying the country's best interests. 29
However, in December, 1942, the more moderate Harrison E. Spangler replaced Werner

w.

Schroeder,

an Illinois

committeeman backed by Colonel McCormick, as Republican National Chairman.

In May, 1943, with the Republican Postwar

Planning Association at the height of its influence, Spangler appointed a Republican Postwar Advisory council of 49
members to consider domestic and foreign policies for the
1944

campaign.

Though Wendell

Willkie was

not

invited,

neither was Senator Brooks, while Governor Green and congressman Dirksen were included.

Watson challenged Spangler

to put his group's proposals before the Advisory council,
which met on Mackinac Island.

Though there were several

isolationists on the Council, it also included a number of
internationalists.

Governor Green played a major role in

66

drafting the convention's declaration of support for reasonable participation of the United States in a postwar cooperative organization among the sovereign states.

The propo-

sal was sufficiently vague as to satisfy both the Tribune
and the Daily News, but it also was a significant step away

from the isolationism of Colonel McCormick.
emerged with enhanced regional prestige.

Governor Green

During the confe-

rence, the Tribune read New York Governor Thomas Dewey out
of the party for advocating a postwar Anglo-American alliance, though the Colonel himself proposed a world union of
sorts--by annexing

England,

Scotland,

Wales,

Canada,

Zealand and Australia to the United States as
states, but excluding the British Empire.

New

individual

The other nations

declined the offer, preferring to remain independent. 30
The battle between isolationists and internationalists
continued.

William J. Grace organized the Illinois National-

ist Revival Committee to draft Colonel McCormick for president.

During

1943,

the

attended by old America

group

held meetings

in

Chicago

Firsters and various extremists.

Despite the Colonel's protests, the group entered his name
in the Illinois primary.

Wendell Willkie eagerly challenged

the Colonel, but withdrew when the Colonel refused to run.
Instead, Willkie entered the Wisconsin primary and dropped
out of the presidential race after his defeat.
publicans chose General Douglas MacArthur,

Illinois Re-

the only major

candidate entered in the primary, but he also withdrew from
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the race.

31

Meanwhile,
slate,

a battle developed over the state party

dominated

by

the

McCormick-Brooks

faction,

which

called for reelection of Governor Green and Congressman-atlarge Day and chose Richard J. Lyons, a diehard isolationist,
to oppose the incumbent Democrat, Senator Lucas.

Opponents

objected to Lyons on geographical as well as ideological
grounds

since

cagoans.

both

Lyons

and

Senator

Brooks

were

Chi-

Several candidates threatened to run against Lyons,

including Congressman Dirksen, who also flirted with a run
for the presidency.

However, most withdrew, leaving Deneen

Watson to challenge Lyons and Colonel Edward Davis to run
against Day.

There also was opposition for other posts, but

the slated candidates easily crushed their rivals in the
April primary.

The national convention, held in Chicago,

nominated New York Governor Thomas Dewey for president and
Ohio Governor John W. Bricker for vice-president. 32
Illinois Democrats were united in their support of
the President's quest for a fourth term and the slating of
candidates

for other off ices.

After the death of party

leader Patrick Nash in October, 1943, Mayor Kelly took control of the party.

He also made a truce with state's Attor-

ney Courtney and slated him for governor.

Senator Lucas ran

for reelection while Emily Taft Douglas, wife of former Alderman Paul Douglas, challenged Congressman Day.
didates were slated for state races,

Other can-

including Edward J.

68

Barrett, a sargeant in the marines, who was running for secretary of state.

At the national convention in Chicago, the

Mayor helped line up support for Harry
dent's choice for vice-president.

s.

Truman, the Presi-

Some Illinois delegates

wanted to retain Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, but Kelly
argued that the President should have a

running mate he

wanted, and persuaded the delegates to support Senator Lucas
until switching to Truman.

Some labor supporters of Wallace

tried to stampede the convention into renominating him, but
Kelly had the convention adjourned for the day,
violation of city fire regulations.

claiming

On the next day, Kelly

closed the galleries to the public and Truman was nominated
on the second ballot. 33
During the campaign, Illinois Democrats supported the
Administration's foreign and domestic policies.

They backed

its plans for a world organization to settle disputes while
Republicans Lyons, Day and Brooks were wary of American ties
to such an organization.

Republicans also demanded that the

nation retain captured islands for bases and blasted the
Kelly-Nash machine for its ties to the underworld, problems
with Chicago schools and machine efforts to win the votes of
soldiers overseas.

Mayor Kelly even wanted to count the

votes of soldiers who had died after voting but before the
election.

Republicans attacked the New Deal and home front

programs, especially rationing, and charged that the fourth
term would lead to a dictatorship.

Democrats replied with
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attacks on Governor Green for his spending and patronage
policies.

Though some labor leaders, mainly from the Ameri-

can Federation of Labor (AFL) and its member unions, backed
The AFL' s
the Republicans, most supported the Democrats.
state affiliate,

the

Illinois State Federation of Labor,

unanimously endorsed Roosevelt.
organizations

(CIO)

set up a

The Congress of Industrial
Political Action Committee,

headed in Illinois by ex-Congressman McKeough, to assist the
Democrats.

Since some member unions included significant

numbers of Communists in their membership and even in leadership posts,

the Republicans blasted the

Communist support.

In November,

President won reelection,
plurality than in 1940.
won.

the voters

carrying Illinois

Democrats

for

spoke.

The

by a

larger

Senator Lucas and Mrs. Douglas also

Republicans won most state offices (except for secre-

tary of state, won by Edward J. Barrett), but by very small
margins.

Even Governor Green, who was much stronger than

the rest of the ticket, won by only 72,000 votes, compared
to 256,000 in 1940.~
The results showed the efficiency of the Kelly-Nash
machine and organized labor in getting out the vote, but also
reflected continued voter support for Democratic policies
and growing opposition to isolationism.
went down to defeat.

Both Lyons and Day

Some Republican newspapers around the

state saw the vote as a personal triumph for the Governor,
but a repudiation of his running mates,

and urged him to
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surround

himself

with

forward-looking

Republicans.

The

Governor reached the same conclusions and sought to broaden
his base beyond Colonel McCormick and the Tribune.

He also

wanted to leave office with a record of progressivism.

To

help achieve this goal, he met with Mayor Kelly, with whom
he had been feuding,

and the two antagonists agreed on a

program of mutual cooperation in the General Assembly.

Chi-

cago gained some limited aid to public housing and legislation permitting unification of the city's transit lines under
the Chicago Transit Authority.
Governor

Green's

ill-fated

Chicago Democrats supported

efforts

to

reform

the

state

constitution as well as his more successful reapportionment
of the state's congressional districts.

Green also secured

some benefits for veterans, including new hospital facilities
and rehabilitation centers.
partisan

coalition

Overall, the unprecedented bi-

benefitted

members of both parties,

who

both,
found

though

it

disturbed

it more difficult to

resist legislation they disliked. 35
During the late thirties and forties, political parties in Illinois developed a new division of power, which
carried on into the postwar era.

once Republican, but Demo-

cratic in the thirties, Illinois became a swing state whose
allegiance could not be taken for granted by either party.
The powerful Democratic organization in Chicago, which gained
control of Chicago in 1931, helped President Roosevelt and
his successor,

President Truman,

carry the state in every
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The Democratic Admi. on during the two decades •
eiecti
nistration, in turn, financed civic improvements during the
oepression and homefront programs during the war, which provided jobs for machine supporters.
organization's

effectiveness by converting blacks

oemocratic party.
in their wards.

Mayor Kelly enhanced his
to

the

His black allies then built a submachine
During the thirties and forties, the Mayor

and his allies had to contend with rivals within the party.
They resolved this difficulty by cooperating with a resurgent
Republican party led by Colonel McCormick in eliminating the
more dangerous rivals.

It was an odd alliance between a

liberal New Dealer and the arch-conservative anti-New Deal
publisher, but it benefitted both.

The Mayor eliminated his

more serious rivals and secured relatively weak Republican
mayoral opponents, while the Colonel gained the election of
his candidates on the state level.
forties,

During the early and mid-

Republicans dominated the state offices while the

Democrats won the national and the Chicago and Cook County
races.

The war brought further changes, strengthening the

power and prestige of Mayor Kelly and gradually eroding the
influence of Colonel McCormick in his own party, especially
after 1944 when Democratic victories eliminated some of his
proteges.

This in turn led Governor Green to a bipartisan

arrangement with Mayor Kelly

in an effort to escape the

domination

The

of

the

Colonel.

new

division

of

power

continued with little interruption into the postwar era.
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CHAPTER III
PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS:
ILLINOIS WARTIME INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
During the Second World War, Illinois industrial production converted from freight cars, farm implements, stoves
and other civilian goods to artillery, tanks,

airplane parts

and other military supplies, while the state's mines and
utilities directed their resources toward supplying the war
industries.

Production was coordinated by a variety of na-

tional defense agencies to satisfy the changing requirements
of the armed forces.

These agencies allocated raw materials

based on the relative importance of each company's product to
the war effort.

State and local defense planners supple-

mented the work of national agencies, while local businessmen set up pools to bid on contracts and coordinated efforts
for protection of industrial plants.
Although

initially,

many

companies

secured

defense

contracts with minimal government supervision, the national
defense planning establishment gradually assumed a more active role.

In May, 1940,

President Franklin Delano Roose-

velt appointed the National Defense Advisory Commission, whose
Industrial Production Division cleared contracts for military
supplies and construction of bases and defense plants.
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In

83

41 the Division became the Office of Production
January, 19 '

Management,
civilian

which

handled

production

as

military

well.

In

production
addition

and

to

later

clearing

contracts, the new agency established a priority system to
allocate materials to defense industries, and eventually restrict the output of civilian goods through such alloca•

t1ons.

1

In November, 1940, the Advisory Commission designated
Federal Reserve Banks as regional off ices where manuf acturers could secure information about government requirements
and credit to finance defense production.

Illinois was di-

vided between the Chicago and St. Louis Federal Reserve Banks.
Branch banks served as district offices
officials

operated the

service.

This

and certain bank
arrangement

proved

inadequate and in the spring of 1941, the Office of Production
Management set up its own field service utilizing the Federal
Reserve Banks as headquarters and their personnel as part of
its field organization.
service,

The Washington off ice ran the field

including special groups such as a

machine tool expediters in Rockford.

delegation of

In June, the agency's

Priorities Division set up its own field organization.

The

War Production Board, which replaced the Office of Production
Management in January,
and set up a

1942,

reorganized the field service

regional organization,

with Region VI,

included most of Illinois, headquartered in Chicago.
St.

Louis-Alton area

later

became part

of

which

The East

the st.

Louis
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r~gion.

The Chicago regional office included sections on

production, priori ties and appeals, technical services, labor,
salvage,

materials redistribution,

compliance and finance.

District offices located in various Illinois cities, assigned
priority ratings in minor amounts of materials, but their main
functions were technical and advisory.
plants, tools,
together

They located idle

materials and labor, brought prime contractors

with

potential

subcontractors,

interpreted

regulations to businessmen, secured technical and financial
aid for companies, recommended relief from restrictions and
monitored

violations

of

priority

orders.

All

services had procurement offices in Chicago.

military

The Chicago

Ordinance District, one of the biggest buyers, increased its
staff from 1400 before Pearl Harbor to over 5000 at its peak.
Headed by prominent businessmen, it could let contracts up to
$1 million in value.

Larger ones were handled by Washington.

The Division also had advisory committees of Illinois industrialists. 2
Conversion to defense production began as early as 1938
when some Illinois firms

received educational

orders

from

military procurement agencies, especially in subcontracts from
the Rock Island arsenal.
test

the

ability

of

The purpose of these orders was to

private

industrial

firms

to

adapt

themselves overnight to production of war supplies. Hence, the
Chicago plant of the American Forge Division of American Brake
Shoe and Foundry Company received an educational order for
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25

,ooo shell forgings in June,

1939.

daily production was half that number.

By April,
The

1941,

its

outbreak of war

in Europe brought contracts for Illinois industries from the
British and French governments.
to Britain.

Steel

companies sold steel

Two railroad car manufacturers, Pullman-Standard

car company and Pressed Steel Car Company, built tanks for the
British at Chicago-area plants.

Smaller firms also secured

contracts with the Allies, especially after the introduction
of Lend-Lease in the spring of 1941.

Williams Oil-0-Matic,

a Bloomington manufacturer of oil heaters, produced gears for
anti-aircraft guns used in the Battle of Britain in 1940-1941.
Whiting Corporation,

a

builder of cranes and railroad and

industrial equipment, produced cranes for Russia.

Other firms

made war supplies for England under contract with the United
States government.
got underway,

As the nation's own rearmament program

Illinois companies concentrated more and more

on defense production. 3
Illinois industries produced a variety of products for
the armed forces.

In some cases, they simply adapted existing

product lines to military uses.

caterpillar, Austin-Western,

Barber-Greene and others built construction equipment for use
in constructing roads and airfields.

Pullman-Standard built

railroad equipment for the armed forces overseas.

Ingersoll

Milling Machine Company won the coveted Army-Navy "E" award

in the fall of 1941 for building a machine to mill battleship
armor.

Many Illinois plants made the same things for the
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armed forces as they did for
engines,

gloves,

wire,

nuts,

civilian use: tractors, diesel
bolts,

screws and the

like.

others made some adjustments to adapt peacetime products for
military use.

Zenith Radio had to

retool since military

specifications required closer tolerances than civilian radio
equipment.

Whiting Corporation, the crane manufacturer in

Harvey, made hoists for loading bombs into airplanes.

Elgin

watch Company produced fuses and navigational instruments.
western

Electric

made

gun

directors,

field

telephones,

switchboards, cable and radiotelephone sets for tanks, planes
and ships.
military.

By 1944, 83 percent of its output went to the
Diamond

T.

Motor

Company,

a

Chicago

truck

manufacturer, produced military trucks and also built a halftrack troop carrier, a new type of hybrid vehicle with wheels
in front and tracks in the rear.

Springfield-based Sangamo

Electric, a manufacturer of meters, made signal equipment for
the

Signal

Corps,

fire

control

equipment

and

aircraft

instruments. 4
Many companies, however, made items for the military,
which were far different than what they produced in peacetime.

Pullman-Standard plants built tanks, howitzers,

trench mortars, aircraft assemblies and shells.

In 1942, the

Company erected a shipyard on Lake Calumet which constructed
small escort ships and landing ships, medium (LSM's) for the
United States and British navies.

International Harvester

Produced tanks, military trucks and tractors, and also made
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torpedoes and shells, though it also continued to make farm
Pettibone-Mulliken, a Chicago-area manufacturer

equipment.

of railway track equipment, turned out carriages for heavy 155
millimeter cannon.

In its Springfield plant, Allis-Chalmers

built the M-18 tractor for towing heavy artillery.

Western

cartridge, of East Alton, made small-arms ammunition as did
a

large

number

Belleville made
parts.

A

of

small

shells,

group

of

Stove

firms.
bombs,

manufacturers

ammunition boxes

thirty-three

plants

in

and

six

in

tank

states

cooperated in a program to produce armor plate for tanks and
other combat vehicles.

Kroehler Manufacturing Company,

a

Naperville furnituremaker, converted to production of plywood
A Chicago

airplane parts.

firm,

Victor Adding Machine

Company, became a major producer of bombsights.

An electrical

products plant in Bloomington made proximity fuses for antiaircraft shells.

A Decatur steel fabricator built prefabri-

cated bridges for use overseas.

Another Decatur plant, the

Garfield Division of the Houdaille-Hershey Corporation, worked
on a top secret project involving production of parts for the
first atomic bombs.

Wallpaper firms made munitions. 5

Production soared.

The Chicago area almost tripled

its industrial output between 1939 and 1944.

Many firms were

rewarded for their productivity by being awarded the Army-Navy
"E"

award.

Such awards

depended on high production and

quality, but also low absenteeism, avoidance of work stoppages, fair labor standards, labor-management cooperation in
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. n , conservation of critical materials, progress in
produc t 10

overcoming obstacles and a good health and safety record.
one Illinois firm even lost its award due to labor diff iculties, while an award to another firm was delayed until a labor
dispute was settled.

6

Although many firms secured defense contracts in 1940
and 1941, Illinois did not gain nearly as much at first as
other states.
conditions.

Much of this was due to geography and war
Early in the war, the armed forces of the Uni-

ted states and the Allied nations demanded ships and planes,
which were usually built on the East and West Coasts.

Still,

some Illinois political leaders felt that the state was being
slighted in the granting of contracts.
in

the

1940

election

and

renewed

They raised the issue

the

charges

after

the

•
7
election.

Some efforts were made to alleviate the situation.
May

1,

1941,

On

Governor Dwight Green directed the Illinois

State Council of Defense to consider means of getting armament work for Illinois firms with unused plant capacity and
machinery.

Although Illinois industry was recovering from

the Depression,

there still were many idled factories and

unemployed workers.

Illinois Director of Labor Martin P.

Durkin, who surveyed 1423 plants in the state, each employing
less than 500 workers,

reported that 166 firms capable of

turning out armaments were operating less than one shift when
they

could

run

two

or

three.

Meanwhile,

the

Illinois
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Manufacturer's

Association

turned

over

to

the

Office

of

production Management a list of 720 Illinois manufacturers
with unused plant capacity and machinery adaptable to defense
production.

The Office of Production Management also worked

with the National Association of Manufacturers in seeking out
usable plants and machinery, and in May, 1941, held a clinic
in Chicago to promote defense business.

At the clinic, the

agency discovered that many companies did not know how to get
orders.

It quickly set out to remedy the situation and match

contractors
capacity.
fill

with

potential

subcontractors

with

unused

The agency's Defense Contract Service had the firms

out exhaustive questionnaires describing their plant

facilities and specifying the type and model of machines in
the plant.

When a contractor needed a subcontractor to assist

in filling an order,

the agency could check its files of

manufacturers with the plant capacity and machinery needed for
the job and suggest potential subcontractors, especially those
with idle

facilities

and

low priorities

for

their normal

production. 8
During the spring and summer of 1941, a new situation
developed which made it imperative for the state's mills and
factories to convert to defense production.

The rising tem-

po of rearmament created shortages of materials and led the
Office of Production Management to develop a system of priorities to shift materials from civilian to defense production.

Under the system, producers of raw materials had to
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give preference to defense orders.

The system was gradually

refined and strengthened so that all manufactured goods, civilian and defense-related, had a priority weighted in accordance with its usefulness to the defense effort and its
relative scarcity at any given time.

Priorities were re-

vised from time to time to reflect changing military and
homefront requirements.

For a time, the Office of Produc-

tion Management concentrated on defense-related production,
while the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply
handled civilian goods.

However,

while the latter had no

authority to direct producers of raw materials to distribute
them in accordance with its demands, it did have the power to
tell the Off ice of Production Management to carry out its
recommendations after defense needs had been met.

The Of-

fice of Production Management resented having to follow programs formulated by the Off ice of Price Administration and
Civilian Supply.

This was resolved by transferring civilian

supply functions to the former agency.

The President also

created the Supply Priorities and Allocations Board to formulate policies on priorities which the Off ice of Production
Management put into effect. The new agency was abolished when
the War Production Board replaced the Off ice of Production
Management in 1942. 9
Meanwhile, the priority situation and shortages of
raw materials created problems for the state's manufacturers.

Many responded by stepping up purchases of supplies.
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BY April, 1941, 57 percent of Chicago-area firms were ordering materials for six months ahead or longer.

on January 1,

onlY 30 percent were buying that far in advance, while 50
percent were ordering for periods of three months ahead or
less.

Even with the increased purchases, deliveries were

uncertain.

some companies hoarded materials, leading the

office of Production Management to threaten punitive action.
BY June, many firms, especially the smaller ones, were having difficulty getting supplies and were losing business.
Many cut production and employment, while others shutdown
entirely.

Many communities in the state were faced with

"priority unemployment" as firms without priority rights
were idled for lack of materials.

In July, two-thirds of the

state's small industries reported in a survey by the Illinois
Small Business Men's Association that they would have to go
out of business unless they received war contracts or got
materials for normal production of civilian goods.

The

situation worsened throughout the summer as controls on the
various metals intensified. 10
The climax occurred in September when the Off ice of
Production Management subjected all steel to priority controls.

on September 12, mayors, small businessmen, labor

executives, trade association officials and civic leaders
from several midwestern states met in Chicago to discuss the
situation.

There was special concern over the plight of

smaller industries, which faced the greatest difficulties
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~ith

shortages and getting defense business since procure-

ment agencies generally sought out the largest and bestequipped producers to fill their producers to fill their requirements.

The conference decided to seek a division of

defense work among hard-hit industries, especially in oneindustry towns, increased subcontracts, allocation of materials on a plant-by-plant basis rather than by companies,
increased use of substitute materials and pooling of a comrnunity' s resources so that it could bid as a unit for contracts.

Many of the state's political and business leaders

journeyed to Washington to press their case.

Delegations of

trade and industrial associations, company representatives
and members of the Illinois State Council of Defense descended on the capital and met with the state's congressional
delegation.

Governor Green and Chicago Mayor Kelly also

traveled to Washington several times to lobby the Off ice of
Production Management for more defense business for the
state.

Their efforts did win promises by the agency of more

contracts for Illinois firms.

The Illinois State Council of

Defense also established an off ice in Washington to lobby
for more defense business. 11
In

addition

to

lobbying

for

more

defense

business

for the state firms, business and political leaders developed
systems for helping industries secure contracts. In September, Chicago Mayor Kelly appointed the Chicago Commission on
National Defense, an industrial commission, to stimulate
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ion of pools for obtaining defense contracts, to gather
form at
information on available plant facilities and manpower and to
use

its

influence

surplus materials.

in

obtaining

a

proper

distribution

of

The commission acted as a clearinghouse

for manufacturers' problems, recommended solutions and served
as a 1iason between Chicago manufacturers and the federal
government.

The city was divided into seven areas, each with

a divisional headquarters supervised by a representative of
the industrial commission and aided by engineers.

Advisory

committees of 15 manufacturers and 15 labor leaders were also
chosen.

The Chicago Plan Commission supplied canvassers to

gather information for the commission.

Governor Green and the

state defense council also developed plans
federal contracts.

for pooling of

The Illinois Division of the National

Small Business Men's Association sponsored a conference in
Chicago of businessmen and officials of the Chicago Ordnance
District.

The officers and representatives of large companies

such as Stewart-Warner and General Electric conferred with
smaller manufacturers to arrange subcontracts. 12
The Off ice of Production Management established a Division of Contract Distribution to assist small companies in
gaining defense contracts.

The agency held defense clinics

in various cities to facilitate subcontracting and in October,

1941,

held a big regional clinic in Chicago in which

purchasing agents and production engineers from 150 corporations holding major contracts conferred with representa-
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tives

of

over

3500

small

firms

to

determine

facilities available for subcontracts.

if

any

Some did.

had

Pullman-

standard found six plants with heavy machinery to make parts
for tanks which the company was building at its Hammond, Indiana plant.

Within a month, the company completed arrange-

ments for the smaller firms to produce the needed parts.

The

off ice of Production Management also sent out defense trains
to tour cities across the nation with exhibits showing samples
of

rearmament

companies.

items

which

could

be

produced

by

smaller

In some cases, the agency allocated contracts to

small companies to relieve local unemployment resulting from
lack of materials.

In April, 1942, the War Production Board

tested the Stanley Plan of letting subcontracts to Chicagoarea

plants.

subcontractors

Under
used

the
a

plan,

mutual

contractors

clearinghouse

and

potential

which

matched

contractors with potential subcontractors having the machinery
to do the job.
learn how to
special code.

Subcontractors attended a special class to
list their machines

in a

directory using

a

Those who participated were put on a mailing

list for a special weekly listing of contract opportunities.
The plan proved sufficiently successful that in June, 1942,
it was extended throughout the Chicago region of the War
Production Board. 13
Small companies used a variety of means to gain contracts.
pers.

Some advertized their availability in major newspaEarly in 1941, Lyon Metal Products,

an Aurora-based
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manufacturer of metal shelving and business furniture,

sent

its salesmen out to visit other companies and field off ices
for procurement agencies in search of contracts and subcontracts.

The company neglected its own successful business to

concentrate on defense business.

Its aggressiveness paid off.

By the spring of 1942, it was farming out orders when it had
more than it could handle.

Many companies formed pools in

which they bid as a group on defense contracts.
most popular late in 1941 and early in 1942.
Peoria's

Association

of

Commerce

Pooling was

In August, 1941,

Industrial

organized the Mother Hen Pool of Group Resources.

committee
Fifty-four

local firms pooled facilities and equipment, with two serving
as Mother Hens and assuming responsibility for any contracts
secured.

The pool printed catalogues of facilities.

Late in

the summer of 1941, Decatur formed a pool of fifteen metalworking firms following a conference between Governor Green
The presidents of the companies

and a local businessman.

gathered information on their facilities, which was placed on
file with defense production offices.

One of the company

presidents headed the group and another made all contacts with
government offices.

The Decatur pool arose in response to

shortages of materials.

Metalworking of one sort or another

accounted for 50 percent of the city's industry and payroll.
The

Off ice

of

Production

Management

and

state

and

local

political and business leaders encouraged pooling as a means
by which smaller firms could get defense business.

There were

96

over twenty in Chicago alone.
tors,

Most involved metal fabrica-

though there were some composed of

furnituremakers.

surgess-Norton developed a

pool to make tank parts,

ultimately

bodies

supplied

American-built tanks.

tank

for

85

percent

which

of

all

Pools were granted immunity from anti-

trust laws provided that they could demonstrate a link between
increased efficiency and war needs.

Although some pools were

successful, others failed to gain any business and eventually
Many were mismanaged and others were poorly

fell apart.
organized.
organized

By
in

February,
the

Chicago

1942,

twenty-two

Ordnance

pools

District

had

but

been

none

had

obtained a contract. With such mixed results, pooling declined
generally in the spring of 1942. 14
Pearl Harbor brought more problems for smaller industries.

The armed forces stepped up their purchasing, but

continued their traditional reliance on larger companies.
Small industries could only get business when larger ones
could not handle any more.

Even then, many of the jobs were

ones that other companies simply did not want.

In March,

1942, the War Production Board issued a directive granting
contracts to small companies through negotiation without requiring them to bid against big manufacturers.

One of its

first fruits in the Chicago area developed in April, 1942 when
one hundred firms secured contracts to make bomb parts.

In

June, 1942, the Smaller War Plants Division, later the Smaller
War Plants Corporation, was established to help small business
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participate
enjoyed

in

some

Al though

the war effort.
success,

small

business

the

new

continued

agency

to

have

difficulty in getting war contracts throughout the war
and they often suffered the most from contract cancellations
. th e war. 15
later in
Meanwhile, controls on materials tightened as the
united states entered the war.

This intensified shortages

of supplies and also equipment.

Some companies traded or

sold materials to others in exchange for supplies they needed.

In the summer of 1943, the War Production Board and

several Chicago area war plants launched a drive to share
steel, which resulted in cancellation of orders for 700,000
tons of steel.

Some companies resorted to illegal means of

getting the supplies they needed.

In the fall of 1941, the

Office of Production Management barred a Chicago firm from
using aluminum

for

six months

after the

company violated

priority regulations by diverting aluminum from rearmament
projects to companies making jukeboxes, slot machines and
other nonessentials.

In February, 1942, the War Production

Board amended the order to allow the firm to fill war orders, but continued to penalize other violators, who hoarded
scarce metals or diverted them to nonessential uses.
ril, the agency penalized Mills Novelty Company,

In Ap-

a Chicago

manufacturer of jukeboxes and gambling equipment, for diversion of materials to such machines.
ter turned to war production,

The company, which la-

sold its products

to local
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gangsters as well as country clubs evading anti-gambling laws,
though the latter had to divide their profits with the Capone
gang.

The company appears to have had some connection with
•

•

•

local pol1t1c1ans.

16

one source of raw materials was scrap and refuse of
various kinds.

Throughout the war, various war agencies,

state and local defense councils and local organizations
sponsored scrap drives to collect metals, wastepaper, rubber and even kitchen grease, which was used to make glycerine, an ingredient in munitions.

Scrap drives started in

the summer of 1941, when the general public contributed
cooking utensils and other items to help relieve a shortage
of aluminum.

Scrap drives soon encompassed other metals,

particularly iron and steel.

Manufacturers turned in obso-

lete unusable machinery for scrap.

Farmers provided a rich

harvest of wornout machinery for scrap drives.

Railroads

were an especially rich source of scrap from unused spur
lines.

Railroads abandoned many miles of branch lines du-

ring the war, though in some cases, the need for scrap conflicted with the need of local communities for transportation.

Many proposed abandonments aroused strong protests.

One of the most controversial involved a segment of the Illinois Terminal system running from Peoria through Bloomington and Decatur to Champaign-Urbana and Danville.

The War

Production Board supported the abandonment in order to get
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the rails,

but backed down amid vigorous protests from the

communities and the line continued in operation.

No such

protests greeted the disappearance of Civil War cannon and
other community war memorials into the nation's scrap pile.
Much of the sacrifice was probably needless, but there were
shortages.

Scrap dealers took advantage of the situation and

a black market developed in steel scrap.

Many scrap dealers

resorted to a practice known as "top dressing,"

under which

they loaded railroad cars with inferior grade material, then
put a load of higher quality scrap metal on top and billed the
steel companies at the higher rate.
put in a load of dirt.

One Chicago dealer even

Such practices were a headache for

steel producers and undoubtedly hurt production. 17
There also were shortages of machine tools and some
resorted to the black market to fill their needs.

Some com-

panies were able to reuse old obsolete equipment.

However,

while some machines were readily adaptable to defense production, others were not.

Many companies were forced to re-

tool when they switched from civilian to military production.

Machines also wore out, especially with wartime work

schedules.

Machines were used round the clock and broke down

from overwork.

Sometimes, even if machines were available,

they were unused due to a lack of workers with skills to use
them.

The War Production Board and the Chicago Ordnance

District also purchased or leased idle machines and made them
available to manufacturers in need of machinery. In February,
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1944 , the Anny Air Force established a warehouse in Chicago
to dispose of machines rendered surplus when contracts were
cancelled.

Many companies already made their own tools, but

still found it necessary to increase their production of tools
and add to their tool-making staff.
In Chicago,

a problem.

Plant protection was also

Mayor Kelly appointed Patrick H.

Joyce to the post of Industrial Coordinator in March, 1942.
Joyce,

who

was

president

of

the

Chicago

Great

Western

Railroad, met with local business leaders and developed a code
for plant protection which was eventually picked up by other
communities.

Joyce and his associates also helped plants

organize for protection against enemy attack,

organized an

inspection of plants by the Fire Department, and worked on
plans for transportation of war workers.

Later, in 1943, the

War Department and other agencies took over security and plant
protection

and

inspection,

and

in

March,

1944,

the

Anny

discontinued its Advance Warning System as there no longer
was any danger of air attack.

There were some efforts at

sabotage and war plants did establish guards to prevent this. 18
The conversion from civilian to war production created many shortages of civilian goods.
able was often of poorer quality.

Even what was avail-

Manufacturers, who stayed

in civilian production, had to make do with substitute materials

and even these were often hard to get.

Retailers

stocked their shelves with ersatz merchandise and were glad
to get even that.

sears,

Roebuck and Company,

which de-
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signed much of its own merchandise, scavenged in stock rooms
and dumps of various manufacturers in search of materials that
could be used in hard goods.

Even so, durable goods became

scarcer during the war and retailers and mail order firms had
to devote more space to soft goods such as clothing.

They

also had to restrict their sales to maintain their inventory.
consumer attitudes varied during the war.

In December, 1942,

holiday sales were brisk, but returns were few.
what they had due to shortages.

People kept

In 1943, several "Victory"

models of clothing items of spartan design were introduced.
However, as news from the battlefront became more optimistic,
people anticipated the easing of shortages and became more
reluctant

to

accept

substitute

Victory

goods.

models

disappeared in 1944 and shoppers turned to luxury goods and
higher-priced
appliances
quality.

items.

and

Scarce

furniture,

items,

remained

popular

such

as

regardless

of

Sears sold iceboxes, which could be converted to

electric refrigerators after the war.
sold well.
teeism,

however,

Finally,

utilities

Secondhand merchandise

to aid war workers and reduce absen-

such as

Commonwealth

Edison

program for repair and resale of old appliances.

promoted a
People could

bring in appliances to electric appliance stores for repair
and resale to war workers.

overall,

despite shortages of

goods, retailers had record sales in the war years.
retail sales in Illinois,
June,

Monthly

which totaled $14, 435, 854. 00

1941, reached $17,363,949.00 in June,

1944.

in

Chicago
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retail sales rose from $1,650 million in 1940 to an estimated
.
.
. 1945 • 19
$2180 0 million
in
Many war industries had to expand their facilities to
fulfill their contracts.

Idled plants were reopened.

In

March, 1942, American Locomotive Company reopened its Chicago Heights steel-making plant, most of which had been closed
for ten years.

Smaller firms made use of whatever space was

available as they expanded to meet war orders.

In Rockford,

an old high school girls gymnasium housed a local war industry.

Though some acquired idle plants of other manufactur-

ers, others had to make do with stores, garages, old livery
stables and other makeshift facilities.
rapidly as a result of the war.

Many companies grew

A Freeport producer of

electric switches with only 138 employees in 1940, had over
1000 by 1944.

To help finance this expansion, private banks

and some government agencies, especially the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, extended loans to companies in need of
them.

In the Chicago region, 31.7 percent of the loans went

to businesses with assets totalling over $5 million or more,
33.2 percent to those with assets of $500,000 to $5 million,
28.2 percent to firms with assets between $50,000 and
$500,000, and 6.9 percent to those with less than $50,000 in
assets.

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation also estab-

lished a subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation, to finance construction of war plants for specific purposes.
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usuallY,

the agency owned the plants,

pri·vate companies for operation.

but

leased them to

In the Chicago area,

it

financed aircraft engine plants, an aluminum rolling mill and
a plant to produce brass and other metal parts for aircraft and munitions.

Not all such ventures were successful.

In 1943, the Defense Plant corporation financed construction
of hemp mills in Illinois and several other states to process
hemp for use in making rope.

Axis victories in 1942 cut off

or reduced foreign supplies of Manila hemp, sisal and jute and
threatened a shortage of rope.

Al though some hemp was planted

in 1943, production was reduced in 1944 and none was planted
after that year.

Allied victories in 1943 and 1944 reduced

the need for the hemp mills as foreign supplies again became
available. 20
A more successful Defense Plant Corporation venture
was the construction of airplane engine plants in the Chicago area.

In the spring of 1941, the Studebaker Corporation

started construction of a factory on the city's southwest side
to manufacture components for engines to be assembled at a
plant in South Bend,

Indiana.

Early in 1942,

the factory

started production of components for engines for B-17
bombers.

The Buick Division of General Motors Corporation

built a plant in Melrose Park, which ultimately supplied
most of the engines for B-24 bombers.

Later, Chrysler Cor-

poration's Dodge Division built a huge engine plant on Chi-
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cago, s

southwest side,

which at that time was the world's

iargest airplane engine plant.

It produced a total of

18,413

engines for B-29 and B-32 bombers, including the planes which
dropped the first

Douglas Aircraft Company

atomic bombs.

constructed an Army-owned plant in Park Ridge to build C-54
transports, many of which were powered by engines from the
The Douglas plant was

nearby Buick plant in Melrose Park.

especially noteworthy for its use of wood as a substitute for
steel

in its

Bendix

construction.

Aviation,

built

airplane carburetors.

the

On Chicago's near west
nation's

largest

side,

factory

for

Other firms around the state produced

airplane parts and subassernblies and even light planes and
gliders.

All of this led some Chicago and state business

leaders to anticipate that the city and state would become the
center of an aviation industry after the war.

This did not

materialize as the aircraft and engine plants shut down after
the war. 21
Ordnance plants were constructed by the Army and usually operated by private operators.
in Illinois,

There were several built

including the large Wilmington-Elwood complex,

which started production in 1941, the crab Orchard Lake plant
near

Herrin,

the

Green

River

plant

near

Dixon,

Illiopolis plant between Decatur and Springfield.

and

the

All except

the Wilmington-Elwood plants started production in 1942.

Some

of the sites aroused some controversy since the land was good
farmland and the farmers did not wish to sell.

Farmers in the

105
Wilmington area were especially angry since hundreds of acres
of wasteland
nearby.

created

by

strip

coal

mines

were

available

Eventually, however, the Army won out and the farmers

were relocated to other areas of the state.

Contractors then

built the Kankakee Ordnance Works to manufacture TNT, tetryl
and lead azide, and its twin, the Elwood Ordnance Works, which
loaded these explosives into shells and bombs.
ordnance plants were

shell

The other own

and bomb-loading plants.

The

Army's own ordnance plants at Rock Island and Savanna also
increased

production.

Construction

of

the

new

stimulated boomtown conditions in nearby communities.

plants
Housing

was scarce and trailer camps sprang up to meet the demand.
Though the plants went to great lengths to ensure safety and
security, there were accidents.

The most serious took place

at the Elwood Ordnance Works in June, 1942, when an explosion
destroyed a building, killing 51 and injuring 41 others. 22
Boomtown

conditions

prevailed

in

Seneca

where

the

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company built and operated a shipyard under a contract with the Navy to build landing ships
tank (LST's).
on other

Since all coastal yards were working full-time

types of ships, new yards were necessary and the

Navy decided to build some on

inland waterways with suf-

ficient depth to float the vessels down to the sea.

The Il-

linois River was part of the Great Lakes-Gulf Waterway with
a nine-foot channel down the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers.
From June, 1942 to June, 1945, the Seneca shipyard built 157
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of the large landing ships and launched them sideways into
The first ship took to the water on

the Illinois River.
oecember

14,

Others

1942.

followed

at

ever-increasing

intervals as the work force gained experience and efficiency.
since housing was scarce,

Federal housing agencies erected

temporary housing for the workers, many of which were from
other parts of the country.

Seneca went from a population of

1235 in 1942 to 6600 by 1944.

The community had to expand its

schools and other services to accomodate the newcomers.

Many

residents resented this and made the migrants feel unwelcome.
some shipyard workers joined local schools,
many were made

to

feel

unwelcome.

The

but even then,

community

benefitted from the influx of shipyard workers.

itself

New churches

were built, while older ones gained new members and income.
Empty

store

buildings

were

business establishments.
business.

remodeled

and

opened

to

new

Food stores doubled or tripled their

Other retailers enjoyed a similar expansion.

Some

locals even claimed that the boom rescued several businessmen
from bankruptcy.

The community itself gained a new school

building, a new drainage and sewage system and additional fire
fighting equipment. 23
Several

other

Illinois

Vessels of various kinds.

shipyards

also

built

naval

Pullman-Standard constructed and

operated a shipyard on Lake Calumet, which erected small escort vessels and landing ships medium (LSM's) for the United
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Other Chicago-area yards built

states and British navies.
small minesweepers,

minelayers,

tugboats,

small cargo ves-

sels, small oil tankers and invasion barges.
firm turned out assault boats.
structed landing craft tanks

An East Peoria

Quincy Barge Builders con(LCT's).

The construction of

naval vessels in Illinois and other Great Lakes states presented some major difficulties.

In the first place, the Rush-

Bagot Treaty of 1817 prohibited such activity until March,
1941 when the United States and Canada made a new agreement
lifting the ban provided the vessels were not used on the
Great Lakes.

A much greater difficulty lay in getting the

vessels out of the Lakes and other waterways to seaports.
Most naval vessels that came out of yards on the Lakes and
various rivers had a sufficiently shallow draft to go down the
Illinois and Mississippi Rivers, the Erie Canal, the Welland
Canal and other waterways.
Wisconsin

built

However, when a yard at Manitowoc,

submarines,

they

were

floated

down

the

Illinois and Mississippi Rivers in special cradles constructed
for the purpose, which lifted them free of shoals.

Chicago

yards on the north branch of the Chicago River had their own
problems

with

shallow

water.

Low

bridges

were

another

obstacle and eventually some communities had to raise them or
make them movable. 24
The demand for steel from such industries as shipbuilding forced the steel industry to increase capacity in
order to increase production.

As early as June, 1940, the
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industry in Chicago was operating at 93.3 percent of capacity and soon United States Steel Company's Carnegie-Illi. oi'vision added two electric furnaces at the South Works
no1s
in Chicago.

Early in 1941, another United States steel sub-

sidiary expanded its facilities in Joliet.

Most additions

to capacity resulted from improvements to exisiting facilities to make them efficient.

The industry was reluctant to

build new facilities to meet the demands of defense, and later, war production as this would add to steel-making capacity, thus leaving them with excess capacity in peacetime and
driving up costs.

They wanted federal financing of the new

facilities and got it from the Defense Plant Corporation.
Late in 1941, Inland Steel Company started construction
of

three

blast

government.

furnaces,

two

of

them

financed

by

the

Early in January, 1942, Republic Steel Corpora-

tion started construction of six electric furnaces at its
Chicago plant, all financed by the government.

The furnaces

were part of the first all-electric steel mill in the nation.

It went into partial operation in 1943 producing

electric alloy steel.

In January, 1944, the War Production

Board recommended that work be stopped on construction of a
bar mill at the plant.
was

completed.

This was soon reversed and the mill

Ultimately,

the

plant

consisted

of

nine

electric furnaces, four batteries of coke ovens, a blast
furnace,

four open hearths, a blooming mill, a bar mill, a
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breakdown mill and three ore unloading bridges.
to production late in 1944.

It went in-

Some companies did construct

additional facilities at their own expense, but the most
significant facilities were financed by the Defense Plant
corporation.

The improvements raised total steel production

capacity in the Chicago area from 15,429,600 tons on December 31, 1939 to 18,600,300 tons as of January 1, 1945.

The

Defense Plant Corporation also financed expansion of other
Illinois steel-making facilities such as Granite City steel
company's plant in Granite City.

All of these improvements

helped to increase steel production to record levels.

Chi-

cago area steel ingot production rose from 17,665,000 tons
in 1942 to peak at 18,090,000 tons in 1944 before dropping
to 16,494,000 tons in 1945.

Pig iron production at Chicago-

area mills went from 6,536,098 tons in 1939 to 13,115,268
tons in 1944 and 11,510,810 tons in 1945. 25
Feeding the state's mills, factories and utilities were
its highly mechanized coal mines.

Illinois coal pro-

duction went from 51,033,319 tons in 1941 to 77,400,031 tons
in 1944.

Production dropped somewhat in 1945 due to labor

shortages.

since coal was more plentiful than fuel oil,

users of the latter were encouraged to convert back to coal.
Even then, however, consumers were urged to buy early.

Dea-

lers secured loans to help them build up stocks during the
summer.

Late in the fall of 1943, the Solid Fuels Adminis-

tration restricted consumer purchases of coal due to shor-
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tages

caused in part by labor difficulties and labor shorta-

ges and mounting demands from industry.

Early in 1945, a

slump in coal supplies led to a brownout, which curtailed
some usage of electricity.

During 1943 and 1944, strikes

led the Solid Fuels Administration to take over the mines and
operate them for a time.

Sales of Illinois coal met

another

obstacle in st. Louis, whose smoke abatement ordnance barred
southern Illinois coal from the city due to its excessive
smoke, and required coal to be shipped in from other states.
This led to protests from Southern Illinois coal interests and
local communities and also from the Midwest Shipper's Association, which charged that the shipping of coal from other
states to St. Louis was a wasteful use of railroad cars in
wartime.

Illinois

mines

also

contributed

lead,

fluorspar and other minerals to the war effort.
long-dormant lead and zinc mines revived.

zinc,

Galena's

Southern

Illinois mines produced almost half the nation's supply of
fluorspar, which was used in making steel, hydrofluoric acid
and cryolite, a mineral used in making aluminum.

Illinois

fluorspar production increased from 117,465 tons in 1939 to
161,949 tons in 1942.u

One industry which was highly dependent on the output
of Illinois coal mines was the electric power system.

The

growth of war industries led to a heavy demand for electric
power and also natural gas.

Indeed, the Seneca shipyard and

several major war industries in the Chicago area were loca-
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ted in Northern Illinois partly because of the abundant supply of electricity.

Still, some utilities had to add gene-

rating units at power plants and even built new power plants
to meet the
sharply.

need

for

power.

Power production

increased

The Commonwealth Edison system, which generated

7 ,550,378,224 kilowatthours in 1939, peaked at 11,583,894,
76 0 kilowatthours in 1944 before dropping to 11,349,117,347
kilowatthours in 1945.

Utilities also added interconnecting

lines to allow for pooling of power to serve specific war
plants or as an emergency reserve.

The Commonwealth Edison

system and the Wisconsin Electric Power built an emergency
power line between Waukegan and Kenosha to connect the two
systems and serve as an emergency reserve source of power
for either system.
tages of materials.

New extensions were limited due to sherRural electrification projects were

curtailed, though some restrictions were eased in 1943 to
permit some extensions to improve farm production.

To con-

serve the use of electricity, the nation went on Daylight
Saving Time or Wartime year-round.

One result was to change

the time of peakload from the late afternoon to the morning.
It changed back when Central Standard Time returned after
the war.

Early in 1945, a coal shortage led to a brownout,

which curtailed outside lighting and forced night clubs,
taverns,

and

other

places

of

entertainment

to

close

at

midnight, thus depriving them of much of their business.
Natural gas usage met with similar restrictions.

Extensions
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to new homes were limited by shortages of aterials.
qas companies resorted to plastic pipe.

Some

Gas deliveries were

cut to businesses, which could use other fuels.

There was a

heavy emphasis on conservation, though some new pipelines
were built and old gas manufacturing plants reopened. 27
Unlike most commodities, production of oil from Illinois wells declined during the war.
64 7, ooo barrels in 1940,
barrels by 1943.

After peaking at 147,

production dropped to 82, 2 60, 000

There were several reasons for this,

in-

eluding the loss of experienced labor to the armed forces,
shortages of equipment and price restrictions for crude oil.
one of the biggest causes for the decline was restrictions on
drilling

by

the

War

Production

Board

and

the

Office

of

Petroleum Coordinator, later renamed the Petroleum Administration for War, headed by Secretary of the Interior, Harold
L. Ickes.

The War Production Board wanted to limit steel,

while the other agencies wanted to conserve oil,
limited drilling to one well for every forty acres.

so they
Under

pressure from Illinois operators and their congressional allies,

Ickes eased the restriction somewhat,

moved all restraints until after the war.

but never reThe General As-

sembly passed a mild oil conservation measure in 1941, but
failed to enact stronger legislation despite pressure from
Ickes.

The oil industry also expanded refineries and other

facilities during the war.~
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Most companies prospered during the war, but profits
were often lower than before Pearl Harbor due to rising taxes,
especially the excess profits tax, and renegotiation of war
contracts.

Renegotiation grew out of a congressional fear of

war profiteering.

Under the law passed April 28, 1942, the
could

renegotiate

contracts if a firm's profits seemed excessive.

The company

would then refund any excess to the government.

Even then,

war

Price

contracts

Adjustment

Board

while many firms had higher profits in 1941 than during the
rest of the war years, they still did much better than during
the Depression years of the thirties.

Many firms, especially

smaller ones, grew to an unusual size under the impetus of
While

war contracts.

others did quite well.
manufacturing

in

some

small

manufacturers

During the war years, the nature of

Illinois

also

shifted

somewhat.

industry grew in proportion to food and clothing.
iron and steel

suffered,

Heavy
In 1939,

industries comprised 21. 2 percent of total

employment in the Chicago area, while food industries employed
14 percent of the workforce, printing and publishing,

10.2

percent, textiles, 9 percent and machinery, 16.5 percent.
1948,

iron

and

steel

was

down

to

20.5

percent

of

In

total

employment in the Chicago area, but machinery was up to 24.1
percent, food processing was down to 11.2 percent, printing
and publishing, 8.3 percent and textiles only 6.4 percent.
Also, even though iron and steel had decreased its share of
the workforce, the industry grew in capacity during the war.
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Illinois emerged from the war as the center of diesel engine
New

ntanufacture.

industries

sprang up

in

light metals,

plastics and the like, while existing firms introduced new
product lines based on their wartime experiences.
Chicago failed to become an

Though

aircraft manufacturing center as

she bad hoped, she increased in stature as a financial center
during the war.
Illinois

29

industries produced a

variety of products

during the war ranging from small parts to warships.
111aterials

Since

were insufficient to allow manufacture of all ci-

vilian product and military supplies,

the national defense

agencies charged with coordination of industrial production
found it necessary to devise a system of priorities for allocation of scarce commodities.

Production of some civilian

products had to utilize substitute materials.

Even war plants

themselves

of

sometimes

made

extensive

use

substitute for steel in their construction.

wood

as

a

Since companies

without a priority could not get raw materials, it was imperative for them to convert to manufacture needed military
supplies instead of civilian goods.

To assist them in con-

version to defense and then war production,
Production Management

and

later

the War

sponsored clinics and other programs.
tical and business

the Office of

Production

Board

State and local poli-

leaders also held clinics

and lobbied

procurement agencies for contracts for firms located in the
state.

Industries

also

formed

pools

to

solicit defense
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business or checked out contracts themselves to see if there
were products they could make.

In some cases, the Defense

plant corporation financed new industrial facilities in order to get military equipment or materials for which there
was a critical need such as aircraft engines.

Through their

own efforts as well as those of political and business leaders and federal agencies, most of the state's mills, mines
and factories managed to play some sort of role on the production front.

The experience involved a good deal of coo-

peration between different levels of government and between
businessmen themselves in dealing with problems of priorities, solicitation of business, acquisition of tools and plant
protection.

It also required some versatility since most

industries produced military items that were at least somewhat
different and often a good deal different from what they made
in peacetime.
the war.

By and large, Illinois industry profitted from

Though many companies did not do as well financially

as they would in peacetime, the tremendous growth in the size
of their

establishments

and

the

volume

of

business

and

experience they had acquired during the war left them well
positioned to participate in the postwar world.
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CHAPTER IV
LABOR RELATIONS AND MANPOWER MANAGEMENT IN WARTIME ILLINOIS
The

Second

World

War

brought

a

change

in

labor-

management and inter-union relations from confrontation to
peration.

During the

thirties

and

early

forties,

labor

unions fought industrial concerns of all sizes seeking recognition and better wages and benefits for their members.
some labor disputes involved rival unions affiliated with the
American

Federation

of

Labor

(AFL)

and

the

Congress

of

Industrial Organizations (CIO) as well as independents, some
of them company-dominated, all competing for the allegiance
of the workforce.

The struggle disrupted defense production

as strikes hit steel, farm equipment and other vital industries.

Pearl Harbor changed all this.

Unions strove to co-

operate with management and with each other in pushing production.

Rival unions laid aside their jurisdictional dis-

putes and for the most part ceased their competitive efforts.

Most companies and unions settled their disputes

through collective bargaining or if this proved unsuccessful,

submitted them to the War Labor Board and agreed to

abide by its decisions.

Some strikes did occur,

but most

were the result of intransigence on the part of one or both
parties in a dispute.

In a few instances, strikes were se124
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rious enough to bring government takeover of the affected
industries.

For the most part, however, labor leaders tried

to prevent strikes and squelch those that did occur.
war brought a measure of labor peace and productivity.

The
In

some cases, defense and wartime conditions helped induce a
reluctant management to accept unions.

The war also brought

an unprecedented degree of government control over the workforce as the War Manpower Commission sought to manage the
labor supply so as to place workers where they were most
needed while the War Labor Board settled disputes to maintain production and restricted wages in an effort to hold
down inf lat ion.

Wartime labor shortages also created em-

ployment opportunities for women and blacks and other minorities.
Union membership grew rapidly

in

the thirties

and

forties as the American Federation of Labor organized new
craft union locals while its offshoot and rival,

the Con-

gress of Industrial Organizations, established new industrial unions in mass production industries.

The first conven-

tion of the State Industrial Union Council in Springfield in
September,

1941 had representatives from 29

unions and 272 local industrial unions.

international

In 1943, the state

organization had a membership of 270,995 though it lost the
United Mine Workers in 1942 and expelled several unions in
the late forties on grounds of Communist domination.

Alarmed

by the rapid growth of its rival, the American Federation of
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Labor

eventually

industrial

reversed

unions

and

production industries.

its

traditional

organized

federal

opposition
locals

in

to

mass

Membership in the Federation's state

affiliate, the Illinois State Federation of Labor rose from
?6,000 in 1933 to 273,000 in 1941 and over 800,000 by 1950.
outside labor unions of any kind had to contend with the
hostility of employers, many of whom went to great lengths to
avoid dealing with outside unions, sometimes forming company
unions

disguised

as

independent

unions.

However,

if

a

company found that it had to deal with an outside union, it
sometimes favored those affiliated with the American Federation of Labor as they were generally more conservative and
less militant, though an anti-union management could provoke
as much militance in an AFL local as in a CIO union. 1
Organized labor benefitted greatly from the defense
boom.

Not only were its members employed in high-paying

jobs, but companies were less reluctant to accept unionization.

The Steel Workers Organizing committee rebounded from

its defeat by "Little Steel" in a 1937 strike and resumed
organizing activity.
grievances developed.
Steel" companies,

Short walkouts occurred whenever local
The strikes aggravated the "Little

but they could do little to stop them.

Defense production gave them plenty of business and they were
anxious to keep experienced workers rather than fire them for
union activity.

The union also picketed the mills and forced

incoming workers to sign up with the union and pay union dues
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or oe barred from the plant.

The National Labor Relations

Board helped matters by ordering the companies to disestaolish company unions.

The companies finally gave in and

signed contracts with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
in 1941.

The heavy defense business and disestablishment of

its company unions finally forced the companies to accept
The union also conducted dues-picketing at

unionization.

u.

s. steel's Gary Works in the spring and fall of that year

in order to force a union shop.

In the summer of 1942, the

union, now renamed the United Steelworkers of America, won
exclusive bargaining rights for all workers at U. s. Steel. 2
In 1936, the Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Committee,

an offshoot of the steelworkers union,

set out to

conquer the farm equipment industry, only to run into determined opposition from International Harvester.

After

company unions were outlawed, the company simply converted
them to independent unions which it still dominated.

The

Farm Equipment Workers union complained to the National Labor
Relations

Board,

which

found

that

the

independents

really company unions and in February,

1941,

disbanded.

the

In January of that year,

ordered them

Farm Equipment

Workers started organizing International Harvester.
competition from the United Auto Workers.
Congress
between

of

Industrial

member

unions

Organizations
in

organizing

were

It faced

At that time, the

allowed

competition

industries.

This

resulted in a bitter feud between the Farm Equipment Workers
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and the united Auto Workers.

The Congress of Industrial

organizations tried to persuade them to merge, but the Farm
Equipment workers resisted.
to raiding its rival,

The United Auto Workers resorted

especially in the postwar era,

and

ultimately, with the assistance of International Harvester,
destroyed the Farm Equipment Workers in the mid-fifties. 3
In 1941, both unions faced another competitor in the
American Federation of Labor.
disestablished at

When the independents were

International Harvester,

the

Federation

started converting them into federal locals with the support
of management, which was anxious to keep out the CIO, especially the Farm Equipment Workers,
communist-led.

which they considered

The latter, which struck two plants in Janu-

ary, 1941 as part of its drive for union recognition, responded to the threat from the AFL by extending the strike to
other plants in March.

The federal locals then led a back
The company also

to work movement which broke the strike.

granted wage hikes to reduce the attractiveness of the CIO.
However, when the National Labor Relations Board held elections, the CIO won most of the plants.
Workers took four,
while
states.

the

United

The Farm Equipment

including the main plants
Auto

Workers

captured

in Chicago,

plants

in

other

Only two plants chose federal locals, and one of

them switched to the Farm Equipment Workers in 1944.

Inde-

pendents hung on at a few plants, but by the end of the war,
most had been voted out by the workers in favor of outside
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By 1945,

unions.

the Farm Equipment workers held eleven

plants, and the United Auto Workers six, while the American
Federation of Labor had the Milwaukee plant and craft unions
in other plants.

The National Defense Mediation Board and

its successor, the War Labor Board, eventually settled the
contract between the company and the Farm Equipment Workers
in 1942.

The union also organized Caterpillar in Peoria,

defeating an independent union and an AFL federal

local.

John Deere was able to fend off unionization of most of its
plants until

1943

when the United Auto Workers won

four

plants, while the Farm Equipment Workers took one. 4
While International Harvester was opposed to outside
unions in principle, it especially objected to the militant
Farm Equipment Workers union, which reputedly was communistled.

At that time, the Congress of Industrial Organizations

willingly hired Communists and their sympathizers as organizers.

Some reputed reds rose through the ranks to dominate

locals and even entire unions such as the Farm Equipment
Workers and the United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers
of America, with which it merged in the late forties after
both were expelled from the Congress of Industrial Organizations for their communist leanings.

The CIO was concerned

about the communist issue, but was quite happy to use Marxists to organize and build its affiliated unions until after
the war when the reds were expelled.
hurt

the

organization's

public

The Communist issue did

image,

and

the

American
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federation of Labor as well as many industry leaders were
quick to take advantage of this.

A congressional committee

investigating domestic subversives came to Chicago in the
fall of 1939 and accused several local CIO officials of being
communists.

The

committee,

headed

by

Texas

Congressman

Martin Dies,

made further accusations throughout the war

years as did the Chicago Tribune and local business and labor
Frequently, the paper played up dissident union

leaders.

members' charges of Communists in union leadership positions. 5
The American Federation of Labor, however,

suffered

from bad publicity due to the influence of racketeers in some
of its affiliated unions.
control of several

In Chicago, local gangsters gained

locals in service industries.

Later,

alleged labor leaders sold jobs and union cards at inflated
prices.

In 1941 and 1942, George Ziller, a reputed Democrat-

ic leader,

forced potential laborers and truckers to pay

exorbitant

fees

to get work at

several

ordnance plants.

Truckers had to join the Teamsters union and laborers the
hod carriers union.
delays,

Ziller collected the dues.

including changes of venue,

April, 1945 and was fined.

After many

he pleaded guilty in

other AFL unions drew criticism

for charging exorbitant initiation fees to join the union
and get jobs at ordnance plants, though several cut their
fees following the exposure of the Ziller scandal. 6
Besides facing opposition

from company management,

many unions had to deal with worker apathy and sometimes
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outright hostility.

Some workers felt they should not have

to join a union to get a job.
union could do for them.

Others questioned what the

The security of a good job seemed

more important than any possible gains from unionization.
Even union members were apathetic.

They had no comprehension

of the expense of running a union and could see no need to
keep up with their dues.

Unions resorted to dues picketing

simply to collect enough funds to keep going.

Ultimately,

they issued reports on audits of their funds to their members
and collected dues through deduction from paychecks. 7
As the nation started to rearm,

President Franklin

Delano Roosevelt and his advisors saw a need for settling
industrial disputes that threatened defense production.
March,

1941,

In

the President appointed the National Defense

Mediation Board to negotiate settlements for strikes in defense industries.

The Board was composed of representatives

of industry, labor and the public, and it handled only disputes which could not be settled by the parties themselves
or by the United States conciliation Service.

Individual

cases were handled by tripartite panels selected by the Board
from its members while the entire group worked out policy.
It relied on public opinion to enforce its recommendations.
Disputants who

refused

to

opinion going against them.

accept

them might

find

public

The Board also required strikers

to go back to work while mediation was in progress.

It

usually

in

was

more

successful

in

ending

strikes

than
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resolving the issues and many of its cases, including that of
International Harvester,
soard.

were passed on to the War Labor

8

one of the Mediation Board's successes was settlement
of a dispute at western Cartridge Company in East Al ton.
The company,

which had defense contracts with the United

states and Great Britain, utilized individual contracts with
its

employees

unions.
union,

and

an

In January,

inside
1941,

union

however,

to

stave

off

outside

the Chemical Workers

affiliated with the American Federation of

Labor,

began organizing the smokeless powder workers, who comprised
about 550 employees out of a total workforce of 6500.

The

union asked for recognition, but the company refused to bargain on the grounds that the smokeless powder division was
not a proper bargaining unit and that recognition would interfere with individual contracts.

The union appealed to

the National Labor Relations Board, which certified the unit
as a bargaining unit and held an election, which the union
won.

The company refused to negotiate and the union threa-

tened to strike.

The company also set up a subsidiary plant,

the East Alton Manufacturing Company, and announced plans to
transfer the smokeless powder workers to that plant.

The

union feared that the change might be detrimental to the
workers, and when the dispute went to the National Defense
Mediation Board, sought protection for its members as well as
union recognition and a union shop.

The

company, meanwhile,
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ted a wage increase to all employees except those in the
gra n
smokeless powder division.
After discussions with the
Mediation Board, the company finally
the union.

agreed to bargain with

Negotiations soon broke down, however, and the

Board got the case.

The two sides continued negotiations

before the Board and separately with little progress. 9
on July 24, the Mediation Board recommended a wage
increase, abolition of individual contracts and recognition
of the union.

Although it refused to endorse a closed shop,

it did recommend maintenance of membership, a provision under which an employee belonging to a union would have to
remain in it for the duration of a contract in order to keep
his job.

The Board saw a need for some form of union secu-

rity in view of company efforts to eliminate union members.
Nevertheless, maintenance of membership was a controversial
issue which finally came to a head with the War Labor Board.
Western

Cartridge

and

the

union

accepted

the

Mediation

Board's findings and signed a contract on August 2, though
some issues were left for later bargaining or arbitration.
This did not end disputes at Western Cartridge.

The com-

pany's anti-labor policies eventually led to two strikes in
the fall of 1942. 10
Al though

the National

Defense Mediation

Board was

successful in ending several strikes, it foundered and broke
up over a series of coal strikes in 1941.

John L. Lewis, a

Republican who supported Roosevelt in 1936, broke with him
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e refused to assist the Steel Workers Organizing Comwhe n h
t11ittee in its strike against "Little Steel" in 1937. As an
isolationist, Lewis also objected to the President's foreign
policies, fearing that war would bring restrictions on union
rights and collective bargaining.
trictions even in wartime.

Lewis opposed any res-

In 1940, he backed Republican

Wendell Willkie and advised union members to do likewise.
When most CIO unions refused to go along with him, he stepped
down as head of the organization after the election, and in
1942, took his United Mine Workers out of the

cro. 11

In the spring of 1941, the United Mine Workers negotiated with the Appalachian Conference of bituminous coal
operators on a series of proposals including elimination of
a difference in wage rates between northern and southern
mines.

Southern mines paid lower wages on grounds of lower

living costs.

The union and northern operators feared that

if this continued, competitive advantages would shift coal
production to southern fields.

The South refused to yield

and the miners struck after the contract expired on March
31.

In Illinois, the Progressive Mine Workers, who had left

the United Mine Workers in 1932, joined the walkout.

Roose-

velt urged both sides to end the strike and resume negotiations.

The northern

operators

soon

reached a

tentative

agreement with the United Mine Workers, but the southerners,
who withdrew from the Appalachian Conference on April 11,
continued to resist.

The union and the northern operators
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inued the strike in an effort to force the South to
cont
yield·
on April 24, as coal shortages threatened, the National Defense Mediation Board took up the dispute and on
April 30, the strike ended, though most Illinois miners remained out until May 3 in a dispute over local issues.

In

June, the Mediation Board recommended elimination of the wage
differential

for

daytime

shifts.

After

the

southerners

finally agreed to this, Lewis pressured them into signing a
contract identical to the one which he negotiated with the
northern operators.

The new contract, signed July 6, raised

wages and abolished the wage differential. 12
Soon afterward,

Lewis sought to extend the terms of

the agreement to the captive coal mines owned by steel companies.

The operators generally agreed except for a demand

for a union shop.

The union already had 95 percent of the

miners in the captive mines and thought it only logical that
it should have the rest.

The companies, however, feared that

if they accepted a union shop in the mines, they would have
to accept it in the steel mills, where the Steelworkers union
demanded the same terms.

If the government imposed a union

shop, they could argue in negotiations with the Steelworkers
that it did not constitute a precedent.
miners walked out.
promptly took up

The National
the

case

On September 15, the

Defense Mediation Board

and within a

few

days,

Lewis

ordered the miners back to work for a month while the Board
considered the dispute.

A Board panel tried to avoid the
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union shop issue because of its repercussions in the steel
and shipbuilding industries and tried to turn the matter over
to the full board while the mines continued working.
declined and called the miners out on October 26.

Lewis
After a

personal plea by the President, Lewis agreed to a temporary
reopening of the mines while the Mediation Board took up the
dispute.

However, on November 10, the Board

two against a union shop in the mines.

voted nine-to-

The two

cro members

resigned in protest, thereby leading to the Board's collapse.
Roosevelt summoned both sides to the White House on November
14

and

requested

them

to

continue

coal

production

and

negotiations, but warned that he would not impose a closed
shop.
22,

On November 17, the miners struck again.

Lewis accepted a

On November

proposal by President Roosevelt for

arbitration and ordered the miners back to work.

The panel,

which included Lewis, Benjamin Fairless of U. S. Steel and
John Steelman of the Conciliation Service, voted two to one
for a union shop.

Though Lewis won his victory. his tactics

angered the public and led to numerous anti-strike bills in
Congress though none passed. 13
Soon after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt convened
business and labor leaders in Washington to establish some
basis for wartime cooperation.
program

banning

strikes

and

The conferees agreed on a
lockouts

for

the

duration,

peaceful settlement of disputes and creation of a War Labor
Board to handle disputes which could not be solved through
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_..al procedures.
In effect, labor agreed not to strike,
no.1-•u
o trust its fortunes to the Board.
In January, 1942,
bUt t
Roosevelt appointed the National War Labor Board with representatives of business,

labor and the public.

The Board,

which replaced the National Defense Mediation Board, handled
disputes which threatened the war effort.

Later, its duties

were expanded to include wage stabilization.

Sometimes, it

also handled cases of union recognition and other issues
normally dealt with by the National Labor Relations Board.
When employees struck, the War Labor Board had to get them
back to work.

Both sides were expected to abide by its de-

cisions, though they were advisory and not enforceable in
Late in 1942, ten regional boards,

the courts.

including

one in Chicago, were established to handle local wage stabilization and local disputes subject to review by the National Board.

The War Labor Board succeeded partly because the

country was unified and partly because both management and
labor were represented on the Board and took an active role
in pol icy-making. 14
One of the first issues the War Labor Board had to
deal with was union security, the same issue which tore apart
the

National

Defense

Mediation

Board.

Unions

generally

wanted a union shop or closed shop while management wanted
an open shop .
promise.

Union maintenance of membership was a corn-

No one was forced to join a union, but those who

belonged to a union when a contract was signed had to remain
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. i't while the contract was in force or lose their jobs.
in
unions wanted some form of security as protection against
hostile employers,
threat.

especially in the absence of a

strike

Public members of the War Labor Board supported

union security for this reason and also because they felt
that a stable union would insure better plant discipline and
observance of the no-strike pledge and discourage inter-union
rivalry and raiding,

which sometimes disrupted

industrial

15
peace b efore the war.

Union security was a major issue in the dispute between International Harvester and the Farm Equipment Workers
union dating back to the spring of 1941, which the Mediation
Board passed on to the War Labor Board.

In the spring of

1942, the Farm Equipment Workers and the American Federation
of Labor joined in submitting the dispute to the Board.
April,

In

the Board voted eight to four to recommend mainte-

nance of membership in the contract subject to a referendum
of the membership of the unions involved.
members dissented,

Though industry

they indicated a willingness to accept

maintenance of membership with an escape period during which
an employee could resign from a union without losing his job.
The Board soon adopted this provision and made it a standard
feature of maintenance of membership agreements.
tional

Harvester,

though

still

opposing

union

Internasecurity,

especially with the Farm Equipment Workers union,

finally

accepted it in order to avoid any disruption of war produc-
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tion.

A referendum of union members approved maintenance of

membership by a wide margin and the company had little labor
trouble for the rest of the war.

16

Although the War Labor Board saw maintenance of membership as desirable to obtain union security, it sometimes
refused to grant it or even withdrew it if a union violated
the no-strike pledge.

The Chemical Workers Union struck

western cartridge in September, 1942 for refusing to reinstate its president.

He was fired in June for entering a

restricted area without permission, but the union attributed
the firing to his union activities.
had a contract with the union,

Even though the company

it continued trying to get

rid of the union and keep out other unions.

American Fede-

ration of Labor President William Green ordered the strikers
back to work, but blamed the strike on the company's antilabor policies.

In November, the War Labor Board ruled that

the company's policies provoked the strike and ordered it to
reinstate some workers and deal with the union; but it also
criticized the union for calling a strike over minor issues
and refused to continue maintenance of membership in a new
contract.

Meanwhile, a second AFL union struck the casting

and brass mill shops

in October,

accusing the company of

refusing to deal with it to settle grievances.
ordered the men back to work.

Again, Green

The National Labor Relations

Board, meanwhile, ruled that the company had interfered with
union organization, discriminated against workers and domi-
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nated an independent union.

The Board ordered the indepen-

dent union disestablished and directed the company to cease
its anti-union policies.

The company appealed to the United

states circuit Court of Appeals, but the court ruled against
it in May, 1943 and ordered enforcement of the Board's ru•

ling.

17

At first, the War Labor Board had no set policies and
proceeded on a case by case basis settling disputes on their
merits as they arose.

Over time, the Board developed some

policies based on similar cases.

Some settlements provided

for automatic deduction of union dues from paychecks when
the physical difficulty of collecting dues interfered with
war production.

The Board also dealt with wages, vacation

plans and other issues.

In June, 1944, following a strike

by a United Auto Workers local at a John Deere plant in Mo-

line, the Board penalized the strikers and ordered withdrawal of the company's vacation plan,

replacing it with one

less liberal. 18
One of the War Labor Board's most troublesome issues
was wages.

On April 27, 1942, President Roosevelt announced

a program for holding down inflation, including controls on
wages as well as prices.
by restricting wage hikes.

The Board had to stabilize wages
At the time,

the Steelworkers

union was negotiating a contract with the Little Steel cornpanies.

The chief issues in dispute were union security and

wages.

The companies objected mostly to union security,
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though some felt that wages should be frozen in wartime.

In

July, the War Labor Board concluded that since the cost of
living had gone up 15 percent since January 1, 1941, wages
should be adjusted accordingly.

The Board awarded a pay hike

of 44 cents a day, far less than the $1 a day increase the
steelworkers wanted, but more than the companies wished to
pay.

The union

accepted

accepted it under protest.

u. s.

it

glumly,

while

the

industry

The Board also raised wages for

steel and generally used the Little Steel formula as a

yardstick for future wage settlements.

Hence if a company's

wages were already high enough, they could go no higher. 19
The Little Steel formula did not solve the problem
since the War Labor Board could only handle disputes.

It

could do nothing about wage agreements arrived at through
collective bargaining.

Many companies raised wages to keep

their workers and attract others.
other to raise wages.

This naturally forced

On October 2, 1942, Congress passed

the Economic stabilization Act and on the following day, the
President ordered new wage and price controls.

Now the War

Labor Board had to develop and administer a wage-stabilization program.

Employers could not raise wages without ap-

proval of the War Labor Board.

The President forbade wage

hikes except to eliminate inequalities and substandard wages.

Even then the Board had to maintain wages at the level

of September 15, 1942.

In April, 1943, the President issued

a "hold the line" order further restricting wages and pri-
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one immediate result was denial of thousands of wage
ceS·
hike petitions in the Chicago Regional War Labor Board ofpay restrictions caused problems for employers wish-

fice.

ing to satisfy their workforce.

Early in 1943, the Studeba-

ker Aircraft Engine plant in Chicago agreed to a request by
a united Auto Workers local to raise wages to the level of
General Motors plants, only to suffer some embarrassment when
the Regional War Labor Board denied its request to raise
Another Chicago firm was fined for raising wages.

wages.

Employers continued to think up ways of raising wages without
violating the stabilization program, usually through fringe
adjustments such as job reclassifications, paid holidays and
the like.

Meanwhile, prices continued to rise, though at a

slower rate due to price control, and by 1943, labor unions
were

demanding

relaxation

of

the

Little

Steel

formula.

Though some cracks did occur, the formula held for the most
part.

Between January, 1941 and October, 1942, basic wage

rates in manufacturing rose 15 percent.
1942

and

July,

percent.

1945,

Meanwhile,

however,

the

the cost of

Between October,

increase

living

was

only

rose about

9

33. 3

percent between January, 1941 and July, 1945, hence the labor unrest.

Sometimes, the War Labor Board approved a wage

hike if it were necessary to attract workers into a critically important industry.

In 1944, the radio manufacturing

industry in Chicago found it difficult to attract workers
due to low wages.

Representatives of the armed forces, union
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ieaders and company officials persuaded the War Labor Board
to approve a wage hike for the industry. 20
Though most business and labor leaders went along with
wartime

restrictions,

defied the government.

there

were

some who

dissented

and

Usually, the government responded by

seizing the strikebound industry.

At one point, from Decem-

ber 28, 1943 to January 18, 1944, the entire railroad industry was taken over to end a strike,
short-lived

and

the

companies

but the takeover was

continued

to

operate

the

roads. 21
The situation was different with the Toledo, Peoria
and Western Railroad, an Illinois carrier whose owner, George
P. McNear,

refused to deal with unions and who considered

standard railroad work rules obsolete and inefficient.

When

he issued new ones, the unions struck on December 28, 1941.
McNear refused to accept arbitration, and after all efforts
to end the strike failed, the government took over the line
in March, 1942 and operated it fo~ the rest of the war. 22
Sewell Avery also disliked unions, but his main purpose in resisting the War Labor Board was to dramatize his
opposition to the growth of presidential powers under the
New Deal and War Powers legislation.
was fighting their fight.

Conservatives felt he

As president of Montgomery Ward,

Avery fought unionization in the thirties and early forties.
Even after a

cro union won and election at the Chicago store

and warehouse in January, 1942, Avery refused to deal with
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the union.

In October, the War Labor Board ordered the com-

pany to sign a contract providing for maintenance of membership, voluntary dues checkoff, arbitration of grievances and
seniority rights.

Avery refused until finally in December,

after several orders by the President, he agreed to sign a
contract, but under protest.

However, the company continued

to fight the union and in November, 1943, notified the union
that it would not negotiate a renewal of the contract because it doubted that the union still had a majority of the
workforce.

When the War Labor Board ordered a temporary ex-

tension of the contract, the company refused.
after another refusal, the union struck.

On April 12,

Other unions sup-

ported the strike by refusing to cross picket lines.

Truc-

kers refused to pick up or deliver packages at Ward properties.

On April 23, Roosevelt ordered the strikers back to

work and the company to comply with the War Labor Board's
decision.

The union called off the strike, but the company

denied the authority of the War Labor Board and challenged
the President's right to seize a

civilian business.

The

government responded by taking over the company's Chicago
offices.

With photographers clicking away, Sewell Avery was

carried from his office by Army troops.
short-lived.

The occupation was

On May 9, after the union won an election by a

large margin, the company was returned to its management. 23
During the summer, the union tried unsuccessfully to
negotiate a contract, and the War Labor Board again ordered
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renewal of the contract and some wage hikes.
again refused to comply and on December 27,
struck.

The company
its employees

At the same time, disputes arose in Ward stores in

some other cities due to the company's rejection of War Labor Board orders.

The situation was especially serious in

oetroit where other unions pledged support to Ward employees.
on December 28, the government took over Ward properties in
Chicago and six other cities.
the business,

This time, the Army operated

using men experienced in retail trade.

The

government also filed a suit in district court for a judgement on its right to seize the properties under executive
order.

On January 27, 1945, Federal District Judge Philip L.

Sullivan ruled against the government on grounds that the War
Labor Disputes Act authorized seizure of facilities used in
production of items used in the war effort, but he did not
feel this included distribution.

However, the government won

on appeal on June 8, when the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that production

included distribution and

also cited the

company's own applications for priorities, which claimed that
its materials and services were essential to the war effort.
The Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal because the
properties had been returned by then.

Though the Army ran

the stores until October, 1945, the union finally lost its
fight. 24
Defiance of wartime restrictions was not confined to
management.

John L.

Lewis led a series of strikes in the
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coal fields in 1943.
contract.

In March, negotiations began on a new

The United Mine Workers sought a wage hike of $2

a day, which would break the Little Steel formula, and portal-to-portal pay (travel time from mine entrance to workplace and return).

In late March, with the deadline approa-

ching, the President asked both sides to continue production
while working on a new contract.
nue to May 1.

The union agreed to conti-

On April 22, the case went to the War Labor

Board, which ordered work to continue until a new contract
was signed.

However, late in April, miners started walking

out and the strike soon became general.

The President or-

dered seizure of the mines by Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes as head of the Solid Fuels Administration for
War, and the miners returned to work.

Lewis hoped to nego-

tiate through Ickes, but the War Labor Board insisted that
Ickes was to administer the mines while it settled the dispute.

Lewis refused to negotiate with the Board,

feeling

that it had violated the no-strike agreement with the Little
Steel formula which Lewis was out to break.

To achieve his

goals, he sought to divide and confuse his opponents among
the operators and provoke inter-agency rivalry.

Since Lewis

refused to deal with the Board, it appointed a staff member
to present the miners' case.

On May 25, it denied the wage

hike as contrary to the Little Steel rule and also denied
portal-to-portal pay.
ward.

The miners struck again soon after-

Many members of the Progressive Mine Workers joined
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the strikes,

though officially,

their union opposed them.

Aqain, the President ordered the miners back to work and a
truce was called until June 20.

On June 18, the War Labor

soard ordered amendments to the previous contract, but still
turned down portal-to-portal pay.

On June 21,

the miners

struck again. Lewis called it off on June 23 and extended
the truce to October 31 on condition that the government run
the mines.

He preferred Ickes to the Board.

Meanwhile, the

strikes provoked public outrage sufficient to enable conservative forces in Congress to push through the Smith-Connally
Act requiring advance notice of strikes and a strike vote.
rt also allowed the War Labor Board to subpeona witnesses.
Lewis could no longer avoid appearing before the Board. 25
Meanwhile,
Green,

through

the

efforts

of Governor

Dwight

Illinois coal miners reached an agreement with the

Illinois Coal Operators' Association providing for portalto-pay and other benefits.

Lewis appeared before the War

Labor Board and urged them to use it as the basis for a national settlement, but eastern operators objected to its cost
and the Board rejected it.

Later, the Illinois operators

and the United Mine Workers submitted a revision,
Board rejected it on October 26.

The miners struck again and

again the President ordered them back to work.
ward,

the

War

Labor

Board

but the

modified

agreement and ordered it into effect.

the

Soon after-

second

Illinois

It gave the miners a

wage hike, including portal-to-portal pay, but a longer work
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Lewis had beaten, but not crushed the War Labor Board,
and he had not cracked the Little Steel formula.

His efforts

and those of his militant followers gained them the enmity of
much of the public and even of American labor, who blamed him
for the passage of anti-strike legislation.

In 1945, there

were some coal strikes, but they never became general, and on
April 11, 1945, a contract was signed. 26
Wartime strikes were not uncommon.

Many companies

continued anti-union policies throughout the war.

In 1944,

the War Labor Board noted a growing tendency among Chicagoarea employers to question the majority status of a union
each time a

contract came up for renewal.

Mills Novelty

Company, which normally made gambling equipment for sale to
gangsters, helped organize and signed a contract with an AFL
union after a CIO union won an election.

Another firm re-

fused to bargain with the United Auto Workers for two years
after the union won an election.

Both firms were represen-

ted by a Chicago law firm with several clients, all of whom
followed

the same policies,

often resulting

in strikes.

Other strikes were caused by young and militant unions, whose
members and often the leaders as well were unused to the
discipline associated with such organizations.

The huge

Dodge-Chicago plant, with eleven different unions representing its diverse workforce,
most of them short-lived.

had over two hundred strikes,

The overwhelming majority of war-

time strikes were unauthorized work stoppages lasting a few

149
bours or at most a few days.

In Illinois, strikes rose from

279 in 1942 to 492 in 1944 with a total of 1114 for 1942 to
194 4.

With 7. 5 percent of the nation's non-agricultural work

force, Illinois had 9.5 percent of the nation's strikes in
that period.

Still, for the most part, the no-strike policy

generally held.

Though more Illinois workers were involved

in strikes than in any year since 1927, the loss of time was
only one-tenth that of 1927.

Union leaders worked to avert
In 1944,

strikes and to stop those that did occur.

the

Amertorp torpedo plant in Forest Park had a great deal of
labor unrest partly because of a

request for a wage hike

which the War Labor Board denied,

though officials of the

steelworkers union complained of a bad element that had come
into the plant.

Some of these officials had to spend much

of their time at the plant trying to stamp out strikes. 27
Unions generally cooperated with each other in curbing disputes.

The American Federation of Labor and the

Congress of Industrial Organizations called a truce and for
the most part ceased

jurisdictional

raiding,

though some

firms continued to invite AFL unions into their plants to
keep out the CIO.

However, in 1943, workers at the Interna-

tional Harvester Farmall plant in Rock Island grew dissatisfied with their AFL Federal local and urged the United Farm
Equipment Workers to organize their plant.

The union star-

ted doing so, but backed off at the insistence of the War
Labor Board and the CIO, which feared that this would dis-
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ruP t

labor relations.

In 1944, however, the union went ahead

despite protests from the War Labor Board and the American
Federation Labor and in June, 1944, easily won an election at
the union

itself was

subjected to raiding by the United Auto Workers.

There also

tbe plant.

were

some

However,

a

year later,

unsuccessful

attempts

to

merge

the

American

Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial OrganizaThe chief dissident from labor unity was John L.

tions.

Lewis, who had grown disenchanted with the CIO and taken the
united Mine Workers out in 194 2.

Lewis flirted with the

American Federation of Labor from time to time, but always
withdrew his union within a
union's

District

50,

created

short time.
to

organize

Meanwhile,

his

Gas,

and

Coke

Chemical Workers, set out to organize other fields and even
raided existing AFL and CIO locals. 28
Unions also worked with management in promoting production.

In 1942, at the suggestion of the War Production

Board and some labor leaders, many companies set up labormanagement committees.

The committee at

u. s.

Steel's South

Works in Chicago had fourteen members evenly divided between
management and labor.

There were six subcommittees similar-

ly divided dealing with personnel and safety, publicity, employee transportation, materials and products, practices and
methods,

and machinery and equipment.

The committee and

subcommittees devised a suggestion system, found ways of imProving quality and conserving materials,

conducted scrap
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'des

developed ways of improving the operation of equip-

dr1v

1

~ent,

preventing delays and generally improving efficiency.

The committee also promoted car pools,
and improved plant food service.

fought absenteeism

Committees in other compa-

nies often had similar organizations and functions.

some-

times, friction developed over the composition of such companies as some companies sought labor representatives who
did not belong to the union with bargaining rights and thus
were

unrepresentative

of

the

workforce.

Many

feared that labor would try to get into management.

companies
For the

most part, though labor-management committees worked well.
Besides the committees, many companies developed suggestion
systems.

Many workers also contributed in other ways by

giving up holidays so the plants could continue production. 29
One of the most serious problems in war production
was the shortage of manpower.

The draft took many of the

younger men, thus forcing employers to look outside traditional labor pools to fill their needs.

To assist them and

utilize labor supplies more efficiently, President Roosevelt
established the War Manpower Commission on April 18, 1942.
It was organized into twelve regions corresponding to existing regions of the United States Employment Service.
Sixth Region, headquartered in Chicago,
Indiana and Wisconsin.

The

included Illinois,

Regions were broken into labor mar-

ket areas, each with a director.

Illinois's ten areas were

headed by a state administrator.

Also,

in December, 1941,
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all

state employment services were brought under

federal

control in the United States Employment Service and the latter integrated with the War Manpower Commission.

30

one source of labor was the black community.

On June

2 5 , 1941, under pressure from black leaders, President Roo-

sevelt issued an executive order banning discrimination in
companies having defense contracts and also setting up a Fair
Employment Practice Committee to investigate complaints of
discrimination.

The agency started as part of the Office of

Production Management,

then went to the War Manpower Com-

mission and finally became an independent agency in 1943.
It worked closely with the War Manpower Commission and the
United States Employment Service in seeking jobs for blacks.
Some companies such as International Harvester and PullmanStandard already had significant numbers of black employees.
Buick, Studebaker and others, however, discriminated against
blacks and also Jews.
aliens.

A few firms also barred Catholics and

The Fair Employment Practice Committee managed to

end such discrimination in some cases.

The United States

Employment Service sought to recruit without discrimination
and often got results.
employment
whites,

manager

and

In January, 1942, one firm fired its
a

superintendent

for

hiring

two

but refusing to hire their black instructor in a

defense training class.

In August,

1942,

a Chicago Union

League survey found a 300 percent increase in the number of
contractors employing blacks since January, 1941.

The air-
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craft

and engine plants and mass transit lines in Chicago

hired blacks

while

the

meat

packers,

farm

and

railroad

equipment companies increased their employment of blacks. 31
Many

companies,

however,

refused

to

hire

blacks,

usually claiming they had no segregated facilities to accomdate them.
blacks.

Some argued that other workers would not accept

This was sometimes true since many AFL unions, es-

pecially railroad unions, barred blacks or segregated them
into auxiliary locals dominated by all-white locals.

CIO

unions, however, welcomed blacks into their ranks and many
were active in union affairs.

Sometimes, local communities

objected to employment of blacks at local industries, especially if they were imported to the community.

A shortage

of foundry workers in Rockford prompted the United States
Employment Service to seek black laborers from other cities.
Local residents objected, but still would not fill the positions themselves.

The United States Employment Service tried

for years to get Western Cartridge in East Al ton to hire
blacks,

but

community

opposition

made

this

impossible.

Sometimes, employment or promotion of blacks prompted walkouts, even in CIO unions.

In December, 1942, white toolma-

kers struck when a black was promoted to toolmaker at the
Studebaker engine plant.

In December, 1944, several hundred

workers at the Pullman shipyard struck in protest against
promotion of a black employee,

but returned after a week

without securing his demotion.

Whites struck because they

154

feared loss of status and job security when blacks were emUsually,

ployed and promoted.

however,

such strikes were

short-lived and blacks stayed in their newly-won positions. 32
Women were another important source of labor.
were already employed in poorly-paid office work,
industries and industrial jobs.

Many

service

Many companies were reluc-

tant to hire women for traditionally male jobs, but pressure
from the United States Employment Service and the loss of
men to the armed forces forced them to accept women.

By the

end of the war, there were few industries that did not employ women in production jobs.

In Chicago, Republic Drill

and Tool Company adapted its machinery and production processes to women and soon over 80 percent of its workforce
were women.

At the Bendix Aviation carburetor plant in Chi-

cago, 80 percent of the workforce were women.

Women drove

taxis, directed traffic, worked at filling stations, drove
buses in Rockford and highway trucks between Chicago and Iowa
and operated interurban trains on the Chicago, North Shore
and Milwaukee Railroad.
and yards,

stations,

Railroads employed women in shops

ticket off ices

and commuter trains.

Women worked in Chicago steel mills, aircraft engine plants
and shipyards,
Indiana,

oil

fluorspar mines in Rosiclare and ordnance plants

around the state.
into

the

refineries in Wood River and Whiting,

ranks

of

As they acquired experience, some moved
supervisors.

One

woman,

who

left

a

supervisory position at a bank after a nervous breakdown,
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~orked

at the Savanna ordnance plant supervising hundreds of

employees loading TNT into shells.

The attraction of high-

paying jobs in war plants lured women from lower-paid jobs in
laundries, beauty shops and other service industries.
there, however, opportunities for women increased.

Even
By the

end of the war, women managed over 500 Woolworth stores. 33
Employment of women raised other issues.

Many women

were paid at a lower rate than men for the same work.

The

war Labor Board and the United States Employment Service
urged equal pay for equal work and sometimes got results.
In March, 1943, machinists at Hummer Manufacturing Company
in Springfield struck to protest wage differentials between
men and women.
of men.

The company raised wages for women to those

Illinois passed legislation in the spring of 1943

requiring equal pay, but limited it to manufacturing.
attempt to strengthen it failed in 1945.
weekly earnings of women

in Illinois

$32.86 as compared to $54.99 for men.

In June,

An

1945,

industries averaged
In 1943, the General

Assembly also passed a bill relaxing laws limiting women to
eight hours a day amid increasing violations.

There also

was considerable debate about whether women would want to
continue in wartime occupations.

Conservatives,

including

some AFL unions, urged that women return home after the war.
Even those who recognized that women would want to work expected them to choose more "feminine" employment.

Actually,

a United Auto Workers survey in 1944 revealed that almost 50

156
Others wanted other

percent wanted to stay in factory work.

34
jobs, but very few wanted to return home.

Employment of women with children created a need for
day-care facilities.

In Chicago, the Office of Civilian De-

fense set up nurseries to care for children of war workers.
In other communities, private groups and individuals established child care facilities for children of war workers.
Many parents, however, were unable to secure day-care services or simply chose not to place their children in the care
Unattended children often got into trouble.

of others.

This was especially true of older children and teen-agers.
Juvenile delinquency became a serious problem all over the
state.
lism,

Boys ran in gangs, stole cars and engaged in vandaarson

and

petty

theft.

Young

"Victory girls"

"patriotutes" seduced or were seduced by servicemen.
Springfield,
creased

64

arrests of young girls
percent

in

1942

offenses soared 104 percent.

while

for prostitution

arrests

Because

for

of such

other

or
In
insex

activity,

venereal disease increased dramatically, thus posing a threat
to servicemen as well as their dates.

Political and civic

leaders blamed parents, especially working mothers for the
situation.

However, with the need for labor growing, society

could not simply demand that mothers stay home. Many communities responded with youth centers to serve the recreational needs of teenagers under adult supervision.

civilian

defense organizations also put children of various ages to
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tasks suited to their age groups. 35
at
work
Many teenagers went to work in war plants or worked
on farms during the summer.

The Illinois Central Railroad

hired teenage boys as station agents and train crewmen.
November,

In

1942, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins lowered

the age limit for employment of girls in war plants to sixteen.

Employment of teenagers sparked controversy.

While

industry needed workers and even some educators urged parttime jobs for students, others felt that children should stay
in school.

Some compromised by urging students to work part-

time or in the summer instead of quitting school to work
full-time.

This relieved the shortage of labor while keeping

students in high school.
war plants,

often

Still, many dropped out to work in

illegally.

By 1943,

Illinois

led the

nation in child labor violations. 36
Illinois industries went to great lengths to secure
an adequate labor force.

Aside from hiring women, minori-

ties and children, many recalled retirees and when possible
hired the handicapped.

Some used prisoners of war, though

labor unions sometimes objected to this.

Jamaicans and Bar-

badians were imported into Illinois, mainly to work on farms,
but some worked in factories.
reduced relief rolls.

Full employment dramatically

Even drifters disappeared into jobs. 37

Service industries had difficulty keeping people because of the attraction of higher wages in war plants and
also because of the draft.

Employees in industries consi-
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essential were less likely to be drafted than those in
dere d
nonessential industries. At first, service industries such
as laundries were considered nonessential,
the war Manpower Commission decided to
locally essential when this was the case.
workers
higher wages.

also

to

other

classify them

as

38

cities

because

of

Freeport lost workers to Rockford where wages

were low enough,
Freeport.

migrated

but eventually

but still 25 to 30 percent higher than

Labor shortages were aggravated by hoarding of

labor and labor piracy.

The problem appeared in Chicago in

1941 when companies hiked wages and engaged

in extensive

recruiting activities in an effort to attract workers.

out

of town firms set up recruiting offices to hire workers with
promises of exorbitant wages.

In 1943,

a

farm equipment

company pirated workers from LaSalle to work at its Rockford
plant.

A Litchfield shoe company engaged in labor piracy

until it lost some of its own workers.

The War Manpower

Commission worked out labor stabilization agreements with
war plants to curb the problem in specific communities. 39
As labor shortages intensified in the course of the
war, the War Manpower Commission classified several communities as areas with critical labor shortages.

By February,

1944, over 80 percent of the labor force in Illinois was in
areas with a critical shortage of labor.

For the last two

years of the war, the state had the worst labor shortage in
the nation.

Most cities protested their classification as
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areas with critical labor shortages since their industries
had difficulty gaining new war contracts while the problem
iasted.

Some were more effective in dealing with the situaWhen the Springfield-Decatur area was

ti on than others.

classified as having a severe labor shortage early in 1944,
Springfield protested,

but its industry and labor leaders

also set to work to increase the labor supply and better
manage manpower with employment ceilings,

labor allowances

and efforts to combat labor turnover and absenteeism by keeping stores and banks open on certain nights.

Decatur was

much slower to react, partly because smaller plants feared
that Caterpillar,
treatment.

a major employer,

would enjoy preferred

The company was unpopular due to its recruiting

policies, so much so that in 1943, the United States Employment Service off ice called in company officials to impress
upon them the need for cooperation with the area labor stabilization program.

Decatur did eventually adopt many of

the measures that Springfield used in its program.

Workers

in areas of labor shortages had to work a 48-hour week.
stirred protests since many
schedule.

jobs did not

This

require such a

The goal was to release workers to jobs where they

were needed.

Unfortunately, long hours brought a decline in

productivity and an increase in accidents and

absenteeism.

Another controversial measure was the job freeze for workers
in essential jobs adopted by the War Manpower Commission in
February, 1943.

Labor leaders

protested, especially Victor
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oiander, secretary-treasurer of the Illinois State Federation
of Labor, who likened it to slavery.

Actually, workers could

switch jobs in order to work at the highest level of skill in
a war industry.
money.

They could not switch simply to make more

40

During the course of the war,

labor and management

sought to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation, or
if agreement could not be reached, through settlement by the
war Labor Board.

Al though there were some strikes, many were

due to intransigence on the part of one or both parties such
as Sewell Avery, George P. McNear or John L.
others

were

short-lived

walkouts

arising

Lewis.
out

of

Many
minor

grievances in a workforce unused to factory and union discipline.

Most union leaders sought to cooperate with manage-

ment in pushing production.

Even companies with militant

unions often experienced little trouble with them once contracts had been settled.

In order to achieve labor peace,

labor agreed not to strike,

while management reluctantly

accepted maintenance of membership, a form of union security.

The War Labor board made this a standard feature of

contract settlements, accepting labor's arguement that th
would help bring labor peace by creating stability and preventing jurisdictional raids by rival unions and other labor
difficulties.

The Board also was quick to discipline both

labor and management if either violated agreements or simply
refused to accept them.

Most disputes, however, were set-
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tled with a minimum of difficulty.
Another function of the War Labor Board was wage stabilization to help hold down inflation.

Its tool was the

Little steel formula which limited pay hikes to keep pace
with price increases.

Management still sought various means

of increasing wages to attract and keep workers, while unions
pointed out that prices were rising faster than wages and
demanded pay hikes.

Al though cracks developed

in Little

steel, the policy generally held until the end of the war.
Even with wages stabilized,

most workers prospered during

the war and improved their economic status.
been unemployed before the war,
jobs in war plants.

Ultimately,

Many who had

now worked at high-paying
this contributed to the

postwar economic expansion.
Labor unions generally benefitted from the war as the
crush of business in the defense emergency and during the
war forced companies such as International Harvester and the
Little Steel corporations to accept unionization and union
security.

This changed the nature of postwar industrial

disputes.

With the battle for union recognition largely won,

most were disputes over wages and benefits.
The war brought an unprecedented degree of government
control over the movement of labor even to the point where
war workers were restricted in their freedom to change jobs.
The War Manpower Commission sought to place workers in positions where their skills would be utilized most efficiently.
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lt also ordered longer workweeks in areas of serious labor
shortages.

To further relieve labor shortages, the agency

coaxed employers into hiring women and minorities in ever
increasing numbers

in highly-paid and highly-skilled jobs

previously closed to them.

Wartime gains ultimately led to

the civil Rights Movement and the Women's Liberation Movement
of the fifties, sixties and seventies.
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CHAPTER V
TRANSPORTATION IN A STATE AT WAR
The Second World War imposed a massive burden on the
nation's transportation system,

especially the railroads.

To handle the load, carriers were forced to coordinate their
services and adapt to changes in traffic volume and direction.

Before and after the war, all carriers of freight and

passengers competed with each other to some degree.
tion was interrnodal and intramodal.
government at the

federal

Competi-

Wartime conditions led

and state level

to

impose re-

strictions to eliminate competitive practices which impeded
the flow of traffic.

Government also ordered the curtailment

of duplicate services in order to free equipment for use
elsewhere and approved the establishment of new carriers and
new routes to handle an increasing traffic load.

Carriers

also had to handle a much heavier traffic load, but could not
get

enough

equipment

building armaments

to

handle

instead of

trucks, planes and ships.

it

since

locomotives,

suppliers
freight

were
cars,

The War Production Board strictly

limited the amount of equipment that could be produced and
dictated the kind of equipment to be built.

Carriers and

shippers responded by making more intensive use of existing
equipment.

Government soon imposed similar restrictions of
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its own.

Although the government did not repeat its First

world war takeover of the railroads,
movements

of

the

railroads

and

it did regulate the

other

carriers,

dictate

routings of shipments and how they should be loaded and even
shifted some commodities

such

as

oil

from

one means

of

transportation to another.
Illinois has long been a major crossroads and terminal for the transportation arteries of the nation, and as
such played
nation 1 s

a

significant

role

in

troops and war supplies.

the

carrying

In 1940,

of

the

Illinois had

11,949 miles of railroads, more mileage than any state except
Texas.

Chicago was a major transhipment center for east-west

traffic and terminal
twenty

trunk-line

for north-south movements with over

railroads

and

serving the metropolitan area.

several

terminal

roads

Other Illinois cities also

were major gateways, especially East st. Louis, Peoria and
the Rock Island-Moline District.

In 1940,

railroad em-

ployment in the state totaled 104,044 or about 10 percent of
the total national railroad workforce.
ment

in

transportation

and

Total state employ-

communication

industries

was

259, 776,

which was also about 10 percent of the national

total.

About

9

percent

employed in such industries.

of

the

state's

workforce

were

Illinois had over 14,000 miles

of paved highways and 54 airports, including a major one in
Chicago.

Barges traveled from Chicago's port facilities on

the Great Lakes down the Illinois and Mississippi rivers to
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•

the Gulf of Mexico.
The

war did

1

not

really create

any

new trends

in

In the

transportation, but did affect some existing ones.

twenties, railroads carried 75 percent of all freight traffie and dominated

intercity passenger service.

However,

even then they faced increasing competition from other modes
of transportation.

By 1940,

their share of the nation's

freight traffic shrank to just under 62 percent, while less
than 9 percent of intercity travelers went by train.
automobile dominated passenger transportation.

The

Railroads

still carried over 64 percent of those who did not go by car,
but buses took almost 30 percent while airlines handled a
small but growing percentage of the market.

Railroads also

faced growing competition for freight from trucks, barges and
pipelines.
rily.

The Second World War reversed the trend tempora-

Railroads handled 90 percent of all defense freight

and 97 percent of armed forces personnel moving in organized
groups.

Gas and tire rationing forced motorists out of their

cars and into trains and buses.

In 1944, automobiles still

accounted for slightly over 54 percent of intercity passenger
travel,

but railroads handled almost 35 percent and buses

over 9 percent.

Freight business also skyrocketed and the

railroad share of the traffic went up to almost 72 percent
by 1943 before dropping slightly in the remaining war years.

The war also retarded the growth of airline business though
that was increasing by the end of the war.

In 1940, airlines
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'ed only 1,041 million passengers or .37 percent of all

carr 1

intercity passengers.

By 1945, they handled 3,507 million

2
travelers or 1.51 percent of intercity passenger traffic.

The war

also

inhibited

implementation

of

a

During

technological innovation in the railroad industry.
the

thirties,

railroads

introduced

streamlined

major

passenger

trains in a successful bid to recapture some of the passenger business which they had lost to the automobile and the
bus.

Though some trains were pulled by streamlined steam

locomotives, most streamliners were handled by diesels.
few railroads were already using

a

few diesels

A

for some

switching chores, but in the thirties, many railroads started
dieselizing passenger service and switching, and in 1940 and
1941, diesels were introduced in line-haul freight service.
Diesels handled freight tonnage at a faster and steadier pace
than steam and at a much lower cost.
ty in starting a train.
to stop for water.

They had less difficul-

Unlike steam, diesels did not have

Diesels were more available.

After

finishing one trip, they could be used on another run, unlike
steam engines which often required some shop attention at the
end of a

run.

Diesels were much more flexible and cost

effective than steam since several diesel units could be
operated together as one locomotive under the control of one
crew with the number of units on a train dependent solely on
the amount of tonnage to be hauled and the terrain.
steam locomotive, however, had its crew.

Every

The implications
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not lost on the railroad unions, who fought unsuccessttere
fullY to put extra crewmen on diesels, and did manage to put
firemen on diesels though they had no fires to tend.
many railroads,

Though

especially those with a good deal of coal

traffic, continued to buy or build steam locomotives, most
began to dieselize their operations.

By 1939, railroads were

buying more diesels than steam locomotives. 3
During the defense period of 1939 to 1941, railroads
enjoyed a substantial increase in traffic.

Freight tonnage

increased from over 292 billion ton-miles

(ton of freight

carried a mile) in 1938 to over 481 billion in 1941, while
passenger traffic went from over 22 billion passenger miles
(passenger carried a mile)
1941.

in 1938 to over 30 billion in

There was some debate over whether the railroads were

preparing adequately to handle the increased load by buying
extra equipment.

Every year from 1929 to 1939, they retired

more freight cars than they added.

In September,

1939,

Railway Age, an industry journal, argued that 2400 locomotives and over 300,000 freight cars would have to be added
to

current

rosters

to

handle

railroads felt differently.

the

additional

load.

The

Ralph Budd, head of the Chicago,

Burlington and Quincy Railroad and head of the Transportation
Division of the National Defense Advisory Commission, assumed
that existing transportation facilities could handle the load
since

there was

a

surplus

of

capacity.

Railroads

were

reluctant to purchase large amounts of costly new equipment
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as theY had done in the twenties, only to suffer heavy losses

of traffic in the Depression.

By 1941, it was hard to get

materials and builders were making armaments.

As a result,

the railroads never did get as much equipment as they needed.

The commission did make recommendations for better utilization of cars and worked with the Interstate Commerce Commission's

Bureau

of

Service,

the

Association

of

American

Railroads Car Service Division and vigilance committees of
the Shippers' Advisory Committee in developing a policing
system to see that cars kept moving. 4
In December,

1941, President Franklin Delano Roose-

velt created the Office of Defense Transportation and named
Interstate Commerce Commission Chairman Joseph B. Eastman to
direct it.

Budd returned to his railroad in January.

new agency had seven carrier divisions:

The

railways,

motor,

water, local, petroleum, Hawaiian and Puerto Rican.

Some,

including

railways,

motor

regional offices in Chicago.

transport

and

petroleum,

had

The agency also had district

offices in Chicago and other Illinois cities.

The Office of

Defense Transportation worked closely with the Interstate
Commerce Commission in coordinating transportation.

Both the

railroads and the government wished to avoid the government
takeover experience of the First World War.

At that time,

rail service had broken down due to inadequate equipment and
poor planning by government procurement agencies.

Whole

trains of cars backed up in terminals due to lack of facili-
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Though the Railroad Administration,
. s for unloading.
tie
which operated the roads from December, 1917 to March, 1920,
eliminated terminal delays,

improved operations and intro-

duced new equipment of standard design,
heavy

expenses,

including

a

it also incurred

substantial

controversial "featherbedding" work rules.

wage

hike

and

As a result, it

was forced to raise freight rates and passenger fares. 5
The Office of Defense Transportation sought to leave
the carriers in private hands, but to coordinate their services and utilize equipment to the fullest extent possible.
The Justice Department facilitated the task by suspending
anti-trust activity for the duration, thus allowing pooling
of traffic, coordination of services, elimination of duplieating services and other efficiencies.

The Office of De-

fense Transportation banned the use

freight

of

cars

for

movement of cargo within cities when trucks were available
and also prescribed minimum limits for loading merchandise
cars.

The Interstate Commerce Commission approved incentive

rates to encourage heavier loading.
Advisory Board,

The Midwest Shippers

a regional group representing shippers in

several states including Illinois, established 63 vigilante
groups with 995 traffic executive members to call on shippers in their communities who were holding cars on sidings
too long.

In peacetime, many shippers held cars on sidings

for loading or unloading for an extensive length of time.
Some used them as virtual rolling warehouses.

During the
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however, such behavior would elicit a call from a member

'War,

of a shippers vigilante committee.

The committees sought to

ioad cars as heavily as possible and as quickly as possible
and unload them at their destination quickly.

In 1943, the

off ice of Defense Transportation made these measures mandatory.

Shippers mounted Perfect Shipping Campaigns stressing

more careful packing and loading to reduce loss and damage.
unfortunately,

some

efforts

to

load

cars

more

heavily

resulted in damage to car structures, especially when cranes
were used to flatten loads in open top cars.

For the most

part, though, heavier loading of cars and quick turnaround
made

them more

available.

The Association

of

American

Railroads and later the Office of Defense Transportation and
the Interstate Commerce Commission rerouted cars to avoid
congestion
destination.

and

move

by

the

most

direct

route

to

their

During peacetime, most carriers sought to haul

cars on their own lines as long and as far as possible to
maximize profits.

This sometimes meant that a shipment had

to travel by a roundabout route to its destination.
measures eliminated much unnecessary backhauling.
of

Defense

Transportation

Director in Chicago,

w.

Railway

Division's

Wartime

The Office
Regional

F. Kirk, was particularly successful

in spotting areas of threatened congestion and routing cars
away from those areas.
office,

from March,

335, 000 carloads,

In all,

during the

1943 to October,

1945,

life of his
Kirk diverted

ignoring priori ties which had caused a
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great deal of trouble in World War I.

Shippers also made use

of alternative types of cars if the type they wanted were not
available.

In some case, they pooled cars.

In the fall of

194 2, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate
commerce Commission and the Association of American Railroads
set up a pool of refrigerator cars for hauling fruits and

vegetables.

Railroads themselves learned to cooperate with

each other in moving traffic efficiently, whereas normally,
they competed vigorously with each other. 6

Even with such restrictions, car shortages developed
as freight traffic skyrocketed.

Freight ton-miles,

which

totalled 481,766 million in 1941, shot up to 747,168 million
by 1944.

The Illinois Central, which carried under 39 mil-

lion tons of revenue freight in 1938, handled over 80 million in 1943.

Other carriers experienced similar increases.

To handle this traffic, railroads ran longer and more frequent trains.

on the Illinois Central, the average freight

train handled around 44 or 45 cars in 1938.
average freight train had about 62 cars.

In 1944, its

In 1945, the line

operated 24.3 percent more freight trains than it had in
1940.

Although the railroads had less equipment than they

had in the First World War, they handled a heavier traffic
load.

With freight ton-miles 81 percent over those of 1918,

the railroads had 600,000 fewer cars to handle it.
nately,

equipment

itself

got

bigger

between

the

Fortuwars.

Freight car capacity increased over 22 percent between 1918
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while steam locomotive tractive effort increased 50

percent.

Even so, more equipment was needed. 7

ouring the defense period,

the increase in traffic

prompted some carriers to acquire more cars and use existing
ones more intensively.

Construction of freight cars for

American railroads in 1939 increased 42 percent over 1938.

The supply of freight cars, which had been declining, started rising again in 1940.

The Illinos Central acquired over

9 100 freight cars in 1939,

1940 and 1941, but as with most

railroads, most simply replaced old, worn-out cars.

More-

over, by 1941, material shortages delayed new car deliveries
by 50 percent and many railroads eventually had to cancel
their orders.

Although the Office of Defense Transportation

pressed for more equipment, the War Production Board insisted that armaments required most of the steel and the railroads would have to get along with what they had.

In the

end, though the Office of Defense Transportation asked the
War Production Board for 311,000 freight cars, 4,159 locomotives

and

5, 150

passenger

cars,

the

railroads

got

only

130,826 freight cars, 2,500 locomotives and 1,977 passenger
cars (Mostly troop sleepers and kitchen cars) .
and

1945,

the

freight cars.
received none.

Illinois

Central

received

Between 1942

only

1, 681

In 1943, as the crisis neared its peak,

new
it

Railroads responded by rehabilitating and

reusing and modifying existing cars.

Late in 1942, the Santa

Fe converted some old box cars into cabooses until regular
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cabooses were available again.

With steel in short supply

the need for cars critical, the War Production Board
an d
authorized railroads to build composite freight cars with
steel framework and wooden plank side sections, which could
readily be replaced with steel after the war.

In 1944, the

Illinois Central built 600 composite hopper cars
Centralia, Illinois shops for coal traffic.

in

its

The company also

converted old gondola cars to pulpwood carriers, while the
Santa Fe used steel ends from junked box cars to make sides
and ends for gondola cars.

In 1944 and 1945,

railroads

starting experimenting with lightweight plywood cars and some
aluminum boxcars were built in Mount Vernon,

freight

cars

bottomed out in 1943 and picked up in 1944 and 1945.

The

material

the

three

Illinois

railroads.

situation eased,

Deliveries

and

by

the

of

Illinois for

fall

of

1945,

Illinois Central was building all steel hopper cars in its
Centralia shops. 8
Even with these efforts, there were car shortages,
particularly for agricultural products.
1941,

a

In the spring of

crisis developed when grain elevators were still

filled with the previous harvest as a new harvest was starting.

Railroads scrambled to find cars while the Commodity

Credit corporation, which owned the grain, frantically tried
to get it out of the elevators.

Ultimately, the grain was

shipped in grain trains to Chicago and then to the East
Coast.

Similar problems cropped up during the war years, but
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PY l943, there were no extra cars available to handle the
wheat load,

thus forcing farmers to store grain on their

farms, and elevators to store it on the ground.
also hit soybeans, corn and other crops.
aggravated

in

January,

1944

when

The problem

The situation was

the

Off ice

of

Defense

Transportation, the War Production Board and the War Food
Administration diverted 200 cars a day to Canada to import
40 million bushels of feed grain bought by the Commodity
credit Corporation.
outraged.
February

Grain Belt congressional leaders were

The diversion was reduced to 100 cars a day in
and

eliminated

remained tight.

in May.

Even

then,

car

supply

Snowstorms in the East caused car shortages

in Illinois and other states early in 1945.

Then in the

spring, war traffic demands diverted grain cars.
coal cars were being used to carry wheat.
persisted until the end of the year.

By June,

The situation

The spring of 1945

brought a heavy traffic shift from the East Coast to the West
Coast as the war in Europe ended and the nation focused on
the Pacific theater.

In May, the Office of Defense Transpor-

tation rerouted 1000 eastbound freight cars and sent them to
Pacific ports.

The traffic shift

Illinois railroads,

imposed peak loads on

especially in Chicago,

brunt of the movement.

which bore the

Traffic peaked in May and June and

did not drop much until the end of the war. 9
Besides cars, the railroads needed locomotives to pull
them.

In 1939, the railroads were plagued with motive power
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obsolescence.

Only four and a half percent of the locomo-

tives of major railroads were less than 9 years old, while
70 percent were at least 19 years old.

Almost a third were

29 years old or older.

By the end of 1940, 69 percent were

21 years old or older.

Older locomotives were inadequate to

meet modern service requirements and cost more to maintain
as they got older.
production and a
purchases.

As in the case of freight cars, defense
recovering economy spurred motive power

Locomotive production went from 272 engines in

1938 to 338 in 1939,

435 in 1940 and 104 7 in 1941.

War

Production Board restrictions cut the output to 936 locomotives in 1942, but then production peaked at 1171 engines in
1944 before dropping to 935 in 1945. 10
The War Production Board was more willing to authorize
locomotives than freight cars, theorizing that enough motive
power would make additional cars unneccessary by permitting
quicker hauls and more intensive handling of existing cars.
Still, the agency did require authorization of motive power.
Since diesels were built for stock to standard designs, the
War Production Board issued blanket restrictions to builders
covering the number of locomotives needed,

while steamers

required specific authorizations by the Board since they were
built to order for individual carriers.
restricted
diesels.

builders

to

construction

of

The agency also
certain types

of

American Locomotive Company and Baldwin Locomotive

Company produced only 600 or 1000 horsepower switchers, while
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the Electro-Motive Division of General Motors,

which had

and freight diesels, built 5400 horsep1'oneered passenger
.
power four-unit freight diesels.

Even then, the latter had

a difficult time filling orders due to its own war production
for the Navy.

Not until late in the war was the company able

to increase production of diesel locomotives.
it was turning out 63

units a

By July, 1945,

Because of these

month.

restrictions, most diesels built during the war were used for
switching, a task at which they were much faster and more
efficient than steam.

When Fairbanks-Morse,

a builder of

submarine engines, started producing diesel locomotives in
1944,

its

first

unit was a

switcher,

which went to the

Milwaukee Road.

Steamers released by diesels were reassigned

to other duties.

Most steam locomotives built during the war

were high-performance freight engines such as the twenty
4-8-2 or mountain type engines built by the Illinois Central
at its Paducah, Kentucky shops in 1942 and 1943 and the ten
4-8-4 or northern type engines built in 1944 for the Rock
Island. 11
In addition to new construction, railroads also leased
or rebuilt locomotives to fill their needs.

The Chicago and

North Western disposed of 100 locomotives,

partly through

sale to Mexico, but mostly through leasing to other lines.
In

January,

1943,

the

War

Production

Board

banned

the

scrapping of surplus locomotives without authorization, but
required them to be repaired and made available for service
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on other lines.

The Baltimore and Ohio rehabilitated 2-8-2

vikado type (called MacArthur type during the war as a
or ,.,
patriotic

gesture)

engines

for

service

on

its

Division, including some pre-World War I engines.
Railroad

modernized

32-year-old

4-6-2

or

Chicago

The Alton

Pacific

type

iocomotives to increase their horsepower from 2200 to 2800,
enabling them to haul longer passenger trains.

Fuel saving

campaigns also helped to improve the efficiency of motive
power.

12

During the course of the war, many railroads upgraded
track and signaling.

In 1943 and 1944,

the Pennsylvania

Railroad upgraded and double-tracked much of its line to st.
Louis, including one eight-mile segment, which was relocated
and straightened.

The improvements, which were done without

interfering with heavy wartime traffic,
creased the capacity of the line.

substantially in-

The Baltimore and Ohio

also improved its lines in Illinois between 1941 and 1946,
installing heavier rail, strengthening bridges and construeting additional yard tracks and other facilities.

Other

lines installed new rails and ties, eliminated grade crossings,
yards.

added spurs to

serve defense plants

and

improved

The Burlington expanded its Galesburg yard to cut

delays in movement of cars through the yard.

When labor

shortages hit track gangs, several railroads introduced new
machinery to reduce manpower needs.

Signaling improvements,

such as Centralized Traffic Control (CTC), allowed a single-
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trac k

line to carry the load of a double-track road.

An

ater at a CTC control station handled all signals and
ope r
mainline switches on the line. By automatically transmitting
information

about

train

movements

to

dispatchers,

CTC

eliminated the need to stop and throw switches by hand, thus
speeding operations.

Fast freights could pass each other

using passing sidings without slowing down.

In 1942, the

Burlington installed CTC on its line from Chicago to st. Paul
and in 1943, the Rock Island installed CTC, cab signals and
radio control on its busy main line between Chicago and Rock
Island.

These

innovations cut the running time of

fast

freights by reducing delays. 13
In the spring of 1941, a crisis arose in the transport
of crude oil from Texas to the East Coast.

Tankers, which

carried most of it, were diverted to carrying oil to Britain.
Although existing pipelines, which handled part of the load,
managed to take on more, they could not replace the tankers.
The Office of Petroleum Coordinator,

later the Petroleum

Administration for War, turned to the railroads, which had
lost most of the traffic to pipelines and tankers,
because of high freight rates.

mainly

Only two percent of petroleum

deliveries to the East coast went by rail.

The Off ice of

Petroleum Coordinator persuaded the oil companies to ship by
tank car and the companies coaxed the railroads to slash
freight rates.

Trainloads of oil were soon running from

pipeline terminals in Ohio, Kentucky and Illinois to the East
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coast.

The railroads,

which had been carrying only 5000

barrels of oil to the East Coast daily before the crisis,
were up to 141,300 barrels daily by the week of October 18.
Although the British returned most of the tankers in October
and November,

a new crisis arose after Pearl Harbor when

military needs again diverted tankers to other routes and
German submarines

sank those

venturing

along

the

Coast.

Again, tank cars filled the gap and by August, 1942, trainloads of tank cars were delivering over 800,000 barrels a
day to the East Coast, usually through Illinois due to connections between carriers.

Soon, 70 percent of oil bound for

the East Coast went by rail.

In August,

the Office of

Petroleum Coordinator banned the use of tank cars to haul
gasoline in 20 states, including Illinois, in order to divert them to the oil trains.

In March, 1942, the agency also

banned the use of tank cars to deliver fuel oil to points
within 100 miles

(later 200 miles)

of pipeline terminals.

This permanently shifted much of this traffic to tank trucks.
Other cars also carried oil and other fuels in containers.
There was a heavy movement of kerosene in oil drums in box
cars to New England.

Barges also carried a good deal of oil

on the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers while Great Lakes tankers
delivered oil to lake ports. 14
Meanwhile, Harold Ickes, head of the Office of Petroleum coordinator, had been trying since the fall of 1941 to
get a large pipeline built from Texas to Salem, Illinois and
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then to the East Coast.

Although vetoed at first by the

supply Priorities and Allocations Board,

Pearl Harbor and

tanker sinkings gave the project new importance.

In June,

194 2, the War Production Board approved construction of the
Big Inch, a 24-inch pipeline.
the

line

extended

from

When completed late that year,

Longview,

Texas

to

Norris

City,

Illinois, where a railyard was built for tank car trains,
which carried the oil on to the East Coast.

Branches were

built to Enfield, Illinois, where a pipeline was built for
tank car trains, which carried the oil on to the East Coast.
Branches were built to Ensfield,

Illinois to connect with

existing pipelines and to Mount Vernon, Indiana to feed oil
to barges on the Ohio River.

In the summer of 1943, the Big

Inch was extended to the East Coast, and later that year, a
20-inch Little Big Inch was constructed along the same route
to carry petroleum products.
1944.

It was completed in February,

Meanwhile, by July, 1943, tank car trains aided by

the Big Inch terminal at Norris City, were delivering over
a million barrels a day to the East Coast with a pool of
10,000 tank cars.

After June, 1943, tank cars were increas-

ingly diverted to carry oil to the West Coast for the Pacific
War, but as late as April, 1945, 30 percent of deliveries to
the East Coast went by rail as opposed to 4 O percent by
pipeline. 15
Water traffic, which grew rapidly during the Depression due to cheap rates, rose still more under the influence
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of defense business.
11ent

from half a

Tonnage on the Illinois Waterway, which

million in 1934 to 7 million in 194 o,

dropped slightly in 1942 and 1943, but then peaked in 1944
at 7 ,250,000 tons.
the winter months.

Ice cutters kept the waterway open during
The war

eliminated

some sources

of

traffic such as automobiles and shifted steel to the rails
since companies

faced with priori ties wanted steel

in a

hurry, and railroads could deliver it much faster than barge
Barge traffic also

lines, though at a much higher cost.
shifted direction.

Before the war, most of it went down-

stream to the Gulf of Mexico.
went upstream.

During the war, most of it

Petroleum products from Texas went up the

Ohio River to Pittsburgh and also up the Illinois Waterway
to industrial plants in the Chicago area.

For a

time,

restrictions on materials threatened to force operators to
use wooden barges, which they considered inflammable, but in
1943, the War Production Board freed enough steel to build
108 steel barges for petroleum traffic.
were used,

but mainly by the armed

Some wooden barges

forces.

Other bulk

cargoes included agricultural products, sulphur, scrap iron
and mine products.

Restrictions by the Off ice of Defense

Transportation on some types of traffic prevented full use
of the waterways and actually reduced tonnage carried on some
routes.

In the Spring of 1943, the agency barred establish-

ment of a rail-water route for movement of iron ore from
Northern Minesota to Southern Illinois,

which would have
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. rted traffic from all-rail routes. The agency reasoned
dive
that the route would have hurt coal traffic going by barge
on the Illinois River.

Barges shipped coal from Southern

Illinois to the Twin cities and to Commonwealth Edison power
16
plants in Chicago.

The Great Lakes also handled a good deal of traffic,
much of it coal

shipped by rail to Chicago where it was

transferred to lake boats at a new Rail-to-Water Transfer
Terminal on Chicago's South Side.

During its first year of

operation in 1943, the terminal shipped over a million tons
of coal to Canada.

some lake carriers, such as Chicago Tri-

bune newsprint carriers, took on loads of coal for the return trip to Canada.
heavy demands

The growth in steel production placed

on Great Lakes

oreboats.

In

1939,

U.

S.

steel's Pittsburgh Steamship Company had only 80 percent of
its fleet in operation.

By July, 1940, the entire fleet of

74 steamers and barges was in service.
similar increases in business.

Other carriers had

By August, 1941, shortages

threatened and the Off ice of Production Management recommended that 25 oreboats be built.
were under construction.
Transportation

By the end of 1942, 16

In addition, the Office of Defense

curtailed

the

use

of

lake

carriers

for

domestic coal traffic in order to free them for ore traffic.
Grain carriers were also diverted to ore traffic.
in

October,

1942,

the

Office

of

Defense

Finally,

Transportation

assumed control of commercial vessels operating on the Lakes
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to secure enough cargo space to carry iron ore and
in order
war materials.
In 1942, the Army constructed a new
otb e r
·
k at the Sao Locks at Sault Ste Marie, Michigan and also

}OC

built a new ore dock at Escanaba to feed oreboats in the
event that the Sao Locks were sabotaged.
transpire

and

the

dock

was

dismantled

Meanwhile,

Great Lakes traffic boomed.

This did not
after

the

By 1941,

passed the 1929 prewar peak of 138 million tons,

war.

tonnage
and ship

operators sought to keep their vessels in service later in
the season and start earlier in the Spring.

This was risky

due to storms in the Fall and heavy ice packs in the Spring.
Ice-breakers were used to open shipping lanes.

Ultimately,

ton-nage peaked at over 184 million tons in 1944 with Chicago
handling over 51 million tons. 17
Trucks did a heavy volume of business during the war
years, though their share of intercity freight business actually declined.

In 1938, motor carriers handled 37 billion

ton-miles or 8.03 percent of the total intercity traffic,
while in 1944, they carried over 49 billion ton-miles, but
only 4.57 percent of the total volume.
was high-value cargo.

Most of the freight

Most livestock and a large part of

other agricultural products was shipped to Chicago by truck.
Most local traffic went by truck.

Some Illinois railroads

used trucks for pick up and delivery and local traffic.

Such

coordinated rail and truck traffic expanded during the war.
During the war, the Office of Defense Transportation

worked
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.
truckers and the states to eliminate inefficiencies.
with
Illinois and other states lifted restrictions on truck weight

and

length though this did not come easily.

Unlike most

states, Wisconsin required out of state trucks to buy extra
licenses.

Finally, in April, 1943, Illinois and Wisconsin

aqreed to end restrictive legislation covering each other's
trucks for the duration.

A thirty-five mile an hour wartime

speed limit was modified in 1943 for heavy trucks carrying
war freight.
insisted

on

The Off ice of Defense Transportation also
full

loading

unessential mileage.

of

trucks

and

curtailment

of

Daily deliveries were discontinued.

In July, 1042, the agency ordered over-the-road truckers to
cut their mileage 25 percent.

Truckers also had to carry

loads on return trips unless this was impossible.

In July,

1943, the Office of Defense Transportation and the Interstate
Commerce Commission approved a plan drawn up by 33 Chicagoarea

common carriers

for pooling highway

freight

in the

Chicago suburban area.

Under the plan, truckers reported to

a

office

central

dispatching

destinations.

The office then

the

loads

they

booked

and

assigned the actual hauling

to the carrier best suited to handle it.

Empty miles were

eliminated and trucks were loaded inbound and outbound, with
unneeded equipment sitting it out.

Trailers were inter-

changed, while tractors worked 24 hours a day.

Later, the

pool set up a new terminal for interchange of freight among
participants.

over-the-road truckers also pooled cargoes.
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In August,

1942,

Information

Service

freight.

Chicago-based truckers
which

acted

as

a

set

up

a

Joint

clearinghouse

for

Truckers without a return load had to phone the

office for information on pos-sible cargoes, and if necessary, wait a few hours until one materialized.
trucks participated in this program.

Even farm

The Army Transportation

corps 1 Chicago Agency routed military freight through the
Joint

Information Service.

In

1943,

the

Army

leased a

Chicago truck terminal and consolidated and rerouted military
freight.

In March, 1944, the Office of Defense Transporta-

tion took over the Joint Information off ices and required
over-the-road truckers to register in the agency's district
offices,

which in turn ordered empty or partially loaded

trucks to handle cargo. 18
Rationing also hit truckers.

The Office of Defense

Transportation issued certificates of war necessity enabling
truckers to buy gasoline, tires and other essential materials.

The agency relied on local war price and rationing

panels to handle gas rationing and in 1944 turned over the
whole program of issuing certificates to the Off ice of Price
Administration.

Still, shortages of tires and parts persis-

ted throughout the war.

Trucks themselves were also ra-

tioned, starting in March, 1942.

Manufacture of big trucks

was suspended in the Spring of 1942 and trailer production
ended in November.

By March,

1943,

the stockpile of new

trucks, which totaled 185,000 in March, 1942, had dwindled
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In May,

the War Production Board authorized

production of 7350 trucks for sale to operators with certificates of necessity issued by the Office of Defense Transportation.

Even then, production never met needs and shortages

persisted.

Highways also suffered from wartime restrictions.

construction was cut sharply and even materials were diff icult to obtain.
travel.

By 1943, some roads were becoming unsafe for

19

Gasoline rationing affected automobiles more than any
other means of transportation.

In 1937, automobiles accoun-

ted for 228,364 million passenger-miles or 85.08 percent of
the total.

Wartime restrictions on gas and tires cut into

highway traffic.

In January, 1943, the first full month of

gasoline rationing, travel on Illinois highways fell off 60
percent and the number of cars 39 percent.

Travelers conti-

nued to use their cars for local transportation and for short
intercity trips,

but

public transportation.

for longer journeys,

many turned to

In 1944, private autos handled

151, 251

million

passenger-miles

or

54. 03

percent

total.

Many had to give up their cars entirely.

of

only
the

In Illi-

nois, auto registrations dropped from 1,825,142 in 1941 to
1,508,222 in 1945. 20
As with freight, the biggest share of the burden fell
on the railways, who saw their passenger load soar from 448
million passengers in 1935 to 916 million in 1944,
dropping to 897 million in 1945.

before

Passengers traveled far-
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ther, too.
42 miles.

In 1935, the average journey was between 41 and
In 1944, it was over 104 miles.

ger and more frequent.

Trains got lon-

In 1939, 85,202 trains operated in

and out of Chicago Union Station with an average of 233 a
day.

The station handled a total of 546,393 cars and trains

averaged about 6 or 7 cars.

In 1944, the station saw 98,217

trains at an average of 268 a day.

The station handled a

total of 769,671 cars and trains averaged between 7 and 8
cars.

The Illinois Central saw its average passenger train

grow from seven cars in 1939 to more than nine by the end of
the war.

The Pullman Company, which served 15,539,849 pas-

sengers in 5124 cars in 1938, handled 35,837,908 in 7485
cars in 1944. 21
Much of Pullman's traffic was military.

During the

war, 97 percent of armed forces personnel moving in organized
groups traveled in special troop trains.

In August, 1940,

railroads moved over 150,000 troops for special army maneuvers.

Similar movements occurred in 1941.

Within seven

weeks after Pearl Harbor, railroads moved over 600, 000 troops
to

new posts.

By December,

1942,

they were moving two

million soldiers a month and by June, 1943, were operating
2500 troop trains a month.

To handle the increasing load,

Pullman-Standard built troop sleepers and kitchen cars and
by 1945 was operating 1667 such cars, some railroad-owned and
others government-owned.

By then, over two-thirds of all

Pullman sleepers were continuously assigned to troop move-
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such military commitments cut into the number of cars

Jllents.

availab 1 e for civilian use.H
To handle the crush of civilian and military travel,
the off ice of Defense Transportation imposed restrictions on
rail and bus traffic.

On the eve of the war, railroads were
In 1941, the Illinois central

still adding streamliners.

added the Land O'Corn between Chicago and Waterloo,

Iowa.

In May, 1942, in an effort to meet wartime traffic demands,
the line reinstated the Panama Limited, a luxury train from
Chicago to New Orleans, which it had dropped in 1932.
afterward,

Soon

the Office of Defense Transportation proposed

abolition of all luxury trains like the Panama Limited, but
nothing came of this.

However, some luxury cars,

such as

parlor cars, were dropped from trains to add to their passenger-carrying capacity.
ted

about half

coaches.

Old

of

The Chicago and North Western conver-

its parlor and

Pullmans were

also

cafe-lounge cars
converted

to

into

coaches.

Special trains for excursions, conventions and other events
were cancelled,
selves.
Illinois

In

and in many cases,

1942,

State

Governor

Fair

for

the

the conventions them-

Dwight

Green

duration.

cancelled
Schedules

the
were

lengthened to provide more stops, thus providing an alternative to the automobile.

Many roads required reservations and

some raised fares to discourage vacationers.

On October 1,

1942, the Office of Defense Transportation froze passenger
schedules and prohibited extra trains.

This hit travel to
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llorida especially hard and Florida was quick to protest, but
to no avail.

Several lines coordinated their trains between

Chicago and Florida.

In Illinois, the Alton and the Illinois

central

sleeper

coordinated

Springfield.

service

between

Chicago

and

Very little equipment was added in 1942 and

much of it was ordered in 1941.

Difficulties with priorities

and the emphasis on freight traffic and war goods prevented
construction of new passenger equipment.

In April, 1942, all

new construction was banned, leaving some cars still uncornpleted.

No new cars were ordered after that date until 1944

when the railroads orderd 54 o new cars.

Meanwhile,

the

off ice of Defense Transportation and the railroads sought to
discourage would-be passengers from traveling,
during holidays, all to no avail.
civilians and soldiers on leave.

Trains were packed with

People stood in the aisles,

vestibules and anywhere else there was space.
of food

despite rationing.

especially

In the

Diners ran out

spring of

1944,

the

Federal Bureau of Investigation made numerous arrests for
black markets in Pullman accornodations.

Ultimately,

this

hurt efforts by the railroads to increase their passenger
business after the war as passenger recalled their wartime
experiences

and

deserted

the

rails

for

other

means

of

travel. 23
One of the more controversial means of accomodating
passengers was cancellation of existing trains.

In July,

1941, the Illinois Commerce Commission allowed the Southern
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Railway to drop a pair of trains in Southern Illinois to free
equipment for use in serving military posts and other defense
transportation needs.

The Illinois Central dropped several

mixed trains and local passenger trains on several branch
lines in Illinois and also made other changes to free cars
for the armed forces.

Other Illinois railroads also dropped

money-losing locals during the war.

In February, 1942, they

asked the Illinois Commerce Commission for permission to drop
any trains they wished without notice as a war measure, but
were denied it, though they did gain this permission in other
states.

In July, however, the Office of Defense Transporta-

tion coaxed the Illinois Commerce Commission into calling a
meeting of railroad and bus officials to identify duplicate
and unessential runs which could be eliminated.
tified 70, some of which were discontinued.

They iden-

However, others

continued to run due to protests from local communities, who
wanted transportation, especially since tires were rationed. 24
One of the most controversial disputes pitted local
communities and the Illinois Commerce Commission against the
War Production Board and the Office of Defense Transportation.

The Illinois Terminal System, an electric interurban

railway, operated passenger and freight service on over 400
miles of lines from Peoria via Springfield to St.
Springfield via

Decatur

Bloomington to Peoria.

to

Danville

and

Decatur

Louis,
through

In July, 1942, the Illinois Commerce

Commission approved bus competition along its routes from
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peoria to Decatur and Champaign, largely due to dissatisfaction with the interurban•s service.

The company responded

bY petitioning to abandon the affected lines, arguing that
it was losing money on the routes and business would not
support both bus and rail service.
howls of protest.

The proposal met with

The interurban operated 26 daily passen-

ger trains on these lines as well as freight service, mostly
in grain, coal, oil and some manufactured goods.
munities depended

on the

Illinois Terminal

Local com-

for mail

and

other necessities as well as passenger service, while farmers, grain elevators and some industries relied on it to
ship their products.

Shortages of trucks, buses, tires and

gasoline gave added weight to their protests.

In October,

the Commerce Commission denied permission to abandon,
also revoked its approval of bus competition.

but

Meanwhile,

however, the War Production Board requisitioned the lines in
September in the hope of realizing 18,000 tons of scrap metal from rails and bridges.

The Commerce Commission, howe-

ver, ordered the Illinois Terminal to keep the lines running
and was later upheld in the courts.

Politicians, including

both of the state's Senators, became involved and Congress
started investigating War Production Board seizures of railroad branch lines.
wishing to

The Office of Defense Transportation,

eliminate duplicate

service,

investigated and

found the lines unneeded, but the Commerce Commission felt
differently and in December ordered the Illinois Terminal to
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continue operating the lines and to improve service.

The

company said it wanted to use the cars from the lines to
carry workers to the Illiopolis ordnance plant.

(Actually,

it soon started using rejuvenated elevated cars from New York
for the purpose.)

Finally, in March, 1943, with the scrap

metal situation easing, the War Production Board gave up the
fight and later returned the lines to the Illinois Terminal,
who continued to operate them until the fifties.

The Office

of Defense Transportation also caved in under the barrage of
protests and concluded that the lines were needed.

The bus

lines, meanwhile, charged that they were being sacrificed to
keep the Illinois Terminal alive and went to court to get
permission to offer bus service.

In July, 1945, the Illinois

Commerce Commission found Illinois Terminal service inadequate and allowed some, but not all, of the bus companies to
compete with the interurban. 25
other proposals to abandon rail lines were more successful.

The Illinois Central did not protest when the War

Production Board requisitioned the rails of its branch from
Freeport, Illinois to Dodgeville, Wisconsin.
a money-loser.

The line was

The Illinois Commerce Commission denied per-

mission for the Chicago and North Western to abandon a line
from Caledonia to Cortland despite an Interstate Commerce
Commission order allowing it, but was overruled in a federal
court.

Although several branch lines were abandoned in 1942,

the War Production Board no longer needed rail for scrap
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after 1942, while wartime rationing conditions necessitated
retention of many branches which might otherwise be abandoned.

Indeed, many of the rails from abandoned lines were

reused at war plants.

Abandonments dropped after 1942 and

there were none in Illinois in 1943 and 1944 and only a short
segment in 1945 despite efforts of some roads to get rid of
lightly-used branches.u
Early in 1945, with railroads straining under heavy
passenger loads, the Office of Defense Transportation again
tried to eliminate unnecessary services and ordered railroads
to

drop

50

capacity.

trains

operating

with

less

than

35

percent

This provoked a confrontation with the Illinois

commerce Commission when the Office of Defense Transportation
ordered the Chicago and Illinois Midland to drop a pair of
trains

between

Peoria

and

Springfield.

The

Commission

directed the railroad to ignore the order and the trains
continued to run until the late forties. The travel situation
worsened as the nation shifted its armed forces from the
European Theater to the Pacific.

In June, President Harry

s. Truman asked Americans not to travel in order to free cars
for troops.

In July, the Office of Defense Transportation

ordered sleepers off passenger runs of under 450 miles to
free

900

sleeping

cars

for

troops.

Illinois

railroads

promptly took off sleepers on runs from Chicago to Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, st. Louis, the Twin
other

cities

in

Illinois,

Iowa,

Indiana,

Cities and

Wisconsin

and
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Michigan.

Even then, soldiers had to sleep in shifts.

The

off ice of Defense Transportation also ordered coaches pooled
for use by the Army.

On July 11, the

nation's railroads

handled a record 54,814 soldiers in one day.

As in the case

of civilians, the soldiers were dissatisfied with the service
and many swore off rail travel after the war. 27
Like rail service, bus lines were subject to wartime
restrictions.

Buses had to carry full loads and could not

travel over thirty-five miles an hour even though designed
for higher speeds.

New buses were unavailable in 1942 and

1943 and parts were hard to get.

Greyhound established a

plant in Chicago to repair existing parts.

The Office of

Defense Transportation and the Illinois Commerce Commission
sought to eliminate duplicate routes,

but still maintain

adequate

pooling

service.

One

solution

was

of

routes.

Several bus companies pooled routes between Chicago, Peoria,
Springfield and other communities for the duration of the
war.

There also was a great demand for additional service,

especially to

serve

war plants.

The Office

of

Defense

Transportation and the Illinois Commerce Commission worked
out a policy under which a potential bus operator had to
first gain approval from the Office of Defense Transportation
and then the Commerce Commission and then request gas, tires
and equipment from the Office of Defense Transportation.
Many applicants were existing carriers, which simply secured
additional routes, but many were private individuals such as
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truckers and farmers operating overage or makeshift buses.
Wildcat operators charged what they pleased and ran where
tbeY pleased.

Hundreds sprang up to carry workers to war

plants, including 41 serving Western Cartridge at East Alton.
The Illinois Commerce Commission forced those at Western
cartridge to conform to state requirements on insurance and
safety, but relaxed its requirement for incorporation in view
of the need for the service, and only required approval of
tbe Office of Defense Transportation.

The company itself

resolved disputes over routes and schedules.

Aside from

serving war plants, some carriers added other routes where
a need arose,

sometimes only for the duration.

panies expanded during the war.

Many com-

Black Hawk Motor Transit

Company grew from 13 buses running over 522 route-miles in
1941 to 27 buses in July, 1942 operating 998 miles. 28
City and suburban transit systems were subject to some
of the same restrictions as intercity bus lines as well as
some geared to local transit.

Like intercity carriers, city

and suburban systems had to contend with equipment shortages.
The Chicago Surface Lines installed some buses in 1942, but
could not get any more until 1944 due to a

freeze on new

eguipment by the Office of Defense Transportation.

No new

streetcars or trolley buses arrived during the war, though
opening of the city's first subway in 1943 helped relieve
congestion.
duration.

Work on a second subway was suspended for the
To save gas and tires, the Surface Lines opened
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a neW

bus garage and other storage yards.

company introduced a

11

The Chicago Motor

Victory" bus with high narrow seats,

which could handle more passengers and also tested synthetic
tires on some buses.
68

buses

and

The Quad cities bus system lengthened

renovated

others

it

had

planned

to

junk.

Transit systems in Chicago and other Illinois cities added
or extended routes to accomodate war plants and military
posts and areas hard hit by tire and gas rationing.

However,

the office of Defense Transportation, in a controversial move
to save tires, forced the Surface Lines to cut three routes,
one of which was used by workers at the Dodge-Chicago plant.
Despite vehement protests by city officials, they were not
restored until after the war.

Chicago Motor Coach had to cut

its mileage to 85 percent of its prewar level.
holiday and non-rush hour buses were cut.

Sunday and

Chicago was better

off than some cities since it still had streetcar lines.

The

Off ice of Defense Transportation urged greater use of the
carlines to save gas and tires.

Still, these restrictions

hit the transit lines as they were handling a big increase
in traffic, which was intensified by tire and gas rationing.
Ridership on the Surface Lines rose from 676,258,744 in 1939
to

884, 704, 135

in

1945

while

the

Chicago

Rapid

Transit

Company handled 202,988,763 passengers on the elevated lines
in 1945 as compared to 145,394,382 in 1939.

This did not

include servicemen who rode free on the city's transit lines.
To handle

this

increased

load,

Chicago and

other cities
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reso r

ted to staggered hours for stores, schools and facto-

ries.

shoppers were urged to shop at noon and avoid the rush
Even so,

many riders,

forced out of cars

by gas

rationing, froze at wintry bus stops as jammed buses went by.
surface carriers also skipped stops to speed service.
bUS

The

system in Bloomington cut a fifth of its stops for the

duration,

while Chicago Motor Coach cut a

There was no protest at this.

stops.

fourth

However,

of

its

when the

office of Defense Transportation coaxed the Chicago, Aurora
and Elgin Railroad, an electric railway serving the western
suburbs,

into eliminating 16 flagstops,

riders screamed in

protest and the Illinois Commerce Commission ruled against
the cuts.

One wartime innovation in Chicago transit was a

river transit service between the Chicago and North Western
station and Michigan Avenue instituted in June, 1943. 29
All forms of transportation were restricted to some
extent during the war, but only airline passengers had to
get a priority to travel.

Priori ties were issued by the

Army's Air Transport Command in Chicago in several classes.
Non-priority and low-priority passengers had to deplane in
favor of higher priority passengers and cargo, often at refueling stops.
armed forces.
dules.

Airlines lost many of their planes to the
The rest flew longer on more restricted sche-

Airlines coordinated services to eliminate duplicate

flights and cancelled some short-distance runs from Chicago
and St.

Louis to nearby states.

Airlines started adding
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flights

in 1943,

and 1944 as the Army started returning

planes.

By July, 1945, Chicago's Municipal Airport (Midway

Airport) had 238 daily flights.

By the end of the war, the

airlines were increasing their share of the inter-city travel market.

In the Spring of 1941,

Chicago improved its

Municipal Airport by relocating a railway bisecting its runways.

Airport construction lagged during the war, but after

the war,

Chicago used the Douglas aircraft plant airfield

for O'Hare field and several Illinois cities built municipal
.
t s. 30
airpor

One of the biggest problems of transportation systems
in wartime was the shortage of labor.

Many of their emplo-

yees went into the armed forces at the same time that traffie was rising.
drivers.

Greyhound lost a large percentage of its

Trucks were idled for lack of drivers and a shor-

tage of mechanics to repair them.

Railroads had severe

shortages of labor in train crews, track gangs, roundhouse
and shop

fore es and other jobs.

shortages,

roundhouses

still able to work.

To help solve manpower

recalled older employees who were

Railroads and truckers hired vagrants

for jobs at freight docks and track gangs.

The Illinois

Central hired sixteen and seventeen-year-old boys to work as
switchmen, firemen and brakemen and set up a school in Carbondale

to

train them.

The

company also

hired younger

teenage boys to work as telegraphers at country stations.
The Wabash hired high school boys to work on track gangs in
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al Illinois.
centr
A major source of labor was women.

By March, 1943,

ailroad, which was losing men at the rate of 2000 a
one r
month was replacing them with 1500 women and 500 men. Women
soon comprised eight percent of its employees.
central hired women

for office

jobs,

agents, messengers car cleaners,

The Illinois

station and ticket

electrical and machinist

helpers, engine wipers and flagmen on commuter trains.

By

October, 1943, the company employed 69 women at its Centralia shops.

Women changed freight car wheels for the Illi-

nois Central, loaded freight cars for the Burlington, wiped
engines and cleaned coaches for the Milwaukee Road, worked
as yard

office

clerks

in the

Belt Railway

of

Chicago's

Clearing Yard and worked on track gangs on various railroads.

Women also operated interurban trains on the Chica-

go, North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad, drove buses in Rockford and trucks between Chicago and Iowa.

Employment of wo-

men in transportation jobs met with some opposition from
railroad unions,

which felt them unsuited for rail jobs.

The head of the switchmen's union said he hoped that he would
never see a woman switchman.
By April,

1945,

there were

He was soon to be disappointed.
57 woman

percent of the total nationwide.

switchtenders,

1.82

The unions also felt that

any employment of women should be limited to the duration of
the war, but as late as 1948, railroads continued to employ
women in many traditionally male jobs, including switchmen,
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although only in small numbers.
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Blacks were another source of labor,
met with union hostility.

but one which

Railroad unions generally barred

blacks from membership or enrolled them in auxiliary locals
dominated by conventional all-white locals.

A notable ex-

ception was the largely-black Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
porters, headed by blacks.

Its president, A.

Philip Ran-

dolph, fought a long battle in the twenties and thirties for
union recognition,

not only with the Pullman Company,

with other railroad unions.

but

In the late thirties, redcaps

formed their own union, which became the United Transport
service Employees in 1940 and affiliated with the Congress
of Industrial Organizations in 1942.
black dining car workers.

It went on to organize

Some blacks were employed as lo-

comotive firemen in the South since this was hot dirty work.
However, they could not join a union or be promoted to engineer.

In 1941,

railroad unions reached an agreement with

railroads operating in the South to ban blacks from serving
on diesels and to reduce the number of black firemen.

The

Fair Employment Practice Committee held hearings on the issue and on discrimination by other railroads
against blacks.

and unions

In 1943, it ordered the railroads and the

unions to cease discriminatory practices, but they refused
since the agency had no powers of enforcement.
then appointed a

The President

committee to meet with the agency,

carriers and the unions,

but without success.

the

Meanwhile,
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two black firemen pursued the case through the courts and in
December, 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that a union representing a craft of railroad workers could not negotiate an
agreement

preferential

to

its

members

against other employees because of race.

and

discriminate

However, the ru-

ling did not affect discrimination barring blacks from employment in the first place. 33
Even in the North,

railroads offered many jobs to

blacks, but only lower-level positions.

Blacks could serve

on trains only as porters, waiters and maids.

Blacks served

as coach cleaners, but were barred from the Carmen's Union.
This sometimes led to delays.

On one occasion, a train of

soldiers and sailors on the Chicago and North Western was
delayed for over seven hours for lack of white carmen to
service the train, though there were plenty of blacks who
could do so.

The Pennsylvania Railroad employed over 17,000

blacks, but restricted them to jobs on track gangs, dining
car crews, coach cleaning, loading cars and the like.

The

New York Central hired two blacks as carmen's helpers at its
yard in Chicago, but refused to employ more for other jobs,
claiming that the public and the unions would not accept
this.

The Illinois Central and the Pennsylvania hired black

women for track gangs, and the former employed some at its
Centralia shops.

By and large,

blacks made few gains in

railroad employment during the war.

Airlines did no better,

employing blacks mainly in service jobs.

Blacks did gain
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jobs on Chicago's transit lines in 1943 as streetcar motormen and conductors, elevated trainmen and conductors and bus
drivers.

By December,

1944,

there were over 500 blacks

employed on the city's transit lines with few complaints from
the public or other employees.

34

In addition to hiring women and blacks, railroads imported Mexicans,

Track

mainly for work on track gangs.

maintenance jobs were very difficult to fill and by November,
1942,

the

Office

of

Defense

recruitment of Mexicans.

Transportation

was

urging

After the United States made ar-

rangements with the Mexican government,

6000 Mexicans were

imported to work on western railroads.

More followed and

some Illinois carriers made use of them.

In 1945,

over

68,500 Mexicans were in service on the nation's railways as
track workers. 35
A more controversial means of addressing labor shortages involved relaxation of work rules.

Railroad unions

responded to the threat of unemployment due to dieselization
by insisting that firemen be employed on diesels even though
they had no fires to tend.

The unions even tried to get a

full crew for each diesel unit in multi-unit locomotives.
Many states,

including Illinois, had full-crew laws requi-

ring employment of a set number of crewmen on a train and
unions insisted on their enforcement.
often

forced

really needed.

Such full crew laws

railroads to employ more crewmen than they
Railroads also had to pay a full day's work
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for a train crew traveling only 100 miles, which could be
done in a

few hours.

Unions,

however,

charged that the

railroads were wasting manpower due to unnecessary delays
and argued that better wages and working conditions would
solve the labor shortage.
tion pressed for a
success.

The Office of Defense Transporta-

relaxation of work rules with limited

Not until well into the postwar era was there any

meaningful progress on work rules. 36
In 1941,

the work rules issue caused a

strike and

government takeover of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad, a 239-mile road running straight across Illinois from
Effner,

Indiana to Keokuk,

Iowa.

George P.

McNear,

its

puritanical owner, built the line into an important bridge
route

between

eastern

and

western

railroads

and

by-pass

around Chicago, saving up to 28 hours on a cross-county run.
He also scrapped with important shippers, alienated prominent Peorians and even other railroad executives by his outspoken opinions, though the latter supported him in his fight
over work rules.

McNear, who refused to deal with unions

even after they won an election in November, 1940, considered
the standard work rules obsolete and inefficient.

In the

fall of 1941, he issued new ones under which 55 men would do
work previously done
unions,

by 83,

though at higher pay.

The

fearing loss of jobs and reduced wages for their

members, struck on December 28, 1941, the date the rules were
to take ef feet.

The National Mediation Board, the United
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states Conciliation Service and the War Labor Board tried to
settle the strike without

success.

McNear

rejected all

suggestions for arbitration even as the unions accepted them.
Meanwhile, he hired replacements, mostly rejects from other
railroads, and tried to run trains under the new rules.
led to violence.

Strikers stoned trains,

This

tried to burn

locomotives and company buildings, shot at trains, railyards
and

homes

of

company

officials.

Court

violence and mass picketing were ignored.
convicted of plotting to blow up a bridge.

orders

banning

Three men were
McNear sought

additional protection from local police and state militia,
but was unsuccessful.

Other railroads complained of unsafe

practices by the strikebreakers employed by McNear.

Since

the strike held up war supplies, the President urged McNear
to arbitrate and when he refused,

ordered the Office of

Defense Transportation to take over the road on March 22,
1942.

The agency settled with the unions and operated the

road for the rest of the war.

Even so, the settlement was

not far different from McNear's own work rules.

The agency

found that standard work rules insisted on by the unions
would

triple

labor

costs.

Arbitration

resulted

in

an

agreement more costly than under McNear's rules, but far less
than the unions wanted under standard work rules.

Railroad

and business leaders generally backed McNear's efforts to
change work rules, but the public had mixed feelings.
felt he was an obstructionist,

Some

others blamed the unions,
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while others felt both sides were wrong.

37

Nationwide railroad labor disputes also arose during
the war years.
paid vacations.
dispute,

In 1940, fourteen non-operating unions sought
The National Mediation Board took up the
In June,

but could not resolve it.

1941,

these

unions were joined by five operating unions in seeking wage
hikes.

Essentially, railroaders wished to retain the advan-

tages in pay and prestige they had enjoyed compared to industrial workers and which were now threatened by increases
in industrial wages.

Operating unions also wanted to put

extra crewmen on diesel locomotives.

The railroads, howe-

ver, wanted changes in work rules which the unions refused
to accept.

Again, the Mediation Board tried to mediate the

dispute but without success.

In October, the Board offered

arbitration, but the unions refused to accept and called a
strike.

However, the President appointed an Emergency Board,

which approved a temporary wage hike and paid vacation.

The

unions rejected this as insufficient and again threatened to
strike.

On November 27, the President, anxious to avoid a

strike,

reconvened

the

National

Mediation

Board.

The

carriers made concessions and on December 2, an agreement was
reached giving the unions essentially what they wanted in pay
and vacations.

Other issues were left unresolved. 38

In the fall of 1942, the non-operating unions sought
additional wage increases and a union shop.
Board took up the dispute in January,

The Mediation

1943, but could not
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resolve it and suggested arbitration, which the unions refused.

The National Railway Labor Panel,

created by the

president on May 21, 1942 to handle wartime railway labor
disputes, appointed an Emergency Board.

It was unable to

mediate the dispute, but did recommend a wage increase, but
no union shop.

The wage increase would have become law, but

the Economic Stabilization Director found it in violation of
wage restrictions.
strike.

The unions protested and threatened a

The Director suggested that the unions and the

carriers negotiate a settlement, but when they did on August
7, it was the same as the rejected one and he disapproved
it.

Meanwhile, in January, 1943, the operating unions also

asked wage increases.

The Mediation Board also failed to

mediate this dispute and in May the National Railway Labor
Panel appointed an Emergency Board, which recommended a wage
hike within the constraints of the Little Steel formula.
The Economic Stabilization Director approved it and it became law on October 26.
threatened to strike.

However, the unions rejected it and
Meanwhile, on October 16, the Presi-

dent appointed a Special Emergency Board to reconsider the
case of the non-operating unions and recommend wage hikes
conforming with the stabilization policy.

The Board made a

recommendation which the Stabilization Director approved,
but the unions dissatisfied,

asked the Mediation Board to

investigate and prepared to strike.

They also had resolu-

tions introduced in Congress to validate their agreement of
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August 7.

The Senate passed it on December 9, but the House

deferred action.

Later in December, both the operating and

nonoperating unions announced a strike to begin December 30,
1943.

When three operating unions refused the President's

offer to arbitrate, he ordered the War Department to take
over the nation's railroads.

The unions then called off the

strike and talks continued while the Army ran the roads.
seven railroad executives were commissioned as colonels to
supervise operations.

The President also rendered his deci-

sion as arbitrator, which in effect, gave the unions the wage
hikes they wanted.

The Stabilization Director accepted the

agreements on January 18, 1944 and the roads were returned
to their owners.

During 1943, the operating unions also

tried to get extra crewmen on diesel locomotives, but were
unsuccessful except in passenger trains, though they did get
pay increases for engineers on diesel locomotives. 39
Strikes were not confined to the railroad industry.
On May 16, 1945, truck drivers in Chicago struck in protest
over a War Labor Board award of a pay increase that fell
short of their demands.
military trucks,
takeover.

The Army moved some supplies in

while the carriers asked

for a

federal

The Office of Defense Transportation took over

operations on May 23 and the strike ended on May 25 while
the War Labor Board took up the dispute.
came on June 16.

A second strike

Again, the Office of Defense Transporta-

tion took over the carriers, and when truckers refused to
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work, the Army moved in and troops drove and guarded trucks.
The truckers finally conceded defeat and the strike ended
3une 27.

In November, 1944, train crews struck the Chicago,

Aurora and Elgin and the Chicago, North Shore and Milwaukee,
disrupting commuter service and causing substantial absenteeism in local war plants.

The unions had petitioned for

a wage increase, but when an Emergency Board appointed by the
president approved a wage hike, they rejected it as insufficient.

Unlike other disputes, the President refused to in-

tervene in the 17-day strike despite requests that he do so,
and the two sides finally settled on the increase awarded by
the Emergency Board. 40
The railroads and other carriers generally profited
from the war.

Many Illinois railroads emerged from a De-

pression-induced bankruptcy and reorganized during the war.
In the fall of 1942,

the New York Central paid its first

dividend since 1931.

Many carriers also used profits to

reduce debt.

The Illinois Central paid off over $100 mil-

lion in debt. 41
The railroads also persuaded the government to eliminate land-grant rates, which the government had imposed on
the railroads in return for land grants for railroad construction.

The Illinois central land grant, one of the first,

provided for free transportation for government goods and
personnel, but this was soon modified to a discount of fifty
percent.

Non-land-grant roads adopted equalization rates to
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Jlleet competition from land-grant roads.
the

railroads,

hit

with

Depression

During the thirties,
losses

increase in government traffic at low rates,
this provision eliminated.

and

a

large

tried to get

The Transportation Act of 1940

eliminated land-grant rates for non-defense traffic, but kept
it for military transportation.
up any unpatented lands.
brought a

huge

increase

In exchange, railroads gave

The defense program and the war
in military

carried at a fifty percent discount.

traffic,

all

of

it

Again, the railroads

sought repeal, but the Army objected and Congress did not
repeal the land-grant rates during the war, thus saving the
government an estimated $20 million a month.
did not do so well on land sales.

The railroads

The Atchison, Topeka and

Santa Fe earned a total of $25 million from all sales up to
June 30,

1947, but granted the government a total of $215

million in reduced rates.~
Wartime traffic loads placed heavy burdens on the
state and national transportation system.

The vast quanti-

ties of military supplies and armies of soldiers and sailors
were of no use unless they could be transported to where they
were needed.

The biggest share of the burden of trans-

porting military equipment and personnel as well as civilian
freight and passenger traffic fell on the railroads, which
groaned under huge increases in freight and passenger traffic.

Other modes of transport also experienced a significant

rise in traffic.

To handle this burden, commercial carriers
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had to cease their normal competitive practices and cooperate
with each other.
Government played a significant role in this.

Al-

though the government did not repeat its World War I takeover
of the railroads, it worked with the carriers and shippers
to regulate the flow of traffic and direct shipments to their
destination by the most efficient means of transport and by
the most direct route.

Federal and state agencies worked to

eliminate duplicate services and establish new services where
needed.

The Office of Defense Transportation, the Interstate

commerce Commission and other agencies worked with shippers
and with the carriers themselves to insure the efficient use
of equipment and in some cases, divert it to the military or
to special projects such as the carriage of oil to the East
Coast.

The War Production Board allocated equipment to the

carriers as scarce resources became available.

Al though

equipment was always in short supply, government worked with
the carriers to make maximum use of existing equipment.
Labor was also scarce during the war as the armed
forces drained off train crewmen, truck and bus drivers and
other personnel.

To replace them, commercial carriers, like

other employers, had to turn to new sources of labor.

As

with other industries, railroads, truckers and local transit
companies hired women and blacks.

Railroads employed women

in many traditionally male jobs and increased their employment of blacks, often despite union resistance.
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The war did not introduce any major changes in transportation, though women and blacks gained increased job opportunities.
trends.

The main effect of the war was on existing

Prior to the war, the railroads faced growing com-

petition, especially from the automobile in passenger travel, but also from trucks and barges in freight transportation.

The war reversed the trend temporarily.

declined

sharply as

auto

production ceased

autos, gasoline and tires were rationed.

Auto usage
and

existing

Motorists crowded

mass transit systems for local transportation and trains for
long-distance travel.

After the war, however, they deserted

the rails to return to their cars.

Airline travel did re-

tain its wartime gains and expand on them after the war, but
it too was growing before the war, and the chief effect of
the war, at least initially was to retard this growth.

The

postwar era brought the elimination of most rail passenger
service and the loss of much rail freight traffic.

The war

also delayed the full impact of one technological change.
Railroads had to wait until peacetime to dieselize their
operations,

though their wartime experience

further con-

vinced them of the advantages of the diesel locomotive.
Illinois continued to be a major transportation crossroads
after the war, but in highway, air and water transport as
well as rail.
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CHAPTER VI
HOGS, SOYBEANS AND HEMP: ILLINOIS AGRICULTURE DURING
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
Illinois farm production during the second world war
was a complex problem.

Farmers had to produce more, but did

not have enough equipment and manpower to do the job.

At the

same time, their incomes were somewhat restricted by price
controls on farm products, controls which they resented in
the light of rising industrial wages.

Government played a

major role, orchestrating production goals while regulating
prices and the supply of labor and equipment.
brought

changes

in

the

types

of

traditional crops, especially corn,
soybeans,

a

relative newcomer,

after Pearl Harbor.

crops

The war also

planted.

While

continued to dominate,

gained rapidly

in acreage

Illinois farmers experimented with new

war crops such as hemp while reducing the planting of less
essential crops.
Illinois agriculture was highly diversified.
the chief crop,
counties.

especially in the central

Corn was

and northern

Other crops planted in these counties included

soybeans, oats and other grains, asparagus and other vegetables.

Farmers in the southern counties grew winter wheat,

peaches, apples, pears and other fruits and also cotton and
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tobacco.

Many Illinois farmers raised livestock for meat or

dairy products.

In 1945,

Illinois ranked fifth among the

states in total acreage of crops harvested.

ss.3

At that time,

percent of the total area of the state was farmland.

The state also was first in soybeans, second in corn, hogs
and cheese, fourth in chickens, fifth in milk production and
sixth in eggs.

Food processing industries ranged from Chi-

cago meat packinghouses to soybean and corn processing plants
in Decatur, vegetable canneries, dairies and egg processors. 1
Agriculture

was slow to prepare for war, having been

in a depression since the early twenties.

During the thir-

ties, New Deal agencies such as the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration (AAA) and the Soil Conservation Service worked
to restrict farm production.

As late as the fall of 1940,

few of them were adapting to changed conditions.

Agri-

culture did not plan for war because farmers and agricultural agencies feared that increased production would bring
surplus crops and depressed farm income.

There was no inde-

pendent war agency set up to handle agriculture.

Though the

National Defense Advisory Commission had an agricultural division,

it was abolished

in May,

1941 and

its functions

transferred to an office of Agricultural Defense Relations
within the Department of Agriculture.

Other agencies of the

Department such as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Extension service handled much of the task of
promoting increased production, although in March, 1943, the
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war Food Administration was established within the Department
to handle food production and distribution. 2
Some of the agricultural agencies established during
the thirties relied a great deal on local farmers to run
their programs.

Administration of crop reduction and soil

conservation programs rested on state, county and township
committees

composed

of

farmers.

Local

elected annually by cooperating farmers.
participated in agricultural programs.
up sometimes had misgivings.
sometimes
officials.
than

criticized

as

committees

were

Not all farmers

Even those who signed

The committees themselves were

mere

rubber

stamps

for

higher

Big farmers accepted the AAA program more readily

small

farmers.

They

were

better

informed

of

its

benefits, and as commercial farmers were able to profit from
its provisions more effectively than small

farmers.

The

latter were assisted by the Farm Security Administration,
which provided low-cost loans enabling them to buy land and
improve their farms. 3
Farm organizations played a
agricultural programs.
Farm

Bureau

major role

in shaping

The most powerful was the American

Federation,

whose

Illinois

Illinois Agricultural Association,
Smith, a Pike County farmer.

affiliate,

was headed by Earl

the

c.

The Illinois organization was

the most powerful state farm organization in the country,
representing about two-thirds of Illinois farmers by the end
of the war.

Though accused of representing only big farmers,
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it included small farmers and tenants as well.

It did rep-

resent successful commercial farmers as opposed to subsistence farmers.

In 1947, with a membership of 145,851, the

Illinois Agricultural Association easily outranked the National Grange which had only about 9200 members in Illinois
and the National Farmer's union.

In 1942, John L.

Lewis

tried to organize dairy farmers in the united Mine Workers
union's District 50, but with little success.

Though some

locals were organized, the united Farmers of Illinois disaffiliated from District 50 in 1944.

The Illinois Agricul-

tural Association generally supported the Agricultural Adjustment Administration programs and even helped to write
the 1938 law.

Indeed it was criticized by the United Far-

mers of Illinois for its support of the New Deal.

However,

the Farm Bureau and its Illinois affiliate objected to the
Farm Security Administration and during the war, backed the
efforts of Illinois Congressmen Everett Dirksen and others
in seeking to curtail the agency's activities despite its
popularity even with anti-New Deal critics, who praised its
efforts to help small farmers.

When criticized for this by

the Bloomington Pantagraph, the Illinois Agricultural Association replied that it had no objection to how the program
was administered in Illinois.
Farm Security Administration
leaders in the Farm Bureau.

In fact, many members of the
county committees were

also

Still, the Bureau and its state

affiliate were generally apathetic toward small farmers. 4
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one reason for the Farm Bureau's strength was its affiliation with the federal-state agricultural extension service.

county Farm Bureaus organized and funded by farmers

themselves and affiliated with the national Farm Bureau hired
county agricultural agents from a list of applicants approved
by the extension service and paid in part by the Farm Bureau.
The extension service cooperated with the Farm
the

Illinois

Agricultural

Association

programs and new farming methods.

in

Bureau and

promoting

farm

The farm organizations

themselves lobbied the General Assembly to keep the extension
service well-funded.

In 1938, under an agreement between the

Department of Agriculture and land grant colleges such as
the University of Illinois,

state, county and neighborhood

land-use planning committees were created.
colleges

and

the

extension

implementing the plan.

service were

The land grant
responsible

for

The director of the extension service

was the state chairman of the state committee with authority
to appoint farmer members.

Farmers representing different

types of agriculture in the area composed the majority of
members of the state and county committees. State or county
offices of agricultural agencies also were represented.
committees dealt not only with land-use planning,

The

but any

local problem concerning farmers and their families.

The

University of Illinois started organizing the committees in
1939.

The defense emergency hastened organization.

The

University's advisors presided over county committees, which
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consisted of

representatives

of

each agricultural

agency

operating in the county, teachers of vocational agriculture
and home economics and eight to fifteen farm men and women
named by farm and home advisors and farm and home bureau
presidents.

The

farm advisor was chairman and the home
The advisors and bureau presidents

advisor co-chairman.

appointed township chairmen who in turn nominated and the
county committee approved neighborhood leaders--a farmer and
a farm woman for each school district.

Some were suspicious

of the committees since the Farm Bureau had a hand in the
selection of county committees and township chairmen, though
the program included all farmers and not just members of the
Farm

Bureau.

During

the

war,

the

committees

discussed

general production problems, rural fire protection, wartime
food preservation and other problems.

They also made plans

for cooperative use of farm machinery,
transportation

and

labor.

The

canning equipment,

University's

College

of

Agriculture issued bulletins on war crops,

fertilizers and

other wartime farm production problems.

Governor Dwight

Green

named

the

members

of

the

State

Land-Use

Planning

Council as an advisory committee to the Illinois War Council's Committee on Agricultural Resources and Production.
The Council set up a program for relaying information on
wartime agricultural requirements to every farm family
the state.
labor. 5

in

It also directed recruiting and training of farm
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on July 5, 1941, Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard ordered the establishment of state and county defense
boards, later war boards, under the AAA committee chairmen.
The state agricultural war board, headed by Lee Gentry, state
AAA director, was composed of the principal field officers

of the various agencies of the Department of Agriculture
operating in the state, while county agricultural war boards
were composed of representatives of the agencies operating
in

the

county.

As

head

of

the

extension

service,

the

chairman of the State Land-Use Planning Council was a member
of the state U. s. Department of Agriculture War Board and
also a member of the Illinois War Council.

The state and

county agricultural war boards administered federal war
programs, broke down state production goals into county and
farm units and canvassed farmers to secure pledges of production.

on January 12, 1943, Farm Mobilization day, far-

mers meeting in AAA committees heard a radio address by James
Byrnes,

Director of Economic stabilization,

delivering a

message from the President urging increased farm production
to meet the 194 3 crop goals.

The farmers then discussed

means of meeting these goals.

From 1942 to 1944, the war

boards handled the rationing of farm equipment.
presented

farmers'

requests

for

materials

or

They also
labor

and

reported bottlenecks in storage and transportation to the
proper authorities. 6
In April, 1941, the Department of Agriculture embarked
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on a program increasing food production to meet the needs of
Britain and others fighting the Axis powers.

Soon afterward,

the Illinois extension leaders urged a 20 percent
in hog production for 1941,

but also advised

increase

farmers

to

maintain their acreage of corn, wheat and oats at current
levels.

There was no shortage of grain at the time.

a surplus developed by July.

Indeed

Though federal agricultural

agencies were no longer trying to cut farm production, they
still wished to restrict it.

On September 11, Lee Gentry

advised Sangamon County farmers to put 80 percent of their
cropland in whatever crops they were planting, but conserve
20 percent as grassland to avoid soil depletion.

Even though

the nation was preparing to feed 10 million people under
Lend-Lease, it planned to do so by restricting surplus crops
such as wheat in favor of others such as soybeans, though
the Department of Agriculture did make plans to canvass all
farmers to ascertain their 1942 production goals.

After

Pearl Harbor, however, the Department of Agriculture eased
restrictions and told farmers to plant every acre.

Produc-

tion goals were revised in the light of the new situation. 7
Though Illinois farmers grew a variety of crops, their
main contribution to wartime food production lay in corn,
soybeans, dairy products, hogs, cattle, chickens and eggs.
The actual acreage harvested during 1942 to 1945 grew less
than five percent over the prewar years.

Production in-

creased because farmers managed to increase production per
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acre.

Farmers made heavy use of fertilizers.

Illinois led

all states at the beginning of the war in the use of limeDespite shortages, the use of

stone to sweeten the soil.

limestone increased during the war.
also increased.

Chemical fertilizer use

Soil conservation was a problem.

Soil con-

servation districts increased during the war from 25 in June,
1942 to 66 by the end of the war.

They covered over four-

fifths of the state's cropland.

Some soil was lost, however,

due to heavy wartime planting.

Soil loss in the Corn Belt

states of Illinois,

Iowa,

creased

in

12

percent

Indiana,

1943-1944

Ohio and Missouri inover

marginal land was put into production.

Even

1935-1939.

Hilly pasture land

was plowed for cropland, though contour planting minimized
soil

erosion.

Farmers

utilized contour plowing and the

planting of grasses and clover on fallow lands to conserve
and improve the soil and produce higher yields.
Department

of

Agriculture

urged

farmers

to

In 1943, the
reduce

the

planting of crops deemed unessential such as watermelons and
cantaloupes.

In Illinois, growers reduced their areage in

watermelons from 4300 acres in 1940 to 2600 in 1943 and for
cantaloupes
However,

from

1900

acres

in

1940

to

1050

in

1943.

there were no price ceilings on these fruits and

growers soon found that watermelons were the most profitable
crop.

Prices quadrupled between 1939 and 1943 with the big-

gest increases in 1942 and 1943.

Watermelon acreage in-

creased in 1944 though not to the prewar level.

Cotton
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production also dropped,

though

flax

increased from

6000

acres in 1941 to 29,000 acres, then declined to 972 acres in
1945 as demand eased.

8

The chief crop
variety of uses.

in Illinois was corn,

Sweet corn fed consumers while field corn

was used to feed livestock.
duce starches,
products.

which had a

syrups,

Corn was also refined to pro-

vegetable oils,

alcohol

and other

The A. E. Staley Company in Decatur developed a

new type of corn starch for use in making waterproof boxes
to carry supplies on to beaches.

The boxes were thrown off

the ships and floated into shore.

Corn starch also replaced

imported tapioca in a number of products.

Even corn cobs

were ground up to make animal feed, engine cleaners for naval
aircraft,
diene,

furfural,

and

other

a refining agent used in making butaproducts.

produced hybrid corn seed.

Several
Usually,

Illinois

companies

Illinois planted an

average of around nine million acres in corn.

In 1942 to

1945, average annual acreage was 8,624,277, slightly under
the average for 1935 to 1939 of 8, 869, 250.

Planting in-

creased after 1943 so that acreage went from 7, 721, ooo in
1941 to 9,056,000 in 1945.

The average annual yield, how-

ever, went from 331,000,000 bushels in 1935 to 1939 to over
405,000,000 bushels in 1942 to 1945. 9
Illinois wheat declined during the war years.

Early

in 1941, a large stockpile of wheat from the previous harvest glutted storage space as the 1941 winter wheat crop
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started filling elevators.

The situation worsened and by

July, a government appointed grain storage committee warned
wheat shippers not to send carloads of wheat to Chicago due
to lack of storage space.

By August, American farmers were

harvesting the largest wheat crop in 22 years.

The huge

wheat stockpile led the Department of Agriculture to recommend that farmers reduce their acreage in wheat in 1942 and
grow soybeans, flax and other crops that were needed.

Sto-

rage space was in short supply and many farmers were seeking
bins to store their wheat to prevent spoilage.

The Commodi-

ty Credit Corporation eased some of its own storage problems
by selling some of the wheat stockpile for livestock feed at
85 percent of the parity price.

This aroused protests from

farm bloc congressmen, who tried unsuccessfully to ban the
sale of commodities below the parity price.

On May 2, 1942,

wheat growers voted in AAA elections to accept the Department
of Agriculture's

recommended

quotas.

Under

the

quotas,

farmers could make loans on their wheat crop, but they were
penalized if they seeded over their allotment unless they
held the excess on their farms until the quota was lifted.
In Illinois, the acreage harvested in 1942 was about half
that of 1941 and the 12, 623, 000 bushels produced was the
lowest since 1912.

In December, 1942, the acreage planted

in winter wheat was the lowest in 7 8 years.

However,

in

February, 1943, the marketing quota was ended since the need
for wheat was rising.

By March, 1944, there was a serious
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shortage of wheat and Illinois farmers planted more wheat in
1944 and 1945, though production did not reach the prewar
level.

10

Soybean production expanded rapidly during the war
with Illinois the leading producer in the nation.

In 1939,

the state's farms produced half the national output.

In

1942, the Department of Agriculture sought an increase in
oil-bearing crops to make up for the loss of vegetable oils
from the Far East.

It sought a national increase in soybean

production of 54 percent but only 27 percent for Illinois
since the state already produced over half the national total.

Before the war, soybean acreage was about a fourth that

of corn.

By 1943, it was almost half.

Soybean production

increased every year to peak at 75,200,000 bushels in 1945.
Production declined after the war,
prewar level.

but

still

Decatur was the center of a

topped

the

soybean pro-

cessing industry with its A. E. Staley Company as the industry leader.

In 1949, 30 processing plants in the state

handled 46 percent of the nation's output.

The Illinois

Agricultural Experiment Station developed new varieties of
the soybean.

One which was produced during the war was more

productive and richer in oil content.

The Department of

Agriculture's Northern Regional Research Laboratory in Peoria
and a special soybean regional laboratory at the University
of Illinois discovered new uses for soybeans,

which were

usually crushed to produce soybean oil and other products
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including animal
products,

but

munitions.

feed.

some

Most soybean oil went

went

into

glycerine,

a

into

food

component

in

Vast quantities of soy flour went to England

through Lend-Lease for use in sausage.

The Staley Company

built a new soy flour plant which went into production in
1942.

By the end of 1944, however, there was a surplus of

soy flour and the new plant was shut down.
build a

The company did

new solvent extraction soybean mill

in 1944

and

started production in 1945. 11
During the war, the state's soybean processing plants
proved inadequate to handle the increased wartime crop.

To

avoid building new plants, soybeans were shipped south and
west to cottonseed and copra mills.

Unfortunately,

this

produced shortages of soybean meal in the fall of 1942 and
early 1943.
livestock.
withhold

Soybean meal was used to supply proteins to
Farmers protested vehemently and threatened to

their

livestock.

crops

from

the market

to

feed

their

own

Another controversy arose over margarine, a sub-

stitute for butter.

Margarine, which used soybean oil, was

cheaper than butter and thus threatened dairy farmers, who
responded by seeking to have it banned or taxed heavily to
make it noncompetitive.

Farm publications backed them up

only to discover that many farmers and even dairymen bought
margarine. 12
One controversial issue affecting most farm products
was farm prices.

over the years, farmers sought to obtain
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parity prices for their crops.

Parity prices would give them

the same purchasing power they had between 1910 and 1914.
The Administration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
championed their cause and tried various means of getting
farm prices up to parity during the Depression.

The outbreak

of war brought an increased demand and higher prices for farm
products.

It also brought fears of inflation, which led to

price control.

However, the initial price control legisla-

tion included provisions setting farm prices at 110 percent
of parity.
1942,

Consumer prices continued to rise and in April,

President

Roosevelt

ceiling on farm products.

asked

Congress

to

reduce

the

congress balked, however, until

the President asked for legislation lowering the ceiling to
100 percent of parity and threatening to take action on his
own.

Many congressmen and farm leaders were angered by what

they considered an unfair deal for farmers, but they finally
gave in and the legislation passed on October 2, 1942.
Department

of

Agriculture

also

incentive payments and subsidies

used

support

to encourage

The

payments,
farmers

to

plant more essential crops such as soybeans and increase
production of hogs, chickens, eggs and dairy products.

The

Department also used subsidies to reduce consumer prices.
farmers had mixed feelings over such payments.

As a rule,

they preferred that the free market rule farm prices and that
the government refrain from fixing prices.

They saw sub-

sidies as a sort of stigma and feared an unfavorable reaction
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from consumers.

However,

they opposed the abolition

subsidies if it meant lower farm prices.
to ceilings on

farm prices,

of

While they objected

they were willing to accept

government intervention to keep prices at parity or above.
They also felt that consumers should be willing to pay higher
prices in view of their higher wages.

Farm leaders demanded

that wages and other prices be controlled if farm prices were
restricted.
its

During 1943 and early 1944, the Farm Bureau and

congressional

allies

made

repeated

efforts

to

ban

subsidies, but consumers and labor unions wanted subsidies to
Whenever Congress passed bans on

hold down

food costs.

subsidies,

the President vetoed them and the vetoes were

sustained. 13
Ceiling prices on meat and corn helped produce shortages of both in 1943 and 1944.

Illinois was a major produ-

cer of livestock, especially hogs, cattle and chickens, all
of which ate corn.

Feeder cattle were often shipped in from

western states to be fattened in feedlots in Illinois before
going to market.

Farmers and feedlot owners benefitted from

the outbreak of war in Europe and the national rearmament
program which followed.
countries

cut

off

the

German invasions of Poland and other
supply

of

Polish

hams

and

other

products, while Lend-Lease, the war effort and higher domestic consumption increased demand. 14
In Illinois, hog production made the biggest gains.
In December,

1940, the Secretary of Agriculture asked for
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more pigs and announced a program of price supports (mostly
through government purchase)

for hogs,

chickens,

dairy products to encourage production.

eggs and

Illinois farmers

responded with 8,500,800 pigs in 1941, over half a million
above the 1940 total.

The pig crop grew rapidly,

finally

peaking at 11,009,000 in 1943, twice the 1935 to 1939 average.

The Department of Agriculture helped encourage pro-

duction by

increasing support prices

for

live hogs

from

$9.00 per hundredweight in April, 1942 to $13.25 per hundredweight in the fall.

Meanwhile, in February, 1942, live

hog prices hit 110 percent of parity, which was about $13.00
per hundredweight.

The Office of Price Administration then

froze wholesale ...ork prices at a level for early March.
However,

hog prices continued to rise,

small packers to operate at a loss.

thus

forcing many

Large packers had inte-

grated processing sidelines to offset this.

In the spring

of 1943, with live hog prices hitting $16.00 a hundredweight,
the Office of Price Administration recommended ceilings on
live hogs to relieve the pressure on small packers.

The War

Food Administration agreed and announced that prices would
have to drop or ceilings would be imposed, but then increased
the support price to $13.75 per hundredweight to encourage
continued high production.

The Office of Price Administra-

tion further encouraged hog production when it imposed a
ceiling on corn.

The objective was to encourage

feed their corn to their hogs,

farmers to

thus producing more meat.
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This was

exactly what

happened.

Farmers

found

it

more

profitable to feed their corn to their hogs than sell it on
the market.

In June,

1943,

a

Department of Agriculture

survey of the pig crop discovered that farmers had exceeded
the Department's requests by 50 percent and were planning for
more pigs in the fall.

15

Meanwhile, despite record crops in 1942, the promotion
of hog production led to a crisis in corn.

The hogs soon ate

By the spring of 1943, farmers

all the surplus from 1942.

were using seven bushels of the 1942 crop for every five they
grew in 1943.

In six months, they used two-thirds of the

corn supply, leaving only a third to last them
rest of the year.

through the

This led to a shortage of corn which made

farmers even more reluctant to sell their corn.

Those who

did not need corn for feeding held it in the hope that the
ceiling would be lifted.

The Commodity Credit Corporation

called in loans on corn crops, only to find that farmers had
the money to pay off the loans and could continue to hold
their

corn.

Soon,

a

black

market

developed

in

corn.

Truckers bought corn from farmers at up to $1.50 a bushel,
well above the ceiling of $1.07 a bushel, then sold it in
areas where corn was scarce.

They avoided elevators where

the ceiling would be enforced, though some elevators bought
and sold corn above the ceiling in order to save livestock
from starvation.
bought

on

the

Some industries, such as distilleries, also
black

market.

Others,

such

as

the

Corn
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products Refining Company's Pekin plant, shut down for a time
in June due to a lack of corn.
in Decatur

and

Argo

On June 25, with other plants

threatening

to

close,

the

War

Food

Administration seized corn in 96 midwestern terminal elevators and allocated it to industries using corn.

A shortage

of soybean meal further complicated the feed situation.
f_rairie Farmer advised its readers to stretch out protein
feed and rely more on hay, small grains and pasture. 16
The shortage of feed,

especially corn,

hog growers to send their animals to market.

finally led

The huge crop

glutted the market and overcrowded processing, storage and
transportation facilities.

The Agricultural Adjustment Ad-

ministration and other agencies asked farmers to market their
hogs more evenly, but the glut continued.
December, 1943 and January, 1944.

The peak came in

Packers were swamped with

hogs and truckloads roamed the Midwest looking for a market.
The National Stockyards in East st. Louis embargoed further
shipments for a time.

Some farmers even sold their breeding

stock and unfattened hogs.

Prices fell to the government

support level and this was lowered in October,

1944.

The

Off ice of Price Administration stopped rationing most pork
products for a time.

However, feed shortages reappeared in

1944 and, together with the market experience of 1943 and
another glutted market in the spring of 1944, led to a sharp
drop in hog production in 1944.
shortage. 17

In

1945, there was a pork
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The decline in the pig population did not end the corn
shortage.

Other livestock also ate corn and various indus-

tries used huge amounts of corn.

In July, 1943, the War Food

Administration authorized country elevators to buy corn for
the commodity Credit Corporation and urged farmers to sell,
promising supplemental payments if the ceiling price were
raised and if they sold by August 10.
movement of corn to market.

This brought a big

In December, the ceiling was

raised to reflect an increase in parity prices.

Neverthe-

less, shortages returned as farmers held corn to feed their
hogs or sold it on the black market.

In March, 1944, the War

Food Administration ordered country grain elevators in 125
counties in parts of Illinois and other states to allocate 35
percent of corn to industries making products essential to
the war effort.

Soon afterward, the allocation was changed

to 60 percent.

on April 24,

the War Food Administration

froze all sales of corn in those counties except to the
Commodity Credit Corporation and along with the War Department and the War Production Board, appealed to farmers to
sell their corn at country elevators with a small allowance
for shelling and trucking if they sold within a certain time.
Stockmen who needed corn to feed

livestock had to get a

permit from the county AAA office to buy it and even then
were limited to a 30-day supply.
market, but not before Corn

This brought more corn to

Refining Plants at Pekin and

Argo shut down for lack of corn.

They reopened in May, but
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shortages persisted.

There simply was not enough corn to

supply industry and feed livestock.

In June, county Agricul-

tural Adjustment Administration officials started contracting
with farmers for the sale of corn to the Commodity Credit
corporation.
lifted.

Later that month, the freeze on corn sales was

Shortages reappeared in 1945 and 1946 and even led

to tie-in sales by some

country grain dealers in which

farmers had to buy barley to get corn.
offered premiums to get corn,

Terminal dealers

including nylons,

whiskey,

automobiles and tractors. 18
Shortages also developed in beef cattle during the
war, mainly due to price regulations.

In March, 1942, the

Off ice of Price Administration imposed wholesale and retail
price ceilings reflecting 110 percent of parity prices to
producers.

However, prices on live cattle continued to rise

as the government made large purchases of beef.

Retail pri-

ces also rose, leading the Office of Price Administration to
impose dollar and cents ceilings late in 1942.

Meanwhile,

by July, 1942, feeders started reducing the number of cattle
they were buying to fatten for slaughter.

Feeder cattle cost

too much and ceilings on beef made the price on fattened
cattle too low to make a profit.
hurt

by

price ceilings,

which

Small packers were also
left

only

a

small

between the cost of live cattle and the price of beef.
asked for ceilings on live cattle,
Agriculture opposed this.

margin
They

but the Department of

Instead, it established subsidies
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for small packers and slaughterers starting in 1943.

one

result was a general advance in cattle prices and an increased spread between lower and higher quality beef until
price control eased in July, 1946.

Cattlemen regulated the

flow of cattle to force packers to pay steadily higher prices for cattle. 19
Meanwhile, late in 1942, cattle went to market well
before they were fattened, thus leading to a drop in beef by
December.

cattle sales to packers slackened and farmers sold

on the black market.

small slaughterers butchered

livestock
Cattle

that normally would have gone to Chicago packers.
rustlers killed cattle in fields,
away

the

criminal

meat,

much

elements

of

gained

which

dressed them and hauled

went

control

of

to

eastern

small

markets.

packers.

In

March, 1943, the Department of Agriculture set up a system
of permits for slaughterers and livestock dealers, but some
were issued in error and had to be withdrawn.
meat started March 29.

Rationing of

Later that summer, beef became more

plentiful as grass-fed cattle went to market and
summer of 1944, there was a glut of beef cattle.

in the

Rationing

was sharply curtailed until the end of the year when meat
shortages returned and lasted into 1945.

The price of fee-

der cattle dropped and feedlot owners started buying again
in the summer of 1944.

Later that year, they were given a

subsidy on higher quality beef,

thus

permitting a

spread between fattened and unfinished cattle. 20

wider
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Poultry, unlike other meat, was unrationed and thus
in high demand.

However, it was also subject to price ceil-

ings and when feed shortages developed and costs went up,
black markets arose in poultry.

Truckers visited poultry

farms and paid prices well over the ceiling and sold directly to consumers willing to pay higher prices.
bought

directly

from

farmers,

who

regulations or simply ignored them.

claimed

Many consumers
ignorance

of

Poultry dealers also

ignored regulations and despite vigorous

attempts by the

office of Price Administration to enforce them, poultry price
controls eventually broke down.

Although chickens were the

main item, many farmers raised turkeys.

Turkey production

grew from 98,000 birds in 1929 to 818,000 in 1944 and almost
doubled between 1939 and 1944. 21
Unlike other farm products,
exceeded demand during the war.

egg supplies generally

Eggs were in short supply

late in 1942 when price ceilings were first imposed on them,
but by January, the supply increased and prices dropped below the ceiling.

By March, when dollar and cents ceilings

replaced the previous prices, the output of eggs was soaring.

During the summer, demand again exceeded supply and

prices went up again, but then maximum wholesale prices were
established and prices dropped below the ceiling and remained there with few interruptions into 1945.

The War Food

Administration bought eggs simply to support the price in
addition to buying some to be dried for military use and
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Lend-Lease.

Egg drying plants turned out egg powder as fast

as they could with a
Illinois

1 imi ted

labor supply.
10, ooo

egg drying plant produced

A Harvard,

pounds

a

day.

Instead of shortages, the War Food Administration had a surplus of eggs and had to scramble to find markets and storage
space.

Some eggs were given away in Chicago schools.

others were sold as animal feed.

Many eggs could not be sold

and sat in warehouses or were shipped across the country
until they spoiled and became unfit even for animal feed.
Even then, the War Food Administration continued to buy eggs
due to congressional pressure to support the price. 22
In 1941, the Secretary of Agriculture asked for increased milk production.

Illinois farmers responded with an

increase of eight percent between 1940 and 1942.
munities pushed milk production.
held its

first

Local com-

On June 18, 1942, Harvard

annual milk festival,

an event originally

conceived to honor dairy farmers, but also used to push milk
production as part of the local contribution to the war effort.
WLS,

At the 1943 festival,

a Chicago radio director from

the Prairie Farmer's station,

led 1500 farmers in a

pledge to increase milk production until victory was won.
Nationwide milk production faltered in the summer of 1943
and the War Food Administration responded with a feed subsidy.

Illinois farmers in 34 northern counties received the

minimum subsidy.

In 1944, Illinois produced five and a half

billion pounds of milk as well as large amounts of other
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dairy products.
record level.

By May,

1945,

milk production was at a

Although some dairymen sold their cows due to

labor shortages, others expanded their herds.

By 1945, the

number of cows on Illinois farms was 150,000 above that in
1939.

As a result of relatively high milk production, milk

remained unrationed though sales were restricted for a time
in the fall of 1943.

The Office of Price Administration im-

posed price ceilings on milk at the retail level in March,
1942 and for producers

in February,

1943.

agency established some price differentials

Although the
for different

communities and subsidies to lift supply, the price of milk
remained relatively stable throughout the war.

Other dairy

products, such as butter, cheese and evaporated milk, were
used by the armed forces and thus were much scarcer.

Lend

Lease and military requirements pushed up the output of evaporated milk by 70 percent in 1942 and also increased the
use of dried milk.

New plants were built in several Illi-

nois communities.

Military purchases led to shortages of

butter by the fall of 1942 and soon all dairy products other
than fluid milk were rationed. 23
Some farmers grew crops unusual to Illinois during
the war.

In 1943, farmers in four counties switched from

melons and cantaloupes to castor beans, which were used to
produce castor oil.

Aside from being an unpopular medicine,

the oil was used in lubricating airplane motors and to replace tung oil in paints.

Though the farmers produced about
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600,000 pounds of beans in 1943, none were planted after that
year.

Hemp also emerged as a war crop in 1943 due to the

cutoff of supplies of sisal and Manila hemp due to Axis
victories in the Far East and the Mediterranean and submarines in the Caribbean.

Hemp was used to make rope for ships

and army tents and twine for other uses.
corporation,

a

subsidiary

of

the

The Defense Plant

Reconstruction

Finance

corporation, financed construction of hemp mills in several
mid western states.

The Commodity Credit Corporation es-

tablished a subsidiary,

War Hemp Industries,

to build and

operate the mills and provide seed and equipment to farmers.
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration lined up farmers.
Hemp growers had to pay a special tax and keep records for
the Bureau of Narcotics of the Treasury Department since the
leaves and flowers of the hemp plant were used in making
marijuana.
rope.

The stalk contained the fibers used in making

Illinois farmers planted 36, 000 acres in 1943 and

produced 33,120,000 pounds of hemp fiber.
from nothing to as high as $200 an acre.
in between.

Most fell somewhere

This led to some difficulty in getting farmers

to sign up in 1944.

Due to Allied victories, which freed

other sources of supply,
1944.

Profits varied

the need for hemp was reduced in

Planting was reduced, though the ten mills built in

various communities in Illinois opened to process the 1943
crop.

Only four remained in 1945 to handle the 1944 crop.

No hemp was planted in 1945 and the mills closed.

There were
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some efforts to establish a peacetime industry making hemp
cloth, but this did not materialize.

War Hemp Industries

also sponsored efforts to gather milkweed floss which was
used as a substitute for kapok in lifejackets.

Normally

destroyed by farmers and railroad maintenance crews as a
pest, it was allowed to grow.
floss.

School children harvested the

24

Although they achieved record food production during
the war, Illinois farmers experienced many difficulties, of
which the worst was the shortage of labor.

While many of

the state's farm workers were unemployed or underemployed in
1940, shortages appeared by the spring of 1941 as the draft
and defense plants drained off workers.

Will County farmers

lost hired hands to army ordnance plants, thus forcing them
to rely on themselves and their families.

One woman worked

an so-acre farm with the aid of a 12-year-old grandson.
young men entered the armed forces during war,

As

farmers had

to rely on their wives, daughters and younger sons to handle
chores previously done by older sons of draft-age.
also worked long hours, often 80 or 90 a week.
weeks were quite common.

Farmers
Seven-day

Neighbors helped each other with

certain chores such as harvesting.
to assist those who were ill.

Farmers joined together

Still, many farmers found it

impossible to secure the help they needed and had to quit
farming.

Newspapers in rural areas were filled with ads

during the war years announcing the sale of farm equipment
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and livestock due to the shortage of farm laborers.
men were especially hard hit and
cows.

Dairy-

some had to sell their

The quality of farm laborers also declined during the

war years.

Many of those available were inexperienced, un-

trained or incompetent.

One such farmhand made the mistake

of pouring cold water into a very hot tractor motor,

thus

putting the tractor out of commission when it was needed
most.

Many farmers had to supervise workers more closely.

one result of the loss of men to the armed forces and to war
industries was a decline in the farm population of Illinois
from 978,907 in 1940 to 759,429 in 1945, a decrease of over
28 percent,

This was a nationwide development, but Illinois

lost more than other states.a
There were efforts to raise farm wages and thereby
attract and retain farm workers.

In October, 1939, the ave-

rage monthly wage for farm workers in Illinois was $32.25
with room and board and $43. 25 without it.
1943,

By October,

the average was up to $65. 25 with room and board,

$82.50 without.

By April,

1945, hired hands were earning

$81.75 with room and board or $106 without it.

In 1945, farm

wages in Illinois were 248 percent of what they were in 1939.
Nationally,

the increase was even higher at 274 percent.

Some farmers were more willing than others to raise wages to
attract workers.

The United States Employment Service found

it difficult to recruit workers to pick cotton

in Alexander

and Pulaski counties since farmers in Missouri offered better
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wages than did
rented

sacks

Illinois

to

cotton

Missouri

farmers.
pickers

while

expected workers to bring their own.

growers

Illinois

also

farmers

Missouri growers had

agents in Cairo to recruit pickers and transport them to
Missouri

each

day

to

work.

When

Decatur

area

farmers

complained of a labor shortage, the Employment Service found
that almost all complainers paid poor wages and provided
housing unfit for human habitation.

Several denied needing

any help or were reluctant to pay more or furnish better
living quarters.

Several farmhands did leave to take better

farm jobs further north. 26
One of the more controversial aspects of the farm labor situation was the draft status of farm workers.
Selective Service was first established,

When

farmers and farm

hands were inducted regardless of the impact on farm production, though few were taken until after Pearl Harbor.
until March 16,

1942,

Not

did the system develop a system of

essential industries, which included agriculture.

In Octo-

ber, 1942, the War Manpower Commission drew up a list of agricultural occupations qualifying for deferment.

Even then,

the General Selective Service Questionnaire was inadequate
to properly classify agricultural registrants.

In December,

1941, the Logan County draft board developed a special questionnaire for such registrants and in January,
Illinois

State

Director

of

the

1942,

Selective Service

the

System

called a meeting of agricultural leaders which resulted in a
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questionnaire for state-wide use.
other states.

It was later adopted by

In February, the National Director urged lo-

cal draft boards to seek information from the Department of
Agriculture county war boards on the farm labor situation
and farm production, though not on individual registrants.
Beginning in March, 1943, the county war boards could appeal
cases of individual registrants, though they rarely did so.
They generally cooperated with local draft boards. 27
Meanwhile, the growing shortage of farm labor raised
fears that it would hurt farm production.

In the fall of

1942, Congress passed the Tydings Amendment to the Selective
service Act, which provided for deferral of farm workers as
long as they remained in that occupation.

However, if they

left farm work, local boards had to reclassify them to make
them eligible for the draft.

By this time, local boards in

Illinois generally were deferring agricultural laborers who
were needed in their particular jobs.

To secure deferment

of a hired hand, a farmer had to show that the man was necessary and could not be replaced without reducing the yield
of the farm.

A local board also had to consider the wor-

ker•s skill and experience.

The importance of the farm and

its products and the shortage of farm labor in the area.
Farm workers could move from farm to farm without losing
their deferments if the draft board felt that this would
increase production, but if they simply left farm work, they
were generally drafted.

Also that fall, the Department of
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Agriculture prepared a list of war units or work requirement
standards.

Each class of livestock and crop was given a

factor based on the work required in its production.

Thus,

the care of one milk cow was considered one war unit.

Since

beef cattle took less time to care for, three beef cattle or
five yearling steers or heifers were required for one war
unit.

With all livestock and crops assigned war units,

it

was easy to determine if a farm worker was making an important contribution to farm production and the Selective Service System quickly adopted the plan.
county to county, however.

Standards varied from

At first, a worker had to handle

only 8 war units to be deferred,

but this was gradually

raised to 16 late in 1943 due to increasing demands from the
armed forces.
dards.

Some Illinois counties adopted higher stan-

Of 97 counties which reviewed the situation, only 16

stuck with 16 war units and 5 with local variations of lesser amounts, while 19 went to 18 units, 44 to 20 units and
13 to over 20 units ranging up to 25 units per worker.

the

southern counties had the lowest requirement due to the rough
topography which made agricultural conditions less favorable. 28
One result of the Tydings Amendment was to halt the
cityward movement of farm workers.
work.

Many returned to farm

As the farm labor situation worsened in the spring of

1943, draft officials and others urged people with farm experience who were working in other jobs to return to farm
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work,

especially if they were in non-essential work.

The

selective Service referred registrants with farm experience
to the United states Employment Service and gave the agency
30 days to place them in farm jobs before inducting them.
Later,

farm workers took war jobs in the winter when farm

work was slack, returning to farm work in the spring.

Many

took jobs with Chicago meat packers in the winter. 29
Throughout the war, the United states Employment Service and the War Manpower Commission sought to recruit farm
laborers, either to assist individual farmers or to handle
specific crops in the field or in canneries.

There were some

efforts to utilize workers on Works Progress Administration
projects,

but some workers refused

farm work due to

wages, lack of transportation and inadequate housing.

low
Many

were married and thus less attractive to farmers who could
not provide adequate housing for families, though some
accept married men.
Service

and

the

did

In 1943, the United States Employment

Farm

Security

Administration

recruited

farmers and farm laborers from poor soil regions for work in
more productive areas.

Many came from southern Illinois

where unemployment was high and farmers barely made a living.

After two weeks training in tractor operation and

dairy methods at the University of Illinois in Champaign or
the Illinois State Normal University in Normal,

they were

placed on farms in central and northern Illinois.

The Farm

Bureau and some Illinois congressional critics of the Farm
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security Administration attacked the program as impractical
and costly, but backed down under fire from the downstate
newspapers and local farmers.
viled

Migrant workers, often re-

in the past, were a welcome source of labor, though

not as common as before the war due to gas and tire rationing and improved job opportunities near their homes. Working for individual farmers or processors, they followed the
crops. Some workers from Missouri planted and chopped cotton
in the spring, then went north in June to work for a vegetable cannery in Rochelle,

Illinois, returning to Missouri

in October to pick cotton. 30
The Farm Bureau, American Legion posts, civic groups
and the press also helped recruit farm and cannery workers,
especially for special projects.
ral

women's

groups

went

to

In September, 1942, seve-

work

at

tomato

Bloomington-Normal to handle a bumper crop.

canneries

in

In other commu-

nities such as Harvard and Sycamore, groups of businessmen
or "farm commandos" volunteered to assist farmers short of
help.

Farmers near Sycamore simply called the local Chamber

of Commerce to secure the men they needed.

In January, 1943,

the Secretary of Agriculture announced creation of a land
army of Victory Farm Volunteers to assist in farm production.

The War Food Administration eventually took over the

program and the agricultural extension service organized it
at the local level.
to

Each county had a farm labor committee

recruit local businessmen,

women,

senior citizens and
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students for farm work.

Adults received training at nearby

colleges while high school students were trained at school.
Farmers had varying opinions about utilizing city people in
farm work.

Many felt that city people would be unable to

handle farm work while others were quite happy to use them.
victory Farm Volunteers often worked on large projects such
as detasseling corn to produce hybrid seed.
groups and newspapers

Local community

such as The Bloomington Pantagraph

conducted extensive campaigns to enlist Boy Scouts,

civic

groups and ordinary citizens to detassel corn in 1943, 1944
and 1945.

Servicemen from Camp Grant,

Chanute Field and

other military posts also helped harvest crops, but only if
the

armed

services

deemed

the

agricultural

emergency

of

greater danger to the nation than the military situation. 31
A major source of farm labor during the war years was
students.
ment

In the spring of 1942, the United States Employ-

Service

teenagers,

and

other

agencies

started

recruiting

city

including many from Chicago, for work on farms.

Boys did field work and other chores while girls helped farm
women in household duties.

Many farmers were reluctant to

use them at first, but by the summer of 1943 they were anxious to hire them.

High

schools themselves offered cour-

ses in vocational agriculture to train boys for farm work.
In Galesburg,

several agencies cooperated in a program to

train high school boys to operate farm equipment.

While

teenagers working for individual farmers lived on the farms,
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camps were set up to house those working on special projects.
When corn was detasseled in central Illinois, a seed company
housed men and boys at its warehouse and women and girls at
a local high school.

Groups of students working on commer-

cial vegetable farms in Cook County lived in camps run by the
Boy Scouts and religious organizations.
made

special

crops.

arrangements

to

enable

Sometimes, schools
students

to

harvest

During the asparagus harvest in the spring of 1943,

students attending schools in the Hoopeston area worked in
the fields cutting asparagus in the morning, then attended
school until late in the afternoon.
the crop would have been lost.

Otherwise, 70 percent of

In some cases, other crops

were lost due to inadequate labor to harvest them. 32
Starting in 1943, the War Food Administration augmented domestic labor resources by importing Mexicans, Jamaicans
and Barbadians to work in the fields and canneries.

Mexicans

usually worked in the Southwest though some worked as field
hands on vegetable farms in Will County and near Rochelle.
Jamaicans and Barbadians, however, detasseled corn, harvested
peaches and other crops, and worked in canneries.

They were

employed under

of their

employment.

a

contract

However,

specifying the

dates

when the imminent departure of all

Jamaicans threatened to cause a labor shortage in northern
Illinois during the corn and lima bean canning season in
1943, arrangements were made to have some continue working an
extra week until replacements could be secured.

Employers
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provided

food

and

housing

and

subsidized

transportation

between their homelands and their jobs in the United states.
Residents of one community were aroused at first when the
black Jamaicans were housed in a school gymnasium, but the
war Food Administration stood its ground and the Jamaicans
Wages were the same as paid to American workers,

stayed.

but a portion was sent to their home governments and deposited to their credit in local banks.

Sometimes, local labor

supplies proved sufficient, especially when drought cut farm
production.

The West

Indians

then

found

other

jobs

in

foundries, ordnance plants, steel mills and other factories.
Importation of West Indians continued into 1945.
generally found them good workers.

Employers

Some worked 60 to 80

hours a week. 33
Prisoners of war also worked on farms and in canneries, soya plants, corn products refineries and other processing plants starting in 1943 and continuing until after
the war.

There were some Italians at first, but most were

Germans.

They always worked under guard.

Most were housed

at military posts such as Camp Grant, and trucked daily to
their workplace.

As a result, the number who could work was

limited by the number of guards available and also by the
distance from the camp.

Prisoners could not be taken any

farther than would permit them to be returned daily to the
prisoner of war camp.

As the use of prisoners of war in-

creased, special camps were set up at or near their place of
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work.

Prisoners were paid at the same rate as Americans but

received only a small portion of their wages and that was in
script to be used at camp canteens.
united States Treasury.
money.

The rest went to the

Prisoners could not have American

They received the same rations as American soldiers.

They generally performed satisfactory work, though sometimes
problems occurred.

On one occasion, German-speaking farmers

hired as foremen drove the prisoners at a pace they could
not maintain in cutting asparagus near Rochelle, and the men
refused to work.

Even after this was resolved by taking

management out of the fields, the prisoners were still resentful and did not do as well as others near Hoopeston.

In

some cases, prisoners refused to do field work, which they
considered below their standards and were reassigned to unskilled jobs in canneries.

Occasionally, local communities

objected to the presence of prisoners of war, but this was
uncommon.

Some residents were actually more opposed to the

employment of Japanese-Americans.

Arrangements were made

with unions regarding employment of prisoners of war,
only when domestic labor was insufficient.

but

The unions agreed

not to enroll the prisoners as members. 34
One means of alleviating labor shortages was mechanization.

During the war years,

Illinois farmers increased

their use of farm equipment despite shortages.
toward mechanization started before the war.
tractors during World War I.

The trend

Some farms had

By 1940, they were quite com-
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mon.

During the thirties, Illinois farmers reequipped their

farms and when prosperity returned in 1940, they increased
their purchases.

Despite restrictions on materials,

topped previous records in sales of farm machinery.

1941
Many

bought tractors for the first time, while others bought corn
pickers and hay tools.

The war increased the demand for food

production and in 1942, farmers estimated their new
ment requirements as 107 percent of 1940 purchases.

equipHowever,

with steel in short supply, they could only obtain 40 percent
of 1940 production and even then they encountered long delays
in delivery.

Ultimately, this led to some crop losses for

lack of harvesting equipment.

In the

fall

of

1942,

the

Department of Agriculture ordered rationing of farm machinery
by county committees headed by the chairmen of agricultural
war boards.

There were three classifications of equipment.

The committees approved the sale of scarce and much needed
equipment in Group A such as tractors, corn pickers, combines
and the like if the farmer could not meet production goals by
repairing,

purchasing,

renting

or

exchanging

equipment.

Machinery in Group B could be sold if the farmer certified to
the dealer that it was

necessary to meet

farming

needs.

Group C implements included smaller hand operated or horse
drawn
Later,

equipment

and

could

be

sold

without

county quotas were established.

turned down because their
the equipment.

restrictions.

Some farmers were

farms were too small to justify

Small farmers could either get bigger farms
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or join with other small farmers to buy machinery for shared
use.

Many farmers shared their equipment.

auctions

and paid premium prices

for

They also haunted

used or

repairable

implements or even junk that could be used to repair other
equipment.

When ceiling prices were reached in the bidding,

they drew lots.

Some farmers even made their own machinery.

Federal and state agencies also sponsored classes in repair
of equipment.

More implements began to appear in 1944 as the

war Production Board eased restrictions.
the fall of that year.

Rationing ended in

In spite of restrictions, mechaniza-

tion increased during the war years.

Tractors on Illinois

farms went from 126,069 in 1940 to 174,270 in 1945.

One

result was that by 1944, horses sold cheap and farm hands
with obsolete skills could not get jobs. 35
Besides shortages of labor and equipment, farmers had
to

contend

with

rationing

of

gasoline,

tires,

materials, fencing, tools and other supplies.

building

Permits were

required to buy lumber to build bins and cribs for storage
of crops.

Lack of storage capacity proved a serious problem

when freight car shortages caused delays in shipping farm
products to processing plants.

Elevators quickly filled to

capacity, thus forcing farmers to store their crops on their
farms until it could be marketed.

The Commodity Credit Cor-

poration had steel bins at elevators to store surplus commodities, mostly corn and soybeans, and in 1942 sold 50,000
wooden bins to farmers.

still, storage problems persisted
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throughout the war.
Rural

36

electrification was

interrupted by the war.

Most of northern Illinois was already electrified before the
war, largely due to pioneering efforts by Commonwealth Edison's Public Service Company of Northern Illinois.

Down-

state utilities were more reluctant to build power lines in
rural areas which they feared would be unprofitable.

In some

southern Illinois counties, less than 10 percent of the farms
had electricity.

The Rural Electrification Administation

offered low-interest loans to cooperatives to build power
lines.

By July, 1942, Illinois electric cooperatives built

19,274 miles of line serving 48,247 customers.

Electric-

powered equipment performed a variety of farm chores such as
shelling corn,
butter.

grinding

feed,

milking

cows

and

churning

The defense buildup reduced the supply of copper,

thus leading to cutbacks in new construction after Pearl
Harbor.

For a time, there were no new extensions, but in

1943, the War Production Board eased restrictions to allow
extensions when a

farm was near a

power

trification would aid food production.
extensions.

By July,

194 6,

line and elec-

This led to several

electric cooperatives

in the

state served 67,000 customers and 59 percent of farms had
electricity. 37
Agriculture has always been at the mercy of the weather and natural pests and the war years were no exception.
Floods struck in 1943 slowing planting and forcing the re-
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planting of some fields after the waters had receded.

The

following year brought drought in some areas of the state.
Insect pests such as corn borers and chinch bugs also caused
crop losses.

38

In spite of difficulties with weather,

farm prices

and shortages of labor and equipment, Illinois farmers generally prospered during the war.
and paid off mortgages.

They built up bank deposits

Between 1940 and 1945, farm mart-

gage debt in the state fell over 20 percent and by 1949, it
was almost halved.

Many farmers also bought land.

They

could farm more land with a tractor than they could with a
Though the number of farms in Illinois fell

horse.

from

213,439 in 1940 to 204,239 in 1945, the average size of the
farm increased from 145 acres to 154 acres.
large

farms

creased.

also

The number of

increased while medium-sized

There were fewer farmers

in 1945,

farms

de-

but more were

owners or part owners.

There were fewer tenants since many

tenants became owners.

Even farmers who rented all or part

of their lands increased their holdings.

There also was an

increase of small farms of 10 acres or less.

city people

bought

small-scale

small

farms

as

country homes

and

for

farming to supplement income from their jobs and as an inflation hedge.

Some city dwellers also bought larger farms

as and investment in hopes of benef itting from farm prosperity.

By 1943, a land boom was underway which continued into

the postwar years.

Land values, which rose gradually from
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1933 to 1941, jumped almost 50 percent between 1942 and 1945.
city dwellers bid up the price of land, often paying more
than it was worth.

This raised fears that land values would

follow the pattern of World War I when they jumped sharply
between 1912 and 1920,

then plunged below the 1912 level

before finally bottoming out in 1933.

The rise in prices

also made it more difficult for many farmers, both owners and
tenants, to buy land at reasonable prices.
price ceilings on land values.

There were no

Though some farmers saw the

land boom as a good thing, others disliked the speculation
and some wanted restrictions on sales to non-farmers.

None

materialized, possibly because most of the land sold still
went to farmers. 39
Illinois agriculture during World War II was a mixture of old and new.

Agricultural agencies established under

the New Deal set a precedent for the expansion of government
power and planning and the manner in which policies were
implemented.

Their decentralized structure, which was echoed

in special wartime agricultural agencies, placed much of the
responsibility for carrying out policies in the hands of
farmers and their local representatives.

The war brought an

expansion of their role and that of farm organizations, and
a shift from restriction of production to expansion.

Farmers

were encouraged to grow crops essential to the war effort and
reduce those considered unnecessary.

New crops were intro-

duced for the duration while certain existing ones, notably
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soybeans, gained a new and lasting importance.

Some efforts

to stimulate production of specific crops led to scarcities
in others that were also needed.

Ceilings on farm prices

combined with shortages of some farm products to produce
black markets.

Meanwhile,

farmers

shortages of labor and equipment.

had

to

contend

with

In spite of these dif-

ficulties, they managed to feed the nation, the armed forces
and many of the allied nations.

Though the war did not

produce

breakthroughs,

any

major

technological

it

did

reinforce trends such as farm mechanization that were already
underway.

It also brought farmers out of the long Depres-

sion, which had started after World War I, into a

period of

prosperity which continued into the postwar era.
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CHAPTER VII
PRICE CONTROL, RATIONING AND THE BLACK MARKET
During the Second World War, the Federal Government
imposed price and rent control and rationing in an attempt
to hold down inflation in the wartime economy while achieving an equitable allocation of scarce commodities.

While

these restrictions met with a good deal of success, they were
unpopular with much of the public.
increased

Rising wartime incomes

consumer purchasing power

just as

cutbacks

in

civilian production created shortages of goods to buy.

The

business

in-

community wished

to

take

advantage

of

the

creased demand and wartime shortages and was angered by the
government's efforts to restrict their profits, while some
of the public was willing to pay whatever price was demanded
in order to get what they wanted.

Hence, compliance, which

was fairly good at first, declined as the war went on so that
violations were skyrocketing by the end of the war.
control

and

efforts

to

rationing
mobilize

grew

the

out

economy

of
to

the

Price

Administration's

support

the

defense

buildup.
Inflation was a serious problem during the First World
War and one which the Administration hope to avoid if war
came

again.

The

National

Defense
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Advisory

Commission
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established in the spring of 1940 included Leon Henderson as
an advisor on price administration.

Henderson built a small

staff, which formed the basis for the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply,

established by

Franklin Delano Roosevelt on April 11, 1941.

President

In August, Ci-

vilian Supply shifted to the Office of Production Management,
leaving the Off ice of Price Administration to focus on price
control. 1
Meanwhile,

the boom in defense spending stimulated

wage hikes, which in turn tended to raise prices.

Increased

consumer spending resulting from higher earnings intensified
inflationary pressures.

The Office of Price Administration

relied on persuasion to keep prices down since it had no authority.

Many industrial leaders complied voluntarily for

reasons of self-interest, patriotism and fear of bad publicity.

By the fall of 1941,

these informal controls were

effectively restraining prices of about 40 percent of the
wholesale price index components.

Henderson and his staff

purused a policy of selective price control which was loose
enough to allow some price increases where necessary.

Most

large industrial corporations had an inherent interest in
price stablity as existing prices were high enough to cover
costs without creating new competition or adverse publicity.
They also liked the agency's flexibility on price increases.
Throughout the war, large industrial corporations and their
allies in the trade press generally supported price control
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to hold down inflation.

It was the smaller businessman and

the farmer, who opposed it and the laborer, who wanted prices
held down, but wages increased. 2
In July,

1941,

the Roosevelt Administration intro-

duced a price control bill in Congress.

Two controversial

issues were the extent of controls and the standards to be
applied.

At first, the Administration wanted to limit con-

trols to key commodities,
general price freeze.
groups

dissatisfied

but it soon decided to seek a

This created numerous difficulties as
with

the

representative

sought one more favorable to their interests.

base

period

Also, exis-

ting legislation prevented any general freeze of farm prices, which were based on a parity relationship and not pegged
to any fixed figures.

The parity price of farm commodities

could rise or fall with the fluctuation of other prices, and
the ceiling on farm prices was based on the parity price.
Similarly, farm price increases would affect other costs so
that

parity

helped

stimulate

inflation.

Farm

groups,

however, opposed any standard other than parity, and in fact
demanded that farm price ceilings under the proposed legislation

be

prices.

no

lower than

110 percent

of

prevailing parity

Farm prices were approaching parity after a long

depression and farmers and their congressional allies wished
to see the trend continue.

Organized labor was also leery

of price control legislation, fearing that it would be used
to restrict wages.

Labor leaders advised the President that
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they would support the bill only if it avoided any mention
of wage control.

After Pearl Harbor, Congress was more re-

ceptive to price control legislation.

Labor agreed to a no-

strike pledge and creation of a War Labor Board to settle
wage disputes, but they still rejected wage controls and limits on wage hikes.

Farm groups also continued to insist on

110 percent of parity.
nuary 28,
prices.

Hence, the final bill passed on Ja-

1942 had only weak restraints on wages and farm
Still, the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 did

provide a base for price and rent control and rationing. 3
Inflation worsened with consumer prices rising at an
annual rate of 14 percent.

On April 27, the President re-

sponded with a program to combat inflation, including higher
taxes, bond drives, wage controls, more rationing and the
General Maximum Price Regulation, which froze the price of
all consumer products as of March,
control to many areas.

1942 and extended rent

The Office of Price Administration

promptly declared a price freeze on April 28.

However, con-

sumer prices continued to rise, mainly due to uncontrolled
farm prices and wages.

In July, the National War Labor Board

limited wage increases under its Little Steel formula, but
labor leaders agreed to accept wage ceilings only if

they

could be assured that the cost of living would not go up any
further.

Farm groups, however, insisted on 110 percent of

parity protection because rising industrial wages made it
difficult to attract farm labor and undervalued their own
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efforts.

Both groups feared that the Administration would

hold down their own earnings while others' rose.
prices rising and wage hikes threatening,

With food

Leon Henderson

asked the President to seek legislation to stabilize wages
and farm prices.

Roosevelt, wishing to retain labor support,

wanted to focus on farm prices and rely on an executive
order.

Henderson persuaded him that

enough,

this

would not

be

and the Administration introduced a bill lowering

farm price ceilings to 100 percent of parity and authorizing
wage stabilization under the Little Steel formula.
angrily

accused

Finally,

after

the

President

intense

of

pressure

dictatorial
from

the

Congress
policies.

White

House,

including a threat by the President to take action on his
own, Congress passed the Stabilization Act of 1942 on October
2.

Roosevelt

also

established

the

Office

of

Economic

Stabilization to coordinate the policies of the Office of
Price Administration, the War Labor Board and the Department
of Agriculture. 4
Soon after passage of the Stabilization Bill, Henderson sought to hold down food prices through payment of subsidies to farmers to provide them with parity incomes without
raising commodity prices to parity.

Farmers condemned this

policy as wasteful welfare, arguing that they could earn good
prices in the market.

When the Democrats suffered heavy

losses in the 1942 congressional races, especially in rural
areas, they blamed the Office of Price Administration and
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its

controversial

Administrator.

Henderson

resigned

on

oecember 15 and was replaced by Prentiss Brown, a defeated
Michigan Senator whose support of the Administration's price
control policies had cost him his seat.

Henderson's forced

resignation encouraged renewed opposition to his agency's
policies from congressional conservatives.
committees

investigated

the

agency.

Congressional

Small

businessmen

protested its replacement of a general freeze with specific
product ceiling prices,

which threatened profits.

leaders alarmed at rising consumer prices,
seek higher wage increases.

Labor

threatened to

Consumers protested the growing

inconvenience of rationing, which was extended to a variety
of products by late 1943.

They particularly objected to

gasoline rationing imposed late in 1942.

Rural congressmen

sought legislation to ban subsidies, and in the spring of
1943, Congress passed such a bill.

However,

on April 2,

President Roosevelt vetoed it, arguing that such subsidies
were needed to maintain wage stabilization.

After the veto

was upheld on April 7, Roosevelt issued a "hold the line"
executive order directing the Office of Price Administration
and the War Labor Board not to permit any price or wage
increases unless permitted by law.

The order was implemented

with new price regulations and rollbacks, subsidies, improved
retail compliance efforts and wage restraints, all of which
helped to stabilize prices. 5
However, the Office of Price Administration's shift
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to tight price controls instead of more flexible ones brought
renewed criticism of the agency from conservative congressmen
and small business groups for its "impractical" and "antibusiness" policies.

Many congressmen blamed the agency's

policies on its economists and lawyers and passed legislation
requiring that policy be set by people with business experience.

Congressional guerrilla warfare against the agency

took its toll on Prentiss Brown who resigned in August after
only nine months on the job.

His successor, Chester Bowles,

was more politically astute and sensitive to public opinion
and

public

relations.

Bowles

appointed

businessmen

to

policy-making positions in the agency, established standards
for adjusting price ceilings to conform to the hold-the-line
pol icy,

and

directed the agency's

conformity to those standards.

economists

to monitor

He also met regularly with

heads of farm, labor and business groups and increased the
role of Office of Price Administration advisory committees
for industry, labor, farmers and consumers.
the

agency

industry

had

in

advisory

committees,

its

national

committees,

61

and

field

By early 1945,
offices,

agricultural

536

advisory

40 consumer advisory committees and 102 labor

advisory committees.

Bowles also strengthened the 5500 War

Price and Rationing Boards in local communities, which had
been created in early 1942 to administer local rationing.
The local boards took a larger role in ensuring compliance
with the

regulations.

As a

result of these changes

in
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procedure and policies, the Office of Price Administration
became more popular for the duration of the war and opposition was

largely confined to

conservatives

and business

.
t 'ions. 6
organiza

Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack,

the War

production Board asked the Off ice of Price Administration to
set up a nation-wide system for rationing tires.
asked

state governors to

organize tire

through their councils of defense.
Price Administration had a

The latter

rationing boards

Although the Office of

field organization,

it had no

state or local units, only regional ones.

On December 14,

Governor

Jr.

Dwight

Green

named Henry

rationing administrator.
tire boards.

Pope,

state

tire

By January 5, Pope organized 101

Since he had no staff or even an office, the

Illinois War Council gave him office space and staff support
for several weeks.

In the spring of 1942,

the

federal

government provided a paid clerical staff to assist in sugar
rationing, and by summer,

assumed full responsibility for

paid personnel, though the state continued financial assistance whenever federal funds were slow in coming.
tires,

other

commodities

ranging

from

Besides

automobiles

gasoline to various food items were also rationed.

and
Pope

direxcted the rationing program in Illinois until he retired
in May.

He was replaced by carter Jenkins, who stayed with

the Off ice of Price Administration until it closed its state
office in 1946.

Jenkins had previously served as state
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coordinator of civilian defense and directed the organization
of local defense councils.

Even after joining the Office of

price Administration, he continued to attend

meetings of the

Illinois War Council and report on the progress of rationing
and price control in Illinois.

Relations between the two

agencies were close and relatively free of conflicts that
often arose between civilian defense organizations and other
federal agencies. 7
As was the case of case with other war agencies, the
Office of Price Administration made the Chicago metropolitan
area a

separate division within the region.

The Chicago

division was headed by John C. Weigel, and later by Raymond
S. McKeough and finally Rae E. Walters.

Michael F. Mulcahy,

President of the Board of Local Improvements and assistant
corporation counsel, administered the tire rationing program.
Since the Chicago District was separated from the rest of the
state, Mayor Edward J.

Kelly had a good deal of influence

over appointments to major administrative positions.

Hence,

while Weigel was previously an administrative assistant in
the Illinois Department of Welfare, McKeough was a

former

Chicago congressman and unsuccessful senatorial candidate in
1942 who made no secret of his ties to the Kelly machine. 8
In the spring of 1943, the Office of Price Administration divided downstate Illinois into four districts with
offices at Rockford, Peoria, Rock Island-Moline and Springfield.

In August, 1943, the Rockford office closed and its
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territory was divided among the Chicago,
peoria offices.

Rock Island and

Each district office organized its staff

into departments on prices, rationing, information and local
board operation.
tigators

to

Each also had its own attorneys and inves-

assist

in enforcement

rationing regulations.
members

of

interests

price

control

the

labor,
staff.

consumer
Local

and

boards,

business
hastily

organized early in 1942, had offices in city halls,
off ices,
other

and

Advisory committees consisting of

agricultural,

counseled

of

post

local war council headquarters and a variety of

places.

volunteers.

Members

were

local

citizens

serving

as

Many boards started with only two or three

members, but then grew to twenty or thirty.
from all sectors of the community.

Members came

In the fall of 1942,

certain downstate boards had a total of 800 members, including 56 women,

61 union representatives,

merchants and 145 farmers.

64 attorneys,

105

There was some concern that all

elements of the community be represented.

Labor unions and

blacks,

in particular,

pressed for representation on the

boards.

In East St. Louis, the board rejected requests from

labor unions and blacks for representation, arguing that it
wanted a community-wide rather than group representation.
In Springield, the board resisted Urban League pressures to
appoint a black member.

In Chicago, after blacks protested

racial discrimination by the Office of Public Administration,
Michael

Mulcahy,

the

metropolitan

rationing

official,
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announced in June,

1942 that blacks would be appointed to

rationing boards and hired as clerical help.
was done,

Although this

most were segregated in positions in all-black

neighborhoods.

9

The Rock Island board was typical of many in its
organization and operation.

Members were divided into price,

rationing and community service panels with the rationing
groups divided in turn into three panels-food and shoes,
transportation, and fuel oil and stoves.

The transportation

panel had sub-panels on gasoline and tires.
panel

made

decisions

on

the

allocation

Members of the
of

automobiles,

gasoline and tires to members of the community.

At a typical

meeting in February, 1945, the transportation panel granted
a certificate for a used-car to a public-school maintenance
man;

extra gasoline went to a

marine on

furlough,

to a

teacher whose first ration had been miscalculated, to a woman
for trips to fire the furnace of her aged mother,

to an

elevator repairman for emergency night calls, to a farm owner
to supervise repairs and to a family to move to Wisconsin.
The

panel

denied

transportation
gasoline

several

was

other

available.

requests

because

Applications

public

for

extra

in cases of illness or death of relatives were

particularly troublesome due

to

community pressure.

In

March, 1943, several members of the Logan county War Price
and

Rationing

Board

resigned

when

the

Office

of

Price

Administration District Supervisor objected to the transpor-
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tation panel's issuance of emergency gasoline rations to a
iocal woman so that she could attend her mother's funeral.
Most returned after a conference with Carter Jenkins of the
state office of the Office of Price Administration,
stated that all such requests were to be denied.

who

Sometimes,

actions by boards could arouse protests for other reasons.
The Highland

Park Ration

village police department

Board gave

information

on motorists who

had

gasoline ration cards and stamps from the board.

to

the

obtained

The police

department used the information to track down auto owners
who had not bothered to obtain a village licnese for their
cars.

Motorists naturally were furious about the board's

violation of their confidence.

Later,

it turned out that

the board had erred: such information was confidential and
not to be shared. 10
A constant problem for the local

boards was

lost

ration books, though delays in getting new ones and reductions in coupons in replacement books helped encourage people
to be more careful.

Some local boards were overly generous

in granting replacements, thereby leading to a local black
market in ration stamps.

Early in 1943, the Office of Price

Administration relieved the local

boards

of some of the

paperwork connected with rationing by shifting it to local
banks.

Under this system, which was first tested in Albany,

New York,
rationed

merchants opened ration book accounts for each
commodity

they

sold,

and

deposited

all

ration
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coupons

collected

from

customers

into

these

accounts.

Merchants wishing to replenish their stocks wrote a check
against their accounts drawing as many ration coupon units
as they needed.

They then delivered these checks to their

suppliers who deposited them in their own rationing accounts
to be cleared through the banks the same as money.

The

commercial banks acted as agents of the Office of Price
Administration

and

exercised

all

control

over

suspected

forgery, counterfeiting and other fraudulent activities. 11
Price panels did not appear in Illinois in great numbers until June, 1943, when 527 were set up in the sevenstate Chicago region, though some were previously established
on an experimental basis.

At first, their main function was

to distribute information on price regulations to retailers,
though they also passed on consumer complaints of violations
to the district off ice of the Off ice of Price Administration
or

tried

to

noncompliance.
stores,

persuade

the

offending

Volunteer price panel

merchants

to

cease

assistants visited

informed merchants of price control

regulations,

distributed price lists and checked prices to see that they
conformed to price ceilings.

In the fall of 1943, Chester

Bowles pushed through a major decentralization of his agency,
which shifted operational decisions and some staff down to
the field offices and local boards.

In the spring of 1944,

he initiated a nation-wide check by the boards of retail
compliance with price ceilings.

Since this was well-re-

307

ceived, he made such surveys a regular part of the boards'
duties.

Later, he also delegated to them the authority to

negotiate treble-damage civil suits so that they would be
better able to deal with price violators.

By mid-1944, local

boards were regularly reviewing the compliance of almost
every retailer

in the

country.

Bowles

felt

that price

control and rationing would function better if compliance
could be secured at the community level.

As local bodies,

the boards were more aware of violations than the Off ice of
Price Administration's regular enforcement staff and less
likely to cause resentment in dealing with noncompliance.
Also, the agency did not have the staff to check out every
violation, especially since many were of minor importance. 12
In

order to

secure compliance,

price panels

held

hearings in which they would try to settle disputes with
local

retailers.

If

unable

to

secure

compliance,

they

referred the cases to the Office of Price Administration.
In July, 1945, 261 retailers appeared before price panels in
the Springfield district.
agreements,

Of these, 180 signed compliance

50 agreed to make

full

refunds

to customers

overcharged and 16 to settle the administrator's claim on
behalf of

the United States Treasury.

The panels

also

recommended warnings to 5 retailers and referred 10 cases to
the district office of the Office of Price Administration.
Price panels generally were lenient with first offenders who
were cooperative, but they were tougher on second and third-
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time offenders and those who were defiant as some were.
Chicago fruit and vegetable dealer,
charges

of

ignoring

ceiling

prices

A

when confronted with
in

sales

of

fruit,

1aunched into a tirade on the difficulties of business in
wartime and

finally threatened to quit business.

panels represented a

Price

cross section of the community.

A

Chicago panel included an insurance agent, a businessman, a
realtor, a district superintendent of schools and a housewife.

Ration panels followed similar procedures.

When a

Chicago board found that a local couple had secured gasoline
ration coupons from sources other than their ration board,
they revoked the couple's rations and ordered them not to
use their car.

When the couple continued to drive, the board

turned the case over to the Office of Price Administration,
which prosecuted and won a court decision confirming the
local ration board's order. 13
There was considerable debate over whether price and
ration panels and consumers should check up on retailers.
The Illinois War Council refused to recommend that local war
councils sponsor price-checking activities despite pleas of
Administrator Carter Jenkins,

who hoped that the Womens'

Activities Committees of the local councils would lead in
price checking.

The State War Council

finally passed a

resolution instructing local councils to do what they thought
best.

One member expressed the hope that retailers and

consumers could cooperate to avert any policing.

He sug-

309
gested an educational program, but opposed any efforts by
the off ice of Price Administration to get women to spy on
retailers for fear it would split the community wide open. 14
Some

local

war councils were controlled by

local

business interests, who opposed price control activities.
Indeed,

some local ration boards objected to price panel

activities and especially to price panel assistants, usually
housewives.

In Chicago,

several ration boards refused to

accept their assistance in checking prices,

claiming that

the violations they uncovered were minor and the result of
insufficient knowledge on the part of the merchants.

Many

housewives themselves objected to "snooping" even though they
felt prices were too high.

Conservative critics such as the

Chicago Tribune spoke of Gestapo tactics.

still, others,

including the editor of the staunchly conservative Bureau
County Republican, supported these policies, arguing that it
was necessary for civilians to police each other in wartime
and

for

the

community

to

express

its

disapproval

citizens got out of line in the war effort.

when

Eventually, in

the fall of 1943, the Office of Price Adminstration introduced the Home Front Pledge, under which housewives agreed
to pay no more than ceiling prices and to exchange ration
stamps for all commodities they bought.

Even so,

millions

many

of housewives

took

the

pledge,

were

while
more

interested in securing scarce commodities than in paying
lower prices.

Gasoline rationing,

however,

was

another
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matter as consumers were quick to report violators,

even

friends and relatives, to the Office of Price Administra•

tion.

15

Violations

of

price

control

depending on the type of commodity.

took

several

forms

Businessmen often over-

charged, forcing customers to pay overceiling prices.

Others

required payment of extra cash on the side, payment for goods
not delivered or payment for a higher quality of goods than
were actually delivered.

They might also require customers

to buy something for which they had no use.

Many ignored

regulations requiring them to keep records for inspection by
the Off ice of Price Administration.
restrictions

and

regulations

apartments with the agency.

Landlords ignored rent

requiring

them

to

register

All of these violations con-

stituted part of the black market, which also included cattle
rustlers, racketeers and hijackers trafficking in rationed
commodities,

burglars who stole rationed foods and ration

coupons to sell, and gangs who counterfeited such coupons.
Organized crime was heavily involved in the black market,
taking advantage of shortages of various products as it had
done with liquor during Prohibition.

Indeed, liquor became

a black market commodity during the war years as higher taxes
and shortages of some brands sent prices soaring.

Chicago

gangsters resorted to hijackings and thefts from taverns and
warehouses. 16
Tire rationing began soon after the United states
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entered the war.

Japanese conquests in the Far East cut off

much of the supply of crude rubber.

Since rubber was needed

to prosecute the war, civilian supplies had to be curtailed.
Hence, the need for tire rationing.
January,

1942,

When rationing began in

Illinois was given an allotment of 17, 875

tires and 14, 949 tubes to supply the needs of owners of
1,aoo,000 autos and 225,000 buses and trucks for that month.

Later monthly allotments varied but never came close to
meeting demand.

Even before rationing began, there was an

outbreak of tire thefts.

The General Assembly responded by

making tire theft a felony punishable by a prison term of up
to ten years. 17
Most

motorists

obtaining tires.

resorted

to

more

legal

means

of

All motor vehicle owners registered with

their local ration boards and had their vehicles inspected
by tire rationing officials at inspection stations, usually
tire distributors.

Inspecting officials made recommendations

to the local ration boards, which issued certificates for
tires and tubes.

Most of those who got tires were physi-

cians,

nurses and others whose work was essential to the

public

safety or to

the

prosecution of

the war effort.

Others had to make existing tires last.

Many motorists

resorted to retreads and recaps,
rationed.

but these too were soon

Some motorists simply drove less and used car-

pools to get to work.

On November 24, 1942, Peorians staged

a "carless Tuesday" in which those with odd-numbered license
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plates left their cars at home and depended on other means
of getting to work.

Many motorists bought bicycles until

these too were rationed.

Businesses dependent on trucks for

deliveries, including the Chicago Tribune, turned to horsedrawn vehicles.

A Waukegan creamery used wooden tires on

its horse-drawn vehicles.

In March, 1942, the state imposed a

was to reduce speed.
forty-mile-an-hour

Another means of conserving tires

speed limit.

Meanwhile,

scrap drives

collected used rubber, which was then deposited at filling
stations and sent to reclamation plants to help relieve the
shortage of rubber. 18
Finally, in the fall of 1942, the Roosevelt Administration decided upon nationwide rationing of gasoline as a
means of saving rubber.

Gasoline rationing had started on

the East Coast where there was a shortage of gasoline and
fuel oil resulting from sinkings of coastal tankers by German
submarines.

The shortage was essentially a transportation

problem, but gasoline rationing offered a means of saving
tires and rubber by forcing people not to drive, therefore
making tires last longer.

The Administration also imposed

a thirty-five-mile-an-hour speed limit and rationed fuel oil.
In response to protests by trade organizations, the Office
of Price Administration made allowance for traveling salesmen
to receive gas to travel

8600 miles a

year.

Motorists

responded to gas rationing by flocking to gas stations and
filling their tanks.

Some hoarded gasoline in drums stored
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in their homes, only to see it flushed into sewers by local
firemen, who took a dim view of the potential fire threat
posed by the stored fuel.

Gas rationing brought increased

use of public transit and ride-sharing pools and a decrease
in traffic deaths.

It also brought hardship for gasoline

station owners, many of whom closed their doors.

This was

especially true of the smaller stations, which did not offer
as many services as did larger ones, which could repair cars
and tires and sell lubricating oils and other accessories. 19
Gas

rationing

brought

a

wide

variety

of

abuses.

Motorists were supposed to turn in ration coupons when they
bought gas, but many sped away without doing so.
1943,

In July,

the Off ice of Price Administration closed down one

Chicago

filling

station

for

a

year after

its undercover

agents bought gasoline at overceiling prices without exchanging coupons and also bought nylon hosiery,
market staple, for a premium price.

another black

In the same month, it

charged 200 other stations with similar violations.

Mean-

while, black markets in gasoline and ration couposn developed
as

burglars

coupons.

broke

into

In Chicago,

a

ration

board

off ices

and

stole

policeman assigned to guard the

coupons was caught peddling them.

In southern Illinois, a

dispute among thieves involved in stealing gasoline ration
coupons

led

to

a

gangland-style

slaying

of

two

thugs.

Bootleggers brought in gasoline from refineries, while other
criminals siphoned gasoline from parked cars.

Counterfeiters
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produced bogus coupons.

20

Sometimes, efforts by the Office of Price Administration to enforce compliance with rationing became controversial.

In June, 1943, its agents stopped Chicago motorists,

who had driven to Wisconsin.

on June 19,

more than 50

automobiles with Illinois licenses were stopped in Fond du
r,ac, a city about 150 miles from Chicago, by city policemen
working under the direction of the agency's field inspectors.
The Fond du Lac War Price and Rationing Board sat in session
all day to conduct an investigation and impose penalties.
The motorists had to explain how they got enough gasoline to
come that far.

Most were able to show that they had done

nothing illegal and were allowed to proceed, but seven were
found guilty of illegal possession of gasoline and saw their
gasoline and coupons confiscated and rationing privileges
suspended for some time.

The episode raised questions about

the legality of the agency's actions.

Critics accused the

agency of conducting illegal searches and seizures.

Un-

deterred, the Office of Price Administration made plans to
stop more out-of-state motorists in Green Bay on the Fourth
of July weekend, but dropped them when Wisconsin Governor
Walter
agency

s.

Goodland refused to allow police cooperation.

The

resorted to stationing agents near resorts to copy

down license plates of out-of-state drivers and turn them
over to the drivers' own ration boards.

This brought more

protests when 417 Chicago-area drivers were caught driving
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in adjacent states.

Most were either on business or on short

vacations, and the latter included many war workers who had
saved gas for weeks in order to take a vacation.

The agency

backed down amid renewed public criticism. 21
Meat and other food items presented special problems
in price control and rationing since food prices depended on
farm prices, which were uncontrolled at first.

Despite large

increases in farm production, shortages appeared, partly due
to substantial government purchases of foodstuffs to supply
the armed forces and the Allies.

At the same time, consumers

who now had good paying jobs in war plants, were increasing
purchases of food

items,

especially meat.

All of these

factors sent prices soaring and made rationing inevitable. 22
The most serious problems developed with meat and
covered every step in meat production.
the

Office

of

Price

Administration

In September, 1942,
put

the

entire

meat

industry under license and limited the amount that could be
sold for civilian consumption.
prices on farm production.

Later,

it imposed ceiling

However, some farmers sold their

livestock at overceiling prices to packers and slaughterers,
who willingly paid these prices to get the meat.

Packers

)

passed on the overcharges to wholesalers and to retailers,
who in turn passed them on to consumers.

Wholesalers selling

to retailers required their customers to make side payments
of extra cash and to purchase items such as sausage, cleansers and other items the customers did not want.

The Office
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of Price Administration did make some progress in stopping
the upgrading of inferior meat by packers, but the practice
continued among retailers.

Consumers themselves hoarded meat

in locker plants while other consumers could not get meat at
all.

Eventually,

federal officials found it necessary to

seize meat in locker plants and distribute it.

The Office

of Price Administration required slaughterers to register
with the agency and assigned quotas to each slaughterer.
Many, however, ignored these regulations and slaughtered well
above their quotas.

Packers shifted meat to markets command-

ing the highest prices.

Thus, meat intended for Chicago

often went to the East Coast.
problems existed in poultry.

One of the most serious
Consumers themselves often

bought directly from the farmer and paid premium prices.
Despite vigorous efforts by the Office of Price Administration, price controls on poultry soon broke down. 23
Criminal

elements,

including

the

remnants

of

Al

Capone's old gang, got involved in the black market in meat
and other foodstuffs, buying livestock from farmers, slaughtering it and selling it to butchers.
intimidated butchers

into accepting

In some cases, they
it.

Some

criminals

secured control of small packing houses in various Midwestern
states.

In April,

1943,

the federal

government indicted

Peter Golas and several others in a conspiracy to move ten
million pounds of black market meat from the Midwest to the
East Coast.

The scheme involved seven firms in the Midwest
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and New Jersey.

Until the fall of 1942, Golas was simply a

small-time meat. peddler

in the

Fulton

Street

Market

on

Chicago's West Side.

Golas was eventually convicted and

sentenced to prison.

While the illegal operators usually

bought livestock from the farmers,

they also resorted to

cattle rustling, stalking the animals they wanted, shooting
them, dressing them on the spot and hauling them away in
trucks.

Sometimes, they were caught in the act and gunfights

ensued.

Black market slaughterhouse facilities were often

unsanitary, thus posing a health hazard. 24
Rent control was a

response to housing shortages,

which developed as job-seekers crowded into areas where there
were heavy concentrations of new defense industries.

The

same problems arose where new military posts were established
and old ones were reactivated and expanded.

In Rockford, a

city with several defense industries as well as a major Army
post (Camp Grant), migrants moved into trailers, old streetcars,

garages

and other structures.

prevailed elsewhere.
took

advantage

of

Similar conditions

Meanwhile, rents soared as landlords
the

situation.

In

some

communities,

including Chicago, local real estate interests sought to keep
down rents through community pressure.
generally inadequate.

Such efforts were

At first, the federal government could

do little except keep tabs on the situation.
Emergency

Price

Control

Act

of

1942

However, the

provided

for

rent

control, and in April, the Office of Price Administration
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established defense rental areas in certain counties in the
state, including those in the Chicago area.

Landlords could

not raise rents above what they were on March 1, 1942. 25
Landlords naturally objected to rent control and many
tried various means of getting around it.

One method was to

require the tenant to buy furniture in an apartment.
landlords charged for the use of appliances.

Other

Others cut off

the heat or removed appliances if tenants refused to pay
higher rents.

Many, of course, willingly paid higher rents

in order to get living quarters.

Some landlords considered

rent control illegal, and when an Indiana federal judge ruled
it unconstitutional, Office of Price Administration offices
in several communities were flooded with phone calls from
landlords notifying the agency that they would no longer
comply.

Though the ruling was eventually overturned by the

Supreme Court,
ensure

the agency was hard pressed for a time to

compliance.

government.

Other

landlords

simply

defied

the

A Rantoul landlady was locally notorious for

her refusal to comply with rent control regulations.

Her

arrest and conviction, however, quickly prompted others to
comply with the law.
the

emergency

tenants.
lies.

to

Many landlords also took advantage of

discriminate

against

some

classes

of

Many refused to rent to soldiers and their fami-

Couples with children frequently found it difficult

to obtain housing.

One landlord forced a young couple living

near Chanute Field to move a month before their baby was
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born.

Many tenants resorted to buying property in order to

get living quarters free of eviction.

However, this some-

times led to schemes in which homeseekers were tricked into
buying empty

lots.

Real

estate

firms

selling the

lots

promised to build homes on these lots even though housing
construction required a

government priority

for building

materials, which the firms did not have. 26
Although the war sharply curtailed most residential
construction, some new homes were built.

Private developers

built new houses around aircraft engine factories and other
defense plants.

Many of the homes were small "defense" homes

or "war" homes constructed primarily for employees of these
defense plants.
for

quick

They were cheaply built, often prefabricated

construction.

Some

established

neighborhoods

objected to them for fear that they would lower property
values.

In March, 1942, the Chicago City Council reformed

the city's building regulations to permit the construction
of such homes, but limited them to outlying areas where they
would not disturb existing property values.
construction required priori ties
Board for building materials.

All housing

from the War Production

In 1942, the agency estab-

lished quotas limiting the number of new homes to be constructed.

To further alleviate the need for housing, the

Home Owners Loan Corporation leased private homes and even
commercial structures and subdivided them into flats for war
workers.

Private owners also were granted priorities. to make
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similar conversions of attics and other spare rooms. 27
In

some

communities,

private efforts.

public

Prior to the war,

housing

supplemented

the City of Chicago

embarked on a program of slum clearance and construction of
public housing.

While wartime restrictions on residential

construction curtailed the program, some projects were built
to house war workers and military personnel.

Naval noncom-

missioned officers lived in the Frances Cabrini Hornes while
stationed at Navy Pier.

After the war, these projects became

low-rent housing for low-income families.
was constructed in other Illinois cities.
munities,

such as Seneca,

Illinois,

Similar housing
In some com-

war workers lived in

temporary war housing projects and trailer camps.
private housing,
control.

Unlike

public housing was not subject to

rent

This led to some embarrassment for the Office of

Price Administration when federal housing projects raised
rents even as the agency was holding down rents charged by
private landlords.

In Joliet, this led to a long campaign

by the mayor and others to cut rents at a federal housing
project.

Finally, the Office of Price Administration managed

to negotiate substantial reductions in rents at the project. 28
Attitudes toward price and rent controls and rationing varied immensely even within the business community.
The larger companies, especially industrial firms, generally
supported these controls, fearing the effects of inflation
on their own costs.

A plant manager in a Woodstock "factory
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advised a rent control official that every manufacturer in
McHenry County supported rent control.

His company even

offered to underwrite any advertising to get the message
across in the county.
ly

supported

criticizing

price
some

Editorials in trade journals generalcontrols

policies.

to

fight

Most

of

inflation,
the

though

opposition

to

controls came from retailers and landlords, though even then,
the record was mixed.
with

local

Office

In Springfield, businessmen cooperated
of

Price

Administration

officials

in

setting up a model store to demonstrate the proper means of
posting prices and also set up a window display at a local
business to educate consumers on price control.
retailers complained of problems.

Still,

Though they tried to keep

prices down for fear of inflation,

many found th ems elves

caught between rising wholesale prices and the ceilings fixed
by the Off ice of Price Administration and wished to pass on
extra costs to their customers.

Some owners of downstate

cafes, who were denied price adjustments, threatened to quit
serving meals.

Many retailers also complained of excessive

record-keeping required under price control and rationing.
Rationing itself brought scarcities of some items and even
forced some shops to close.

Gas rationing, however, helped

many merchants, especially those in smaller communities by
forcing people to shop closer to home.

Many small retailers

regained business previously lost to chain stores.

Most

merchants generally cooperated with price control, but there
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was a significant amount of cheating, particularly in certain
trades.

Meat merchants often violated price and rationing

regulations.
found

A 1946 study by the American Meat Institute

91 percent of meat merchants

violation.
trades.

in Chicago to be

in

Similar problems prevailed in produce and other

Most of those who were caught had to pay fin es.

The

Office of Price Administration gnerally was lenient with
first offenders.
treble

damages,

For others, the agency generally sought
but usually had

Occasionally,

amount.

a

to settle

for

a

lesser

flagrant violator drew a prison

sentence, but this was uncommon. 29
The public,

of course,

was another matter.

Labor

unions supported price controls and demanded greater enforcement.

By 1943, they were citing price increases for food-

stuffs to justify their demands for substantial wage increases.

While many businessmen felt that the controls were

excessive, labor leaders felt they were inadequate.
ly, much of the public supported price control.

Certain-

Hence, the

Office of Price Administration was able to enlist housewives
to monitor prices.

Many Illinoisans also resorted to raising

Victory Gardens to supply their need for fresh fruit and
vegetables.

Communities

canning centers
Gardens

for

increased

the

the

encouraged
use of

supply

of

the

these

gardeners.

foodstuffs

alleviate shortages caused by rationing.

efforts

and

with

Victory
helped

Still, not everyone

could raise a garden, and some needs, such as meat, could not
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easily be met through private efforts.
rise

in

personal

spending power,

incomes

At the same time, the

generated

increased

consumer

but there were fewer goods to buy.

Many

consumers resorted to the black market, usually by paying
their retailer a little extra or by buying directly from
farmers.
some,

Many also resorted to eating out at restaurants.

of course, had a more difficult time making up for

deficiencies due to rationing.

Hence, in the summer of 1945,

10,000 coal miners in southern Illinois struck in protest
against inadequate meat rations. 30
Overall, price control and rationing was moderately
successful in holding down inflation and distributing scarce
goods on an equitable basis.
show

that

retail

prices

Official government statistics

of

living

essentials

rose

31.1

percent between August, 1939 and August, 1945 with most of
the increase prior to the introduction of price control.
Prices rose only 11.1 percent between May, 1942 and August,
1945 and only 3 percent after May, 1943.

The chief diffi-

culty with these statistics is that there is no good way of
ascertaining how many consumers patronized the black market
or how many retailers engaged in black market practices or
the

extent

to

which

this

consumers actually paid.

activity

affected

prices

that

Those who traded on the black

market were unlikely to confess their misdeeds to government
statisticians.

Still,

given

the

fact

that

prices

were

restricted, any overcharges or extra payments had to start
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with a restricted price base.

Even on the black market, many

consumers probably paid less than they would have if prices
were left uncontrolled and inflation allowed to rise unchecked as it did after controls ended in 1946.

Rationing

provoked a good deal of grumbling, but it put everyone on
the same level.

A Woodford County woman recalled that during

the First World War, her family had been unable to buy sugar
at all because of the price, while neighbors had a bag for
which they had paid a high price.

During the Second World

war, sugar was rationed and its price restricted, but every
family got its share at an affordable price.
other commodities.

So it was with

This was the chief success of price

control and rationing. 31
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CHAPTER VIII
RECONVERSION
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died on April 12,
1945 as the Allied armies swept across Europe.

A month la-

ter, the war was over in Europe and on August 15, the end
came for the Pacific conflict.

As elsewhere in the nation,

the end of the war brought wild rejoicing in communities all
over Illinois.

It also brought dramatic changes in the eco-

nomy and society.

War industries shut down or converted to

civilian production.

Price controls,

rationing and other

restrictions were eased and then lifted entirely.

There were

temporary dislocations as war workers sought peacetime jobs.
Unions struck to secure wage increases and benefits denied
them and their members during the war.
uncertainty

as

the

economy

and

It was a

society

period of

adjusted

to

new

conditions. 1
The civilian defense program was the first casualty
of reconversion.

Early in 1944, the Army discontinued its

early warning system.

Soon afterward, on March 31, Chicago's

Advance Air Raid Warning System ceased operations.
the

Citizens's

Defense

Corps

was

placed

in

In May,

reserve

and

regional offices of the Office of Civilian Defense closed.
In May, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt's succes-
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sor,

abolished the Office of Civilian Defense.

Illinois

Governor Dwight Green promptly put the Illinois War Council
on a voluntary basis and ceased state appropriations for its
operations.

In June, the state council and local war coun-

cils disbanded.

In Chicago, however, Mayor Edward Joseph

Kelly argued that there was still a need for the program to
regulate troop movements and handle salvage campaigns, bond
drives and other activities.
supporters on the payroll.

He also wanted to keep his

When the federal program ceased

at the end of June, he continued the Chicago office as the
Chicago War Service corps until September. 2
During the summer of 1945, war industries started
shutting down.

By the end of May, the shipyard at Seneca,

which employed 10,900

at its peak, was down to 3400 employ-

ees and they were soon to leave.
(LST) was launched on June 8.

The last landing ship tank

Two weeks later, the completed

vessel left the outfitting dock and started downriver.

The

remaining workers soon left town and Seneca returned to a
quieter pace, albeit with several improvements resulting from
the

war-boom.

shutting down.

In

August,

the

ordnance

plants

started

on August 31, the Green River Ordnance Plant

near Amboy ceased operations.

On the same day, the Dodge-

Chicago factory turned out its last B-29 engine.

The other

aircraft and engine plants in the city also shut down, ending
the city's dreams of becoming a major aircraft manufacturing
center.

Many of the closed factories were put to new uses.
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International Harvester bought the Buick engine plant in
Melrose Park to manufacture diesel engines and a new type of
large crawler tractor, while Western Electric acquired the
Studebaker

engine

plant

in

Chicago.

The

Dodge-Chicago

complex was taken over by the Preston Tucker Corporation for
an ill-fated attempt to manufacture automobiles.

Later, it

became Ford City, a combined industrial district and shopping
center.

The city of Chicago acquired the Douglas plant and

used its airfield facilities as the basis of a new airport,
O'Hare Field.

Several companies moved into buildings used

by the Crab Orchard Ordnance Plant.

Reynolds Metals bought

a government-built aluminum rolling mill in McCook operated
during the war by the Aluminum Company of America.

Many

other companies bought government-financed mills and factories which they had operated during the war. 3
Conversion to civilian production started as priorities eased.

In May, 1945, the War Production Board lifted

130,000 orders prohibiting the use of materials for civilian
goods and permitted the manufacture of some scarce and urgently needed consumer products, including appliances.

The

lifting of restrictions did not lead to a sudden increase in
civilian goods as materials were still in short supply, especially metals.

Nevertheless, in June, the Electric House-

hold Utilities Company started making electric ironers at a
Chicago

factory

and

in July,

resumed the manufacture of

washing machines at its Bloomington plant.

Other industries
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started partial reconversion.

A Bloomington firm continued

to fill war contracts while making oil heaters for civilian
use.

In August, the end of the war led the War Production

Board to lift most of the remaining controls on industry.
The Board itself was replaced by the Civilian Production
Board in November.

Other restrictions were also lifted in

August, though others remained.

The Office of Price Admin-

istration ended rationing of many consumer items, including
gasoline, but price controls continued.

The Office of De-

fense Transportation lifted some restrictions on commercial
freight traffic while the War Manpower Commission removed
all controls on the free movement of labor. 4
Meanwhile,

the armed

dollars in contracts.

forces

cancelled billions of

By August, only half as many people

worked in war plants around the country as in May.

Most

remaining contracts were cancelled with the end of the war
in the Pacific.

On August 15, over $2 billion in contracts

with Chicago-area plants were terminated.

On the next day,

the Air Force eliminated another $4 billion in contracts with
Chicago-area industries.
on short notice.

Still,

Thousands of workers were laid off
Chicago and other Illinois com-

munities probably suffered less than other parts of the the
country since the Middle West was in a better position to
reconvert to peacetime production.

Many Illinois industries

were food processors, which had no conversion problems.

They

could simply sell to consumers instead of the armed forces.
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The same situation prevailed with the steel mills.

Other

Illinois firms produced consumer products and capital goods,
which were in high demand.

Many companies, such as Pullman-

standard, already had large backlogs of

orders and were soon

in search of workers to help fill them.

By October, Interna-

tional Harvester's Chicago Tractor Works was in full production making tractors for civilian use.

The company soon

introduced a new small Farmall tractor as well as a giant 18ton 180 horsepower crawler tractor.

The

Electro-Motive

di vision of General Motors converted from

production of

diesel engines for naval vessels to diesel locomotives.

Ekco

Products Company of Chicago resumed production of kitchen
utensils.

Shortages of materials and labor plagued many

industries

at

first.

Uncertainty

over

price

ceilings

hindered the supply of some commodities and parts, while many
workers chose to draw unemployment checks rather than take
jobs that paid less than they had been making.
held up production.

Strikes also

By 1947, however, materials shortages

and labor problems were alleviated and factories were able
to fill their huge backlogs of orders. 5
The war increased the size and number of industries
operating in Illinois.

In 1939, there were 11,983 manufac-

turing establishments in the state.
15,988.

By 194 7,

there were

Some plants closed during the war, but others rose

to take their place.

Many firms, large and small, increased

in size during the war.

Though some small and medium-sized
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firm reverted to their prewar status after the war, others
emerged as major participants
world.

in the

postwar

industrial

There also was a significant shift in the relative

status of different types of industries operating in the
state as heavy industry grew in proportion to food, clothing
and printing.

In 1939, iron and steel and machinery repre-

sented 37.7 percent of employment in the Chicago area.
1948,

it comprised 44.6 percent.

start for the state's industries.
products and entered new markets.

Reconversion was a

In
new

Many firms introduced new
International Harvester

and others promoted freer foreign trade.

There were new

industries in light metals, plastics and other commodities.
Though at first, some feared a Depression, they soon found
themselves hard pressed to keep up with the pent-up demand
unleashed by the end of the war.

Though there was a mild

recession in the winter of 1948-1949, in general, the level
of business activity in the state remained above the prewar
level. 6
Farmers prospered during the postwar years.

Though

price controls continued until late 1946, so did price supports.

The latter proved unnecessary for a time as prices

for corn,

soybeans, wheat and other commodities soared in

1946 and 1947.

Shortages of corn persisted in 1946, leading

terminals to offer premiums to get it,
whiskey, automobiles and tractors.

including nylons,

Many farmers responded

to rising farm prices by increasing production, especially
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in corn and soybeans, the chief postwar crops.

Production

levels for these crops in the late forties far surpassed
wartime peaks.

Falling prices in 1948 led to demands that

90 percent of parity price supports be continued beyond 1950.
In 1949, Congress extended them to 1952.
were restored in 1950.

Acreage controls

Meanwhile, the War Food Administra-

tion ended in 1945 and the Department of Agriculture consolidated some of its agencies, including the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration, into the Production and Marketing
Administration.

The new agency had state and county commit-

tees much like the old Department of Agriculture state and
county boards.

These committees handled the acreage con-

trols. 7
Rising

farm prices contributed to a

values during and after the war.

rise

in

land

Though the total number of

farms decreased, the average size increased as farmers added
to their acreage.

There were fewer medium-sized farms and

more large ones, most of them owned by the farmer.

Mechani-

zation, which continued in the postwar era, was a major factor in the increase in farm size.

Farmers could work more

land with a tractor than with a horse.

Mechanization also

reduced the need for farm labor, which continued in short
supply during the postwar years.

Returning servicemen re-

fused to accept farm work, preferring higher paid industrial
labor.

Young men growing up on farms, who in the past would

have taken jobs as hired hands, now preferred to drive their
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cars over new farm-to-market roads to jobs in town.

Farmers

themselves preferred to replace men with machines. 8
One major change in rural life during the war and after was the rapid decline of the one-room schoolhouse.

The

movement for consolidation of school districts started many
years earlier, but the war greatly accelerated it.

One-room

schoolhouses generally had poor facilities, poorly-paid teachers and low attendance.
ses.

Many lacked water or even outhou-

During the war, the draft and war industries drained

off teachers forcing schools to close at the rate of 1000 a
year and leading the affected districts to send their students to larger schools in other districts.
tinued after the war.

The trend con-

In 1945, the General Assembly set

minimum salary levels for teachers.
construction of new rural roads.

Later,

it authorized

Still, many farmers resis-

ted the the demise of one-room schools, partly because of
higher taxes and partly out of fear of loss of local control.

Some also objected for reasons of nostalgia, espe-

cially in the case of high schools.

Country schools served

as community centers and local high school bands were a
source of community pride.

Nonetheless,

between 1942 and

1948, the number of school districts in Illinois was almost
halved as consolidated schools replaced one-room schools and
the smaller high schools. 9
Unlike most wartime restrictions, price controls continued after the cessation of hostilities.

The Office of
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Price Administration foresaw that the growth of consumer
savings during the war and pent-up demand for goods would
create serious inflationary pressure until industry could
produce sufficient goods to satisfy demand.
reconversion,

To facilitate

the agency developed special price ceilings

for appliances and other durable goods that had been out of
production during the war.
only modest

However, the ceilings provided

increases over prewar prices.

This brought

protests from small companies, which found them too low.

At

the same time, the Truman Administration relaxed most other
restrictions on the economy, including wage controls.

This

left the Off ice of Price Administration to carry the burden
of fighting inflation. 10
The Truman Administration tried to continue the war
Labor Board, but both management and labor wished to escape
wartime restrictions and take their chances with collective
bargaining.

The National Labor-Management Conference held

in November failed to reach any agreement on a replacement
for the War Labor Board, which ceased operations at the end
of the year.

Meanwhile, a wave of postwar strikes hit seve-

ral industries, including steel, as workers sought wage hikes
to offset the loss of overtime pay as well as adjust for
wartime increases in the cost of living.
Administration argued that

The Office of Price

industry could pay moderately

higher wages without raising prices, but major corporations
argued that they could not raise wages without increasing
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prices.
the

In February, 1946, President Truman, concerned about

lagging pace of

reconversion,

gave

in to the

steel

companies and ended a steel strike by approving a substantial
wage increase and a compensating increase in steel price
ceilings.

Chester

Bowles,

head of the Office of

Price

Administration, immediately resigned in protest.

Some other

wage disputes were settled along similar lines.

The Office

of Price Administration became

increasingly unpopular as

large corporations sought looser controls and smaller firms
demanded an end to the program.
trol.

Farmers also pushed decon-

In June, Congress passed a bill substantially weaken-

ing price control.

Though Truman vetoed the bill and coaxed

Congress into passing a slightly better one, price control
was doomed.

Livestock ranchers withheld cattle and hogs when

meat ceilings were reimposed in September.
from stores.

Meat disappeared

The public blamed the shortage on the Office

of Price Administration.

Truman finally gave up and ended

meat controls in October, then abolished the Office of Price
Adminstration

following

the November election.

Consumer

prices shot up by 9.4 percent in the next twelve months and
continued to

rise until

1948.

Rising prices,

in

turn,

encouraged further strikes. 11
The postwar years also brought resolution of an issue
that had troubled many labor leaders for years, especially
in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).
years,

For some

known or suspected Communists had participated in
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union activities.

They were hard workers,

and some rose

through the ranks to head locals and sometimes even entire
unions.

The militant CIO,

in particular,

munists and other radicals.
tries,

including

steel,

attracted Com-

CIO unions in several indus-

farm

equipment,

automobiles

and

electrical equipment, welcomed the leftists into their ranks
and utilized their services in building the union.
the thirties,

During

the class warfare tactics of the Communist

organizers proved effective,

especially when dealing with

conservative anti-union companies, which resorted to heavyhanded methods to keep out unions.
however, it was a different world.

By the late forties,
Most companies accepted

unions and were willing to bargain collectively.
themselves,

such as

the United Steelworkers

Many unions
of America,

wished to preserve their gains and build on them.

The

militant tactics of unions perceived to be Communist-led
seemed to threaten these gains.
the United

Electrical

The radical unions, such as

and Radio

and Machine Workers

of

America and the United Farm Equipment Workers of America,
also maintained ties to the Communist Party and supported
Soviet foreign policy in their union newspapers.

The CIO,

fearing that the radicals would try to takeover the whole
union movement, determined to rid itself of all members and
unions it considered Marxist. 12
Before and during the war, there were periodic outbursts of red-baiting as union dissidents accused their ad-
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versaries of being Communists when resisting union efforts
to expel them.

In 1944 and 1945, such dissidents in Chicago

were often represented by William J. Grace, an attorney and
head of The Citizens USA Committee, a right-wing extremist
organization.

Rival unions also made such charges.

A far

more serious challenge to labor radicals arose when a feud
developed

between

Equipment Workers.

the

United Auto

Workers

and

the

Farm

As early as 1939, the United Auto Workers

protested the employment of an extreme left-winger by the
Farm Equipment Workers union.

In 1940,

the CIO tried to

merge the two, but the Farm Equipment Workers balked at a
demand by the rival to fire two leftist organizers.

The two

unions made agreements from time to time about organizing
plants,

but they always broke down and the Auto Workers

resorted to recurrent raids on Farm Equipment locals seeking
to convince the members to defect to the United Auto Workers.
Some leaders of farm equipment locals joined the rival union
and

tried

success.
unions,

to

take

their

locals

with

them,

but

without

Early in 1945, the CIO again tried to merge the two
but the Farm Equipment Workers demurred and were

upheld by their members.

The United Auto Workers then raided

Farm Equipment locals, claiming that the union was doomed and
that the Auto Workers were rescuing the members.

The latter,

however, did not wish to be rescued and fights broke out. 13
Between 1945 and 1953, the Auto Workers made several
rounds of raids on the Farm Equipment Workers locals, most
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of them unsuccessful.

In 1947, the Farm Equipment Workers

reversed its anti-merger position in order to strengthen
forces within the United Auto Workers who opposed Walter
Reuther, a firm anti-Communist who had won control of the
union, but still faced a hostile Executive Board.

Reuther,

however, opposed the merger and took it to the membership,
who rejected it.

Then after he strengthened his control of

his union in 1948, Reuther again reversed his position and
sought a merger.

In 1949, the CIO expelled the Farm Equip-

ment Workers union when it refused a CIO order to merge with
the United Auto Workers union.

The Farm Equipment Workers

then merged with the United Electrical Workers union, which
was expelled from the CIO on grounds of Communist domination.
Several other unions and union leaders were also expelled in
1949 and 1950.

All were given the right of appeal to a set

of special panels, all of which were really kangaroo courts,
whose decisions were preordained.

The accused could then

appeal to the CIO Executive Board, but those who did, lost
that appeal, too.

The CIO then launched rival unions to raid

those it had expelled. 14
The feud between the Farm Equipment Workers and the
United Auto Workers strongly influenced postwar strikes in
the

farm equipment

Harvester.

industry,

especially at

International

Both organized new plants, but the feud preven-

ted them from presenting a united front.

Even when they

tried to engage in joint negotiations with John Deere, the
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company refused.

Farm equipment companies played off both

unions against each other.

While one was on strike,

other generally was working.

the

Each union tried to outdo the

other in securing gains for its members.

Both unions lost

maintenance of membership for which they had fought hard
during the war,

but the Farm Equipment Workers generally

gained more than the United Auto Workers in the early postwar years. 15
However, in 1950, International Harvester decided to
rid itself of the hated Farm Equipment union, which it considered Communist-dominated.
company entered

into a

In August of that year,

contract with the

the

Farm Equipment

union, but then withdrew it, citing wildcat strikes when the
United Auto Workers went on strike.

The Farm Equipment Wor-

kers promptly walked out in response to what they considered
a brazen double-cross.

They continued on strike until mid-

September and won a wage hike and a two-year contract, but
the United Auto Workers stayed out until November and scored
even greater gains,

including a

five-year contract.

The

company sought to weaken the Farm Equipment Workers union in
favor

of the United Auto Workers.

Leaders of the Farm

Equipment union sought to win a better deal for their members in 1952.

However, the strike, which broke out in Au-

gust, came at a very bad time.

The House Un-American Acti-

vities Committee was investigating Communist involvement in
unions, including the Farm Equipment Workers and its parent,
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the United Electrical Workers, which had sought to prevent
the strike.

With fears of Communism sweeping the nation,

many members began to doubt their leadership and returned to
work.

By early September, 800 went back.

The company then

launched an all-out effort to break the strike,

sending

supervisory personnel to talk to strikers in their homes.
By early October,
Electrical

2000 were back on the job.

Workers

finally

persuaded

the

Workers to give up the strike in November.
was a deathblow to the union.
sions,

which amounted to a

required
checkoff.

members

to

sign

Farm

The United
Equipment

The settlement

Not only did it bring concessubstantial wage cut,

special

stipulations

but it

for

dues

Only 50 percent signed, eventually crippling the

union financially.

stewards handling grievances no longer

were paid, thus crippling the union's grievance procedure.
The union leader, Gerald Fielde, soon lost heart and disappeared from the union's activities altogether. 16
Between 1952 and 1955, all Farm Equipment locals defected to the United Auto Workers, and the Farm Equipment
union disappeared.

If International Harvester expected that

this would end labor militance,

it was soon disappointed.

The Auto Workers pressured the company on grievances (a major reason for company hatred for the Farm Equipment Workers) and finally staged a bitter strike in 1958, which led
to a long-term agreement on grievance procedures.

The 1959

settlement brought the company a measure of labor peace, but
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one which was costly.

Its terms, which included abolition

of mandatory overtime, ultimately made the company less competitive and led to the long strike and corporate reorganization of the eighties.

In retrospect, the Farm Equipment

Workers were probably not much more militant than their rival.

Though the union staged more strikes, they were usual-

ly of short duration.
but longer ones.

The Auto Workers had fewer strikes,

While the Farm Equipment Workers union was

much more militant and uncompromising in its rhetoric,
practice, the union compromised like any other union.

in
In-

deed, both unions were militant primarily because of the policies of the companies they had to deal with, especially
International Harvester. 17
Other long-term labor disputes were also resolved at
the end of the war.
owners in October,

1945.

was returned in July.
trol,

Montgomery Ward was returned to its
The Hummer plant in Springfield

As soon as the company regained con-

it discontinued maintenance of membership and dues

checkoff provisions of the War Labor Board-imposed union
contract.

The union protested and threatened a strike, but

soon withdrew demands for retention of these provisions in
a new contract.

The company also rejected some other provi-

sions of the old contract, but retained the Army-imposed pay
increases.

In the fall, the union did stage a demonstration

strike, but with only spotty results, though the company did
increase wages.

Accounts differed as to the effectiveness
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of the walkout, though some other unions did refuse to cross
picket lines, thus hindering the company in shipment of merchandise.

In general, though, Sewell Avery beat the union.

The end of the Army takeover left the union in the same position as it was earlier, though its members profited from
Army-imposed pay raises.

Still, the whole affair of company

defiance of the War Labor Board hurt

its prestige since

Sewell Avery received the same kind of public abuse thrown
at John L. Lewis for his defiance of the War Labor Board and
its predecessor. 18
Though Sewell Avery won his battle with the union, he
did not do so well against his competitors in business, and
for this he himself was to blame.
other businessmen,

Sewell Avery, like many

feared a postwar depression,

but while

others soon realized that the economy was expanding rather
than contracting, Sewell Avery continued his policy of caution.

While Sears made plans for postwar expansion of re-

tail stores, Montgomery Ward hung on to its cash.

The com-

pany did open some catalog outlets in communities lacking
Ward

stores,

but other

stores grew dowdy.

improvements

were

restricted

and

Sales declined and many executives left

rather than put up with Avery's dictatorial policies.

Not

until Avery resigned in 1955 did the company,

under new

leadership, start spending its huge cash horde.

In 1957,

the store built its first new store since 1941 to replace a
burned out downtown store in Portsmouth, Ohio.

Further new
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stores were built in suburban shopping centers. 19
President Truman also ended the federal takeover and
operation of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad in the
fall of 1945, despite union protests over its return to its
owner, George P. McNear.

McNear, himself, refused to deal

with the brotherhoods and insisted on returning to the work
rules and pay scales he had imposed in December, 1941, thus
prompting the 1942 strike and federal takeover.

He also

pledged to rehire some of his old employees, except for 24
men who had engaged in violence during the 1942 strike, 17
of whom had been cleared of convictions on appeal.

All

thirteen unions responded with a strike on October 1, 1945.
McNear made no effort to operate trains at first, but then
changed his mind in response to protests by shippers.

A

group of shippers met with both sides, but no agreement was
reached.

McNear proposed arbitration by a three man panel,

but the unions wanted arbitration under the Railway Labor
Act,

which McNear would not accept since he felt the ar-

bi trators would be

biased in favor of the unions.

In

January, 1946, McNear resumed some service using strikebreakers.

Violence soon broke out and McNear posted armed guards

on trains.

This brought more violence as guards shot at

pickets and strikers fought with train crews.

Other rail-

roads embargoed the line and refused to allow its trains into
their yards if guards were on the trains.

One switching road

also complained that the crews McNear was using were unsafe.
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one engineer was partially blind.
threatened and shot at strikers.

The guards th ems elves

Some had criminal records.

on February 6, guards on a train near Gridley shot and killed
two pickets and wounded three others.
for man-slaughter, but were acquitted.

The guards were tried
Governor Green and

the Illinois Commerce Commission then tried to settle the
dispute, but failed.m
Meanwhile, shippers along the line grew dissatisfied
with the situation and raised funds for litigation to force
a settlement.

In February, fourteen shippers filed suit in

federal court seeking to force both sides to end the suspension of operations and asking the court to appoint a receiver to operate the line.

A few days later, the federal dis-

trict court in Peoria appointed a receiver to operate the
line,

but the company appealed and the

receivership was

suspended and then revoked in September by the appeals court,
which also ordered the district court to issue an injunction
against the unions.

In December, the district court issued

the injunction and ordered the company to operate the entire
line.

McNear appeared to have won his battle though the

strike remained unsettled.

However, late in the evening of

March 10, 1947, McNear was taking a walk near his home when
he was shot and killed by an assassin.

The murder was never

solved, but it was generally attributed to the strike.
death

of

dispute.

McNear

removed

any

impediment

to

The

settling the

The trustees who took over the road soon reached
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an agreement under which all employees were recalled to work
under pay scales and work rules in use during the federal
operation of the line.

Rail service resumed on April 21. 21

McNear was right in his oppostion to outdated work
rules.

However, his methods of resolving his disputes with

labor made no friends for him or his company or the industry
as a whole.

There were several nationwide rail strikes in

the postwar years.

During the Truman years, several were

settled by seizure of the railroads and arbitration of the
disputes.

The brotherhoods gained some wage increases, but

were unable to force the railroads to accept additional unneeded crewmen.

Not until the late fifties,

sixties and

seventies, however, did the railroads begin to make progress
in eliminating unneeded crewmen.

Even as of this writing,

the matter is still unresolved. 22
The postwar years saw John L. Lewis forced to back
down during a strike.

In April, 1946, Lewis led the bitumi-

nous miners out on strike in a dispute over a variety of issues,

including wages and a health and welfare fund.

walkout led the government to seize the mines.

The

On May 29,

Secretary of the Interior J. A. Krug signed an agreement with
Lewis giving the miners much of what he wanted.

However, on

October 21, Lewis demanded that the pact be reopened.
sent underlings to confer with union leaders at first.

Krug
Then,

on November 13, he met with Lewis and advised him that the
government would not negotiate, but that the owners would.
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Lewis was

angry.

He

had

signed

an

agreement

with

the

government, not the owners, but Krug insisted on presenting
a plan for negotiating between the union and the owners.
Attorney General Tom Clark also presented an opinion upholding Krug's view that the agreement prevailed as long as the
government held the mines.

Lewis,

would terminate on November 20.
to fight.

however,

said that it

The government then prepared

It froze bituminous coal in transit and storage

and ordered railroads to cut use of coal.

On November 18,

the Attorney General secured an injunction against the union
and

its

officers

ordering Lewis and

termination of the agreement.

his

staff to

cease

However, when the union took

no action, the miners struck on November 20.

Public outcries

prompted Lewis to look for a way out without surrendering to
the government.

He found none.

On December 3, he and his

union were found in contempt of court, and later they were
fined.

Lewis soon called off the strike.

to the Supreme Court, but lost.

He later appealed

There were further strikes

in the late forties with varying degrees of success, but in
the fifties, the owners themselves changed policies, seeking
labor peace in the interests of production in a changing
market. 23
One major change in the postwar world was the relaxation of competition between the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) and its offspring, the CIC.

By the late forties, there

were recurrent discussions of reunification.

The old issue
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of craft versus industrial unionism was dead since many AFL
affiliates

were

delayed until

industrial

unions.

William Green,

head

Still,
of

reunion

the AFL,

was

and Phil

Murray, head of the CIO, were both dead since neither was
willing to defer to the other in leadership of a merged
union.

Reunification came in 1955. 24
Postwar changes in transportation greatly intensified

existing trends as government lavished vast sums of money on
new highways,

airports and waterway improvements,

which served to shift traffic away from railways.

all

of

The na-

tion had always financed some highways and canals, but in
the twentieth century, such programs took on added importance
as a means of offering competition to the railroads.
1916,

In

in response to demands by motorists for good roads,

Congress established the first federal highway program.

By

the twenties, every state was eagerly building new roads with
matching federal funds.

The roads were soon crowded with

automobiles, trucks and buses, all of which cut into railroad
freight and passenger traffic and destroyed the electric
interurban railways built in the first years of the century.
In the postwar era, highway spending was greatly expanded
with new superhighways, turnpikes, expressways and finally
the Interstate System as well as state and local roads.
Chicago alone built several expressways, starting with the
Edens, completed in 1951, and the Eisenhower,
1956.

finished in

Automobile usage also increased so that many families
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came to own two or more cars.

Automobiles, trucks and buses

crowded the new highways in ever increasing numbers.

The

railways themselves established some bus systems to serve
outlying areas and eliminate branch line trains.
Pennsylvania

Railroad

assisted

in

the

Later, the

formation

of

the

Greyhound network, and other railroads, including the Santa
Fe and the Burlington, formed the National Trailways System.
After World War II, they generally sold off these bus lines,
which

then

expanded

further.

railways in passenger-miles.

By

1962,

cargoes.

exceeded

Truck traffic also grew rapidly

as more cargo shifted to the highway.
certain types of traffic,

buses

Trucks dominated

especially the more profitable

Truck production boomed in the postwar years and

improvements increased the size and speed of over the road
trucks. 25
Air transport grew tenfold during the decade of the
forties.

New four-engined 50-passenger airliners replaced

two-engined 21-passenger planes.

Many states,

including

Illinois, embarked on a program of building airports.

The

number of airports in the state grew from 54 in 1941 to 162
in 1950.

Chicago built O'Hare Airport and Meigs Field.

Private companies bought planes, and some, like LeTourneau,
a Peoria firm, built airstrips at their plants. 26
Railroads

at

first

were

optimistic

about

postwar

prospects for passenger as well as freight traffic, both of
which continued at a very high level well into the postwar

354
years.

Homebound troops and traveling civilians crowded

trains in the first few months of peace, and travel restrictions continued well into the postwar years.

Due to the

crush of freight and passenger traffic, the Office of Defense Transportation was not abolished until 1949.

Many

lines, encouraged by the heavy traffic, ordered new streamliners, anticipating that trains with modern equipment would
do well in carrying large numbers of people over moderate
distances.

Late in the war, federal anti-trust litigation

resulted in the breakup of the Pullman Company into a carbuilding firm,

which remained independent,

and a sleeping

car operator, which was sold to a group of railroads.
new firm ordered new sleepers.

The

Many railroads ordered the

new vista-dome car, which was introduced in 1945.

However,

delivery of the new cars was delayed by shortages of parts
caused by strikes and materials shortages.

Meanwhile, the

airlines secured new planes while autobuilders rolled new
cars off the assembly lines.
built made money at first,
the

loss

of

riders

Though the new trains that were
it was already too late to stem

to competing modes.

Many potential

passengers recalled overcrowded conditions on wartime trains
and swore off rail travel.

The automobile, the bus and the

airliner steadily siphoned off more travelers so that by the
late fifties, the railroads were running up huge passenger
deficits, which they subsidized with freight profits.

Even

these were inadequate by 1958 due to heavy truck and barge
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competition.
service.
rails.

Some responded with cuts in the quality of

This only encouraged more riders to desert the

The carriers responded by dropping trains at an ever-

increasing rate until the advent of Amtrak saved about half
of what was left of passenger service.

Although Amtrak has

reversed the decline, its chronic lack of adequate funding,
coupled with the high popularity and heavy government support
for competing modes of travel has limited its ability to
expand its share of the intercity travel market. 27
Rail freight traffic did far better than passenger
service in the postwar years, but even that declined steadily despite significant improvements such as piggyback service, unit trains and other technological innovations.

As

of this writing, the railroads, which carried over two-thirds
of the nation's freight ton-miles
little over a third.
pipeline.

in 1945,

now handle a

The rest goes by truck, barge, air or

Railroads

have

been

handicapped

by excessive

government regulation, obsolete work rules and by the need
to build and maintain rail rights of way, while most competing modes use government-built rights of way at very little
cost to themselves.

Though much of the regulation has been

abandoned and some changes have been made in work rules,
this last disadvantage continues.

One result of the loss of

traffic has been mergers and abandonment of redundant and
little-used trackage.

Shortly after the war, the Gulf, Mo-

bile and Ohio merged with the Alton Railroad to form a com-
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petitor to the Illinois Central.

However, in 1972, the lat-

ter merged with its rival and has since sold off or abandoned
much of its track.

Recently, the railroad's parent company

spun off what was left of the Illinois Central itself.

Even

so, Chicago remains a major railroad center and Illinois a
railroad crossroads with connections between carriers serving
all parts of the nation, a function it also fulfills for
highway, air and water carriers. 28
Dieselization of railway operations was completed in
the forties and fifties, eliminating not only steam, but some
electrification.

The Gulf, Mobile and Ohio was one of the

first to retire its steamers in 1949.

Other carriers soon

followed suit, and by 1960, the process, which had

started

before the war, was complete except for a few short lines and
industrial operations.

Even the Illinois Terminal system,

which was the subject of much controversy for its wartime
attempt to abandon part of its line, eliminated its electric
operation in favor of diesels in the mid-fifties.
ended all passenger service at the same time.

It also
The line

through Bloomington and part of the line into Danville, which
the company had tried to abandon during the war, were finally
abandoned in the fifties, mainly because of difficulties in
operating freights over these routes. 29
Early in 1945, Chicago Mayor Kelly and Governor Green
agreed on a plan for public ownership of the city's transit
lines.

In the spring of that year, the General Assembly
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authorized the organization of a transit district to be administered by a seven-man board, four appointed by the mayor
and three by the governor, and created a municipal corporation, the Chicago Transit Authority, with power to buy and
operate transit systems in the Chicago area.

In June, Chi-

cago voters approved the plans for an exclusive franchise
for the authority.

In 1947, the new transit authority took

control of the city's streetcar and elevated lines.

Later,

it bought the Chicago Motor Coach bus lines, thereby gaining
control over all of the city's transit lines. 30
The Chicago Transit Authority was one of the fruits
of the postwar cooperation between Mayor Kelly and Governor
Green.

However, while both men profitted from the alliance,

it was not enough to save their political careers.

In Chi-

cago, several factors combined to force Mayor Kelly to retire from office in 1947 rather than run for reelection.
scandals plagued the public school system throughout the
Kelly years, largely because he and his allies on the school
board insisted on appointing political allies to positions
in the schools.
reached a

In 1945 and 1946, the situation finally

crisis when the National Education Association

issued a report critical of the administration of the school
system and the North Central Association threatened to withdraw its accreditation of the school system.

The controver-

sy forced Kelly to appoint an investigating committee of
Chicago educators and abide by its recommendations.

School
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superintendent William H. Johnson and several school board
members resigned and were replaced from a list of candidates
submitted by the investigating committee. 31
Another crisis which damaged Kelly's political control of the city was racial.

Although other municipal ser-

vices were used as sources of patronage, Mayor Kelly always
protected the Chicago Housing Authority from political interference.

This aroused a good deal of hostility from al-

dermen who were angered by its refusal to make political
appointments.

After the war, they found another reason to

hate the agency.
developing,

In 1945, with a serious housing shortage

the Housing Authority began utilizing Quonset

huts, trailers, converted military barracks and prefabricated units to house returning veterans until they could find
suitable homes.

Much of the housing was located on vacant

sites in outlying areas,
Initially,

the Housing Authority adhered to

segregation,
veterans

usually in white neighborhoods.

but with blacks

in need of housing,

tenants on the basis of need.

constituting
the

20

a

policy of
percent

of

agency began selecting

Eleven of twenty-one housing

sites were integrated without incident, but riots broke out
at Airport Homes and other projects in 1946.

Mayor Kelly

and the Housing Authority backed down in the case of Airport
Homes, but other veteran housing units remained integrated.
The last of the temporary projects was not discontinued until
the mid-fifties.

The Housing Authority also met resistence
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over its efforts to plant public housing in white neighborhoods.

Meanwhile, riots broke out as blacks moved into white

neighborhoods.

In the fall of 1945, white students staged

strikes to protest the presence of blacks in their schools,
but soon gave in under pressure from the Kelly administration.

Still,

racial

tensions,

especially

in

housing,

combined with scandals in the school board and other city
services and dissension in the Democratic Party in Chicago
to make Kelly's reelection uncertain. 32
In 1946,
chief.

Jacob.

M.

Arvey replaced Kelly as party

Soon after the fall elections in which the Republi-

cans made several gains, Arvey surveyed the mayor's prospects for reelection.

The results indicated that Kelly would

have a difficult time winning reelection.

Kelly finally

agreed to withdraw and the machine slated Martin H. Kennelly,
a businessman and reformer, who won two terms in city Hall,
before losing to Richard J. Daley in the Democratic primary
of 1955. 33
After the Republican victories of 1946, Governor Green
looked certain to win reelection in 1948.

Early in the year,

with President Truman running as an underdog for a second
term, the Democratic slatemakers met to choose candidates in
what they thought would be a losing election.
the party's poor prospects

for victory,

Because of

they decided to

choose reform liberal candidates for governor and senator.
Accordingly, they put up ex-Alderman Paul Douglas for senator
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and Adlai E. Stevenson for governor.

Douglas was originally

slated for governor, but the machine soon

realized that if

he won, he would be difficult to control.

The Senate was a

safer place for a reformer.

He would do little damage there

and senators had few jobs to hand out anyway.

Stevenson was

a political unknown and seemed unlikely to win.
did

win,

with

his

lack

of

experience,

the

Even if he
Cook

County

organization felt it would be safe with Stevenson in Springfield. 34
However,
surprise.

the campaign and election proved to be a

Truman,

Douglas and Stevenson were all strong

campaigners in Illinois.

Stevenson concentrated on state

issues, which were ready-made, including a mine disaster and
corruption in the Green Administration and the downstate
party.

on the eve of the election, a new scandal broke in

Peoria

involving collusion between criminals and office-

holders.

Douglas, meanwhile, vigorously attacked both the

extreme left and the extreme right, being opposed both by
the incumbent Senator

c.

Wayland Brooks, and the Progressives

allied with former Vice-President Henry Wallace.

Truman

himself denounced the Republicans in Congress for failure to
pass a bill to provide storage for surplus corn.

Inadequate

storage, often a problem for Illinois farmers, threatened to
force the dumping of surplus corn on the market at deflated
prices.
squeezed

The results were victory for the Democrats.
by

with

a

smaller margin

than

Truman

Roosevelt

ever
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received, but both Douglas and Stevenson won by substantial
•
35
margins.

In office, Stevenson proved to be a capable fairly
effective reform governor, who worked with the Democratic
organization in Cook county, but did not always follow its
wishes.

The party responded by running him for president in

1952 in a race he could not win.

After the 1952 election,

the Democrats in Cook County generally reverted to a policy
of cooperation with the Republicans.

With few exceptions,

the Democratic machine mounted no serious effort to capture
the statehouse and often exerted little effort in the senate
races, especially against Republican Senator Everett Dirksen, who got along well with Mayor Daley.

In 1960, the ma-

chine slated County Judge Otto Kerner to oppose an incumbent
Republican governor with an eight-year-record of corruption.
Kerner won, but made no effort to build up his own machine
or challenge Daley for control of the party.

After Kerner

left to become a federal judge, the machine went back to
slating weak little-known candidates, who would not threaten
the machine, and then gave them little support.

The machine

is primarily interested in the municipal and county elections, and concentrates on them to the exclusion of anything
else except for unusual circumstances such as a presidential
race in which a Democratic candidate such as John F. Kennedy
could render some assistance to the city of Chicago. 36
At the same time, the Republicans mounted no serious
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challenge to the Democratic party in Cook County.

Most of

its mayoral candidates since 1939 have been traditional, oldline Republican politicians who were not attractive candidates and who had little chance to win.

Several times,

the party nominated Democrats who left the party, such as
Benjamin Adamowski, a maverick politician who usually feuded
with the machine during his political career.
Republicans won.
close

to

None of the

Indeed, Bernard Epton, the last one to come

winning,

did

so

circumstances of the race,

only

because

of

the

unusual

in which a black anti-machine

Democrat, Harold Washington, mounted a successful challenge
to the machine in a mayoral race.

In the next mayoral elec-

tion, the Republican candidate finished well behind even a
more traditional machine challenger to the incumbent Mayor
Washington. 37
This collusion between the two parties was a recognition of political realities.

Chicago was ethnic,

black,

Catholic and Democratic, while the downstate was white, Protestant, small-town, Republican and conservative.

Downsta-

ters viewed Chicago as a city of sin and corruption.

While

the two areas of the state had conflicting interests, the
two parties were able to satisfy their own interests and to
some extent, those of their constituents. 38
Another change in the postwar political arena was the
decline of Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick's influence
within the Republican party.

Though the Chicago Tribune
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remained a powerful force, it grew steadily out of touch with
the rank and file, especially the younger Republicans.

The

colonel, who had backed Thomas Dewey in 1940 and opposed him
in 1944,

came out for Ohio Senator Robert Taft in 1948,

saying that Dewey could not be elected.

McCormick and his

paper were bitter over the results of the convention, which
it charged was dominated by "America Lasters" and international bankers.

In November, the Tribune, urged voters to

support Republicans, but did not mention Dewey.

In 1952,

McCormick again pushed Taft and refused to swallow General
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was backed by Dewey.

In August,

he encouraged formation of a third party excluding Truman
Democrats and "Me-too" Truman Republicans.

Though the Colo-

nel approved of some of President Eisenhower's actions, his
paper generally was cool toward the Administration.
McCormick died on April 1,
influence for many years.

1955,

Though

his paper reflected his

Not until 1969, did the Tribune,

under new leadership, move toward the political center. 39
The end of the war also brought changes in society.
Blacks made significant gains in employment during the war.
However, many lost their jobs when war plants shut down and
found it difficult to find new ones.

In 1948, the Illinois

Interracial Commission held hearings around the state and
found continued discrimination by employers and employment
agencies, especially against blacks, but also against Mexicans,

Japanese,

Filipinos,

Jews and Catholics.

One firm
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fired all Catholics after the war.
ted to low-grade jobs.

Blacks were often limi-

Newspaper ads specified racial and

religious restrictions in employment.

Even in unionized in-

dustries, blacks often suffered discrimination.

Unions af-

filiated with the AFL were reluctant to accept blacks or
organized them into all-black auxiliary locals.

However,

CIO unions were committed to a policy of nondiscrimination.
This helped blacks secure employment and advancement in mass
production industries such as meat packing and farm equipment. Some companies were also committed to equal employment
opportunities.

International Harvester, which had long em-

ployed blacks, found that CIO unions were a useful ally in
stopping walkouts by whites protesting promotion of blacks.
The United Auto Workers fought for integration of union facilities even in Southern locals which favored segregation.
It was not until the sixties, however,
significant gains.

that blacks scored

The civil rights movement gained the

support of the Democratic Administrations of Presidents John
F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson in ending discrimination in
employment,

public

accomodations,

housing,

education

and

other areas. 40
As with blacks, women were laid off in large numbers
after the war.

Everywhere, proportionately more women were

laid off than men.
turn home.

Others,

In some cases, housewives wanted to rehowever,

wished to continue working.

Many of those laid off from high-paying industrial jobs faced
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the prospect of accepting lower-paying jobs.

In some cases,

they had been trained to do specific tasks, which were not
needed in factories producing civilian goods.
had to be retrained at a lower wage.

Hence, they

Many were unwilling to

accept lower-paying jobs or wished to go back to their old
jobs when the plant reconverted.

Because of dissatisfaction

over pay scales, many chose not to accept the initial job
offers in the postwar period.
relied heavily

In some cases, companies that

on women workers,

faced

labor

shortages.

still, there were far more openings for men than for women.
Also, the jobs available to women were generally in traditional women's occupations.

A woman scanning help wanted

ads in a Chicago newspaper in September,
openings in stores and office work,
jobs.

1945 could find

but very few factory

Eventually, most women were forced to return to white

collar and service occupations open to them before the war.
However, more women continued working than before the war.
In 1940, only 26 percent of American women of working age
were in the labor force.
employment.

In 1970, 40 percent were in paid

More married women with

families

working after the war than before the war.

continued

The income from

work has given women increased independence and status.

It

has also allowed them to escape undesirable marriages, thus
leading to a rise in the divorce rate.

Employment of women

has also led to a decline in the birth rate since many women
curtailed child-bearing in order to pursue careers or jobs. 41
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One of the most significant changes brought by the
war was in the migration of people to war jobs and military
posts in Illinois.

War boom communities like Seneca experi-

enced huge increases in population.

Though many people re-

sented the newcomers, others eventually came to accept them.
The Seneca shipyard attracted workers

from all

over the

country, thus exposing Senecans to different points of view.
Townspeople picked up new ideas, which they put into effect
in the postwar world.

In the summer of 1945, they started

a new Community Club, which promoted civic improvements, including a new bank, road improvements and new recreational
facilities.
tion.

The public library enjoyed increased circula-

New schools were built and new civic groups started.

Seneca, a sleepy rundown town in 1940, was an enterprising
community in 1950. 42
Another result of the migration of workers and servicemen were marriages between migrants and

local women.

Society pages of Chicago newspapers reported an increasing
number of such marriages as the war went on.

Young service-

men were lonely and many women were eager to marry.
marriage boom also brought a baby boom.

The

The first six months

of 1942 saw an increase of 6,621 births in the state.
of these marriages proved unstable and divorces soared.

Many
By

December, 1943, divorces in Sangamon County were 65 percent
of marriages.
marriages.

By July, 1945, Chicago saw more divorces than

In the fall of 1945, one Chicago judge installed
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a nursery just off his courtroom where children played while
their parents 9ot divorced. 43
Reconversion brought substantial changes to Illinois.
Freed of controls, the state's industries expanded to produce civilian goods to satisfy a burgeoning consumer market.
Farmers enjoyed improved living standards fed by record crops
which sold for record prices.

As price controls and ration-

ing eased, labor unions sought wage increases, first to make
up for reductions in take-home pay due to the elimination of
overtime,

but later to offset the rising cost of living.

The end of controls combined with a

burgeoning consumer

market and strike-won increased wages to set off an inflationary spiral which continued until supplies began to meet
demand.

Travel restrictions also were lifted, thus allowing

the public to choose whatever means of conveyance it wanted
to journey from one place to another.

In growing numbers,

it chose the automobile and the airplane and sometimes the
bus, but not the train.

As riders deserted the rails for

other means of transportation, the railroads were forced by
rapidly growing passenger deficits to abandon the business
of carrying people and concentrate on freight,
still profitable.
and barges.

which was

Even then, they lost business to trucks

Though railroads continued to be major players

in the postwar transportation system, their role was considerably diminished even in Illinois.
The postwar era in Illinois was a period of prospe-
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rity and some uncertainty.

Fears of depression haunted the

immediate postwar period,

while

a

perceived threat

communism led to the demise of several radical unions.

from
some

groups, especially organized labor, women and blacks, struggled with varying degrees of success, to preserve and extend
wartime gains.

Politically, the postwar years in Illinois

were a period of change and continuity.

Although the major

wartime political leaders were forced out of office in a wave
of reform, the fifties brought a restoration of a working
arrangement

between

the

Chicago

Democrats

and

downstate

Republicans, which has continued with few interruptions to
the present day.
years

also

The political leadership of the postwar

reflected the

changed outlook of

Illinoisans

toward the role of government in society and the economy and
the nation and their state in the rest of the world.
the war,
Democrats

the New Deal was hotly debated.
strongly

supported

it,

Before

While Chicago

downstate

Republicans

denounced it and farmers were not sure of its merits, though
they like the benefits they received from farm programs.
foreign affairs,

the state was a bastion of isolationism.

The war changed all this.

As early as 1940, isolationism

was becoming less popular among the electorate.
destroyed it.

power

of

The war

The New Deal also gained acceptance,

among Republicans.
the

In

even

The result was a substantial erosion of

Colonel

McCormick

as

voters

rejected

candidates in favor of more progressive leaders.

his
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CONCLUSIONS
The war brought significant changes to Illinois.
once committed to one party, Illinois became a swing state
whose allegiance could no longer be taken for granted by
either party.

During the twenties, the Republicans domina-

ted politics in the state only to lose control to the Democrats in the thirties.

The forties brought a Republican re-

surgence which recaptured the statehouse for the Grand Old
Party, but the Chicago Democratic machine strengthened its
hold on municipal politics.

During the thirties and for-

ties, Colonel Robert Rutherford McCormick, the archconservative owner and publisher of the Chicago Tribune and leader
of the Illinois Republican Party, often cooperated with his
friend,

Chicago Mayor Edward J. Kelly,

political power.

in the division of

While the Democrats focused on municipal

and county races and exerted little effort toward winning
state positions,

Republicans concentrated on winning the

statehouse while conceding Chicago to the Democrats.
arrangement benef itted Colonel McCormick,

This

who secured the

election of his proteges and also helped Mayor Kelly who
gained weak Republican opposition in mayoral campaigns and
also eliminated his most dangerous rivals within his own
party by running them for state off ices in races which they
could

not

win.

The

war

brought
376

further

changes

which
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strengthened the power and prestige of Mayor Kelly, while
eroding the influence of Colonel McCormick within his own
party.

Before the war, Illinois was a stronghold of isola-

tionism and many Illinoisans questioned the New Deal.
the war,

this was no longer the case.

After

Even Republicans

accepted American involvement in world affairs and government intervention in the economy.

Though Colonel McCormick

dominated slatemaking in his party, his candidates were increasingly unsuccessful.

As a result, Governor Dwight Green

forged an alliance with Mayor Kelly in the General Assembly
at least partly to escape the domination of the Colonel. The
division of power between Democratic Chicago and the Republican downstate recognized political realities and benefitted both parties as partisan rivalry gave way to a measure
of bipartisan cooperation.
A key element in the electoral success of the Chicago
Democratic machine was the black community, which converted
to the Democratic Party during the thirties, at least partly
due to Mayor Kelly's policies.

Kelly provided jobs for

blacks and supported desegregation initiatives.
provided work relief projects.
machine arose in the black wards.

After 1939,

The New Deal
a black sub-

The war brought increased

job opportunities and status for blacks as labor shortages
forced many industries to hire blacks for the first time.
Though many blacks lost their jobs after the war, many others
achieved

lasting

gains,

especially

in

mass

production
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industries

organized

by

affiliates

Industrial Organizations.

of

the

More importantly,

Congress

of

the wartime

gains helped set the stage for the civil rights movement of
the postwar era.
Women also gained increased employment opportunities
during the war.

Though most lost their high-paying jobs in

war plants after the war, many stayed in the work place.
There had been some employed outside the home before the war,
but never in such numbers.

After the war, many more women

continued working albeit in poorly-paid occupations traditionally open to women.

Moreover, as with blacks, war-time

experiences ultimately led to the womens' liberation movement
of the sixties and seventies.
Labor itself benefitted a great deal from the war as
the crush of business made industries reluctant to fire experienced personnel for union activity.

Hence, many compa-

nies were forced by wartime conditions to accept unionization.

The war also brought a temporary measure of labor

peace as both labor and management agreed to abide by decisions of the War Labor Board in those disputes which they
could not resolve themselves.

Labor also agreed to a no-

strike pledge while management reluctantly accepted union
security.

Neither labor nor management was enthusiastic

about wage stabilization.

Labor wished to increase the wages

of its membership, while management sought to attract and
retain workers.

However, they accepted wage stabilization
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in exchange for price control as part of a general program
for controlling inflation.

Even with restrictions on income,

most workers prospered during the war and improved their
economic status.

Ultimately, their earnings and their pent-

up demand for consumer products unobtainable during the war
contributed to the postwar economic expansion.
Illinois industry profitted from the defense buildup
and the war emergency with the vastly increased volume of
business.

Not only did the war bring industry out of a De-

pression, but business activity in the postwar years continued at a higher level than before the war.
companies sometimes

found

Though small

it difficult to get contracts,

almost every firm, large or small, made something for use by
the armed forces of the United States and its allies.
many

firms

produced

items

similar to what

While

they made

in

peacetime, others built tanks, artillery and small warships.
Many manufacturers had to retool and adapt to stringent military specifications.

Businessmen also cooperated with each

other and with government agencies in dealing with problems
of

priorities,

shortages

of

materials

protection and solicitation of business.

and

tools,

plant

Wartime conditions

f creed Illinois industries to be more versatile and gave them
experience which proved useful in the postwar period when
many introduced new product lines and improved existing ones.
The war increased the state's industrial base and the size
of many individual firms.

It also changed the character of
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the state's industries.

Machinery and heavy industry grew

in proportion to food processing and other trades.
Although the war did not bring any major technological changes in agriculture, it greatly speeded up existing
Walter Wilcox,

trends.

in his study of the effect of the

war on agriculture, maintains that the war increased mechanization and farm size and made farmers more market-minded.
The thirties and forties saw great progress in mechanizing
farms throughout the nation.

The increase was greatest in

the West, but also outstanding in the Midwest.

During the

war, shortages of farm equipment retarded mechanization for
a time, but as manufacturers resumed partial production of
farm implements late in the war,
pace.

it proceeded at a faster

Mechanization relieved labor shortages and made it

possible to farm more land.

This was especially important

as many farmers were forced into retirement by the shortage
of farm workers.

Their lands were sold to other farmers, who

increased the size of their own farms.

Thus mechanization

and the shortage of farm labor increased the tendency toward
fewer and larger farms.

Such farmers were more inclined

toward market-based agriculture than subsistance farming.
While such trends were already underway in Illinois before
the war,
tions.

they were greatly excellerated by wartime condiThe war also speeded up the growth of the soybean

industry as soybeans came to rival corn.
of labor, equipment,

feed,

Despite shortages

storage facilities and freight
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cars for shipping their produce, Illinois farmers broke alltime production records on many crops.
held down profits,

most

status during the war.

farmers

Though price ceilings

improved their economic

The war brought Illinois agriculture

out of a long Depression and into a period of prosperity that
continued in the postwar years. 1
As with agriculture, there were no major technological changes in the nation's transportation system during the
war, but it did have to carry a much heavier load with fewer
workers and insufficient equipment to do the job.

To handle

this burden, carriers had to cease competitive practices and
cooperate with each other and with shippers and government
agencies to speed shipments and travelers to their destinations.
Due to its geographical location and its importance
as a major transportation crossroads, Illinois and its carriers bore a major share of the burden of transporting the
traveling public and the output of the nation's mills, mines
and farms.

At that time, the railroads dominated freight

transportation and intercity common-carrier passenger travel,
but even before the war, highway, water and air carriers were
capturing much business previously handled by rail.

The war

retarded and even reversed this trend, but the shift resumed
as the war ended.

Indeed airline traffic grew rapidly in the

final years of the war.
airport

construction

Illinois
after

the

embarked on a program of
war

and

Governor

Green
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established a Department of Aeronautics.

Illinois continues

as a major transportation crossroads today, but in highway,
air and water transport as well as railroads. 2
Government at all levels played a major role in directing the mobilization of the economy and society to bring
the war to a successful conclusion.

This vast expansion of

government power was temporary, however, and even then it
depended on a good deal of cooperation between different
levels of government as well as business, labor and the general public.

Also,

many programs such as the War Labor

Board relied on voluntary compliance while local administration was handled by volunteers.

There was no despotism.

Though the nation accepted some temporary restrictions on
its liberties, it remained a democracy. 3
Much of the experience of Illinois in the Second World
War was replicated in other parts of the nation.
there was much that was different.

And yet

The boomtown conditions

of Seneca, Wilmington and other communities were echoed in
Willow Run,
certainly,

Michigan and other towns around the country.
the

inconvenience and deprivation produced by

price control and rationing was universal.
nois,

as

a

farm

state,

was

not

only a

However, Illiconsumer,

but

a

supplier of black markets, especially in meat.
In agriculture, the growth of mechanization and farm
size were a nationwide phenomenon as farmers sought to cope
with severe labor shortages.

However, the West relied much
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more heavily on imported Mexican workers than did Illinois,
which,

like other Midwestern and Eastern states,

utilized

local labor, especially draft-exempt farm workers.

Illinois

also made extensive use of city-dwellers, especially school
children, some troops from military posts, prisoners-of-war
and imported workers from the West Indies.
differed in the nature of its crops.

Illinois also

Illinois was a Corn

Belt state, but soybeans became a significant crop.

Even

today, Decatur, Illinois remains the capital of the soybean
industry. 4
Gerald D.

Nash,

in The American West Transformed,

described the tremendous impact of the war in changing the
West from a supplier of raw materials for use by industrial
consumers back East to an industrial center in its own right.
Alan

Clive,

however,

in

his

study

of

the

home front

in

Michigan, found that the war did not bring Michigan out of
its dependence on the auto

industry.

Illinois,

did not

undergo such a massive transformation as did the West, but
it already had a much more diversified industrial base than
did Michigan or other one-industry states.

The war brought

an increase in industries producing machinery,
equipment and other capital goods.

electrical

Such industries came to

represent a larger proportion of the state's industries as
compared to food processing and other industries.
continues.

Today,

The trend

the Stockyards are virtually extinct,

while Motorola, Sundstrand and other firms loom large in the
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industrial economy of Illinois.

Some political and business

leaders expected that the aviation engine plants and the
aircraft factory in Chicago would lead to the emergence of
Chicago as a

major aircraft manufacturing center in the

postwar period.

This

did

not

transpire.

The

aircraft

industry was already well established on the West Coast, some
other states west of the Mississippi River and on the East
Coast.

During the war, the West gained additional aircraft

plants financed by the federal government.

With plenty of

postwar capacity, the aircraft industry had no need for the
Chicago

engine

plants,

which

were

actually

operated

by

automobile companies, or the Douglas Aircraft Company plant
in Park Ridge, which was built of wood to conserve steel.
Hence, the Chicago and Park Ridge plants closed after the war
and converted to other uses as did ordnance plants and other
war industries. 5
In

transportation,

however,

Illinois

was

unique.

Unlike most states, which were served by only a few major
transportation arteries or were simply points of origin or
terminals, Illinois was the crossroads of the nation.

Due

to the state's geographical location, most east-west and much
of the north-south traffic of any kind went through Illinois.
Hence,

Illinois played a much bigger role than any other

state in the Union in transporting the nation's goods and
travelers during the war, and felt the burdens of wartime
traffic and restrictions to a much greater degree.
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Illinois was also unique in its labor relations.
unions themselves were part of national movements,

The
which

found fertile ground for organizing new locals in the state's
mills,

mines

and

factories.

During the war,

labor

and

management throughout the nation generally cooperated with
the National War Labor in its efforts to resolve industrial
disputes.

However, Illinois furnished significant dissenters

such as Sewell Avery and George P. McNear, who defied the
government in their refusal to deal with unions.

John L.

Lewis battled with the government, the companies and rival
unions in the coal fields of Illinois.
company,

International

Harvester,

It was an Illinois

which

promoted

company

unions as a means of thwarting traditional trade unions.
Even after, they were outlawed, the company continued the
works councils under various guises and even turned to the
AFL to keep out the CIO.

Other Illinois firms tried similar

tactics on a smaller scale even during the war.
The introduction of blacks and women into occupations
traditionally reserved for white males was also a nationwide
development.

In

Detroit,

Michigan,

whites

staged

strikes to protest increased employment of blacks.

hate

Phila-

delphia transit workers struck to avoid employment of blacks
on streetcars.

White shipyard workers in Mobile, Alabama

started

riot

workers.

a

race

to

protest

the

upgrading

In Illinois, the record was mixed.

of

black

In East Alton,

community opposition prevented the integration of the Western
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Cartridge plant.

However, there were very few walkouts in

war plants around the state over employment or upgrading of
blacks and all that occurred were short-lived. 6
Illinois also avoided the race riots that hit Detroit,
Los Angeles, New York and other cities.

In Chicago, Mayor

Kelly's firm response in quelling any racial incidents kept
them from developing into riots.

Not until after the war,

when Kelly's power was on the wane did Chicago experience the
racial conflicts that afflicted other cities.
The war affected local communities in different ways.
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Chicago industrial area gained somewhat in population, but the
labor force was much bigger than in peacetime.

Employment

gained significantly, especially in manufacturing.

Expan-

sion of industrial facilities was larger than in any other
area of the country.

The value of industrial production in

1945 was almost three times the 1939 amount. 7
Seneca, like other boomtowns, had a different experience.

Seneca did gain a few lasting civic improvements,

including new schools and sewer facilities.

However,

biggest change was in the attitudes of local people.

the

Migra-

tion of workers from other parts of the country to work in
the shipyard exposed Senecans to different points of view.
After the war, the community was much more energetic in solving local problems and its citizens were more open to the
world around them. 8
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Changes in attitudes were probably the most significant

result

of

the

war.

Illinois's

ethnicity

and

its

position in the center of the country influenced its support
for isolationism in the thirties and early forties.

Chicago

had a very large German, Irish and Italian population, which
was hostile toward intervention in the European war, especially on the

side

of

the

British.

Also,

the

distance from the sea gave it a sense of security.
felt

state's
Illinois

safe from attack no matter what happened along the

coast.

Indeed, Illinois business and civic leaders pointed

to the state's distance from the coast when lobbying for
defense industries, arguing that war plants in Illinois would
be more safe from attack than those on the coast.

After

Pearl Harbor, Illinois, like many other states, took action
to guard against air attack.

However,

there was

little

danger of such attacks due to the limited range or enemy
aircraft,

and the defensive measures were discontinued by

early 1944, thereby reinforcing a sense of security. 9
However, Illinois became less isolationist during the
war.

By 1945, most Illinoisans accepted the need for some

measure of international cooperation after the war.

They

also were of the role of their state in the nation and the
world as a whole.

Illinoisans were more outward-looking.

Mayor Kelly and other officials flew from Chicago to Europe
late

in

1945

to

promote

service from Chicago.

trade

and

direct

transatlantic

Illinois firms such as International
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Harvester

and

John

Deere

sought

new markets

and

plants

overseas. 10
The

war

brought

domestic policy.

a

new

consensus

in

foreign

and

In his study of the homefront during the

Second World War, Richard Polenberg notes that the issues of
American

intervention

in

world

affairs

and

government

intervention in the economy were undecided in 1941.

By 1945,

even Republicans accepted them and merely quibbled about the
dimensions of intervention in workd affairs and the extent
of the welfare state.

Although some New Deal programs were

killed by the war, others survived intact to play a role in
the war effort.
a New Deal format.

Indeed, war agencies themselves reflected
While the war ended the relief aspect of

the New Deal, it strengthened the role of government in the
economy.

Colonel McCormick continued to voice a conservative

nationalist opposition to these developments, but even within
his own party, he came to be seen as the voice of the past.
The future lay with more progressive leaders of both parties. 11
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